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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Ryan Jamil Jonna 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Sociology 
 
June 2013 
 
Title: Toward a Political-Economic Sociology of Unemployment: Renewing the Classical 
Reserve Army Perspective 
 
 
The following study is concerned with the problems posed by contemporary 
unemployment—especially the U.S. but also globally to some extent. The most 
immediate problem is the dominance of neoclassical models, which routinely neglect the 
deeper issues raised by contemporary mass unemployment. To go beyond these 
inadequacies, the study also assesses the performance of sociological interpretations. One 
key finding is that sociological analyses also largely fail to provide a compelling theory 
of unemployment and, moreover, that most perspectives implicitly adopt problematic 
assumptions from neoclassical economics. This highlights the dual nature of the problems 
posed by unemployment: on one hand, it is an urgent social issue; and, on the other hand, 
it exemplifies significant weakness within most sociological paradigms. 
In order to address the challenges posed by unemployment, the narrative centers on 
the resolution of three key anomalies of unemployment: 1) persistent unemployment; 2) 
so-called “jobless recoveries;” and 3) the rise of worker precariousness. The anomalies 
 v 
are taken as evidence of paradigmatic contradictions within neoclassical economics and, 
to some extent, sociology. 
The main theoretical contribution of the study is a careful reconstruction of Marx’s 
classical theory of the reserve army of labor (part of “The General Law of 
Accumulation”), which has inspired all critical sociological perspectives on labor markets 
to date. The investigation highlights distinctive characteristics of “political-economic 
sociology,” a term that refers to economic sociologists who draw heavily on notions of 
class and power reminiscent of classical political economy and classical sociology, 
forming an important bridge with heterodox economic approaches.  
The theory of the reserve army is in need of “renewal,” however, because even 
political-economic sociologist have failed to carry the analysis forward and build upon 
the firm foundation provided by Marx. The study’s conclusion is that the reserve army 
framework has enormous potential to strengthen existing work within political-economic 
sociology. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A. Occupy and the ‘New Normal’ 
In October of 2011 work on this dissertation stopped abruptly and unexpectedly for 
about 8 months when I was swept up in an “Occupy” encampment in Eugene, OR.1 The 
decision to ignore entirely my writing regimen and organize with Occupy instead was not 
a difficult one to make even though I was on schedule to defend the upcoming fall. More 
than three years after the Great Financial Crisis of 2007-08 the unemployment rate had 
barely moved, the financiers had not only been bailed out but were being given even 
more power and the news media was preparing workers to accept a “new normal” 
unemployment rate somewhere between 7 and 8 percent (Weidner and Williams 2011; 
Madigan 2010). “The ‘new normal,’ as it has come to be called on Wall Street, academia 
and CNBC,” one commentator explained, “envisions an economy in which growth is too 
slow to bring down the unemployment rate, while the government is forced to intervene 
ever more forcefully in a struggling private sector. Stocks and bonds yield paltry returns, 
with better opportunities available for investors overseas” (Schwartz 2010). 
These portents have proven correct. Having followed the business press, filing away 
article after painful article on the economic, social and psychological impacts of 
1 Occupy Eugene (“Occupy,” hereafter), as our local movement was called, was part of 
the nationwide movement stimulated by the September 17, 2011 occupation of Zucotti 
Park on Wall Street in New York City. 
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unemployment it became more and more difficult to hide myself away writing with the 
knowledge that thousands within the small town of Eugene alone would have their lives 
turned to ruin. A much darker fate was falling upon those in my home state of Michigan, 
where the strongly disproportionate racial impacts (upon mostly black and Latino(a) 
minorities) reflective of the nation as a whole, were painfully evident. For the vast 
majority of the long-term unemployed, confidence and skills steadily erode; 
“marketability” declines precipitously due to widespread and perfectly legal 
discrimination (Editors 2013); family ties strain; and health deteriorates (Dooley and 
Prause 2004; S. J. Davis and Wachter 2011; Borie-Holtz, Van Horn, and Zukin 2010). 
Whether it was a friend, a friend of a friend, or just someone panhandling on a corner, I 
could not ward off a deep because my research indicated that the problem of 
unemployment, dire as it was, would likely worsen. I was also frustrated. Here I was 
intensely researching unemployment during the birth of a movement focused on 
unemployment and economic justice, yet I was not sharing my analysis with others—
analysis that was intended specifically to clarify the issues at hand and help guide efforts 
to resist. Occupy was therefore not only a surprise: it was an enormous and welcome 
relief. 
I often joked to people who asked about my experience in Occupy that I learned more 
about my community in Eugene in eight short weeks than the whole of the previous 10 
years. Part of my insularity undoubtedly had to do with being nestled away in the ivory 
tower but I had found plenty of opportunities to engage with the broader community in 
the past. The difference was that participants in Occupy were engaged in struggle as a 
community, not simply as consumers or a mélange of identities. Of course, uprisings of 
  3                      
this sort occur with unfortunate rarity in the U.S., and what we were doing could hardly 
be described as a “movement” in those early days, particularly because so much energy 
was required simply to see and hear each other openly, with patience and 
understanding—and without suspicion. 
Even if the enormous amount of organizing energy necessary to forge solidarity and 
discipline had been available in excess at the start of Occupy, it would have dissipated 
before leaving hardly a trace shortly after the 24/7 encampments began. Within hours an 
effervescent mixture of street kids, recent evictees, jobless ex cons, war veterans, 
panhandlers, drug addicts and mentally ill (or combination thereof)—collectively referred 
to as the “unhoused” (at least in Eugene), and which largely corresponded to the 
“pauperized” layer of the reserve army of labor in Marx’s terminology (see Chapter 
VII.C.4)—descended with enormous weight upon Occupy encampments across the 
country. These individuals did not have the “privilege” of being categorized as 
“unemployed” by the state—for the latter group there was at least some pittance available 
for a period of time. As in most U.S. cities, the only thing the unhoused got for free was a 
bus pass to leave town and incessant harassment from police. 
Straining to accommodate this new group of Occupiers, the social service function of 
Occupy immediately came into conflict with its broad movement demands. However, it 
was not simply the scale of human tragedy in the form of the unhoused that early plagued 
the Occupy uprising. Inculcated with the dominant liberal individualist ideology of 
capitalism, a large number of well intentioned Occupy activists were strongly prejudiced 
toward one or all segments of the unhoused. This came out in a number of ways but the 
intolerance reached its peak when a significant number of “housies” (the derogatory term 
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coined by the unhoused for Occupiers with homes) proposed to restrict entry into the 
encampments by permanently removing “non-activists”—aka, the “unhoused.” The 
proposal was defeated but Occupiers never bridged the rift it created. Despite the tumult, 
the encampment had up to this point remained an impressively vibrant center of 
organizing, education, social service projects and the fulcrum of several impressive cross-
issue collaborations. Nonetheless, Occupiers began to polarize strongly. 
As a fierce proponent of solidarity across racial, sexual, ethnic and class lines, I 
fought as hard as possible to prevent the divide from widening. Even though a segment of 
the local media displayed a surprising amount of deference and even encouragement, at 
least with respect to its typical behavior toward progressive movements, public support 
rapidly turned to derision as Occupiers pushed the issues of the unhoused to the forefront. 
Occupiers generated hundreds of compelling video, audio and written accounts of the 
lives of the unhoused, clearly revealing systematic barriers that only the poorest members 
of the community had the misfortune to confront. Around this time I wrote a guest 
editorial for the local paper2 that attempted to contextualize the problems of the 
unhoused, and appeal directly to the activists and community members estranged by 
Occupy’s support for the cause of the unhoused. Yet this and numerous similar efforts 
were met by some of the most vicious attacks on the poor I have ever witnessed. These 
attacks were not limited to the cyber sphere, they reached unhoused Occupiers directly at 
our final encampment site in Eugene. 
                                                
 
2 “Occupy Eugene Isn’t Just a Protest, It’s a New Community.” Register-Guard (Dec. 12, 
2011). 
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B. A Moment of Dignity 
After moving hundreds of people and thousands of pounds of supplies and equipment 
four times in as many weeks, the occupation rooted strongly at Washington/Jefferson 
Park. This was not so much a “park” as it was the necessary architectural byproduct of 
the two largest overpasses in Eugene, beneath which lay a small, grassy area bordered on 
all sides by busy roads and virtually abandoned but for the occasional drug transaction. 
Its central location ensured that the Washington/Jefferson encampment received 
relatively constant media attention—which grew progressively more negative as the days 
ticked on and protests and lockdowns sprang up with increasing regularity around town. 
With some help from a few housies a large group of unhoused Occupiers organized, 
created a set of community agreements, and made an admirable effort to undermine 
criticisms of the site by keeping the encampment free of drugs and violence, and 
addressing the local media. Nonetheless, city residents expressed their scorn by honking 
incessantly and hurling insults—the favorite being, “Get a job you hippies!”—during the 
early morning traffic rush, making it impossible for people staying at the encampment to 
get the most essential of requirements for healthy psychological functioning: rest. 
Within days this situation came up for discussion at a “community conversation”—an 
event created by Occupy to encourage community involvement and address concerns 
about the encampment. As a response to the ill treatment by morning commuters, an 
occupier explained that he had been interviewing people at the site about their former 
employment. He discovered that many of them had only recently become unemployed 
and possessed a wide range of skills—from carpenters, roofers, and engineers to teachers, 
cooks, and cleaners. He decided to put in a financial request for “signs…on laminated 
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card stock with ground stick.” The idea was to make “help available” signs listing the 
skills of each person staying at the site, with their phone number at the bottom.3 He 
carried out the plan and eventually lined the streets surrounding Washington/Jefferson 
with dozens of “help available” signs. The early morning honking and yelling stopped the 
next day and Occupiers at the encampment reveled in a moment of dignity—fought for, 
and won, on their own. 
To my knowledge none of the Occupiers got hired for any work—there was clearly 
none to be had. The Occupiers were not naïve; they knew it was highly unlikely they 
would get any calls given the extent of underemployment and hidden unemployment. To 
most people I spoke with it was quite enough that our comrade’s idea was a public 
relations coup; at most, it represented a potential model upon which to build a local 
system of work sharing or worker’s cooperatives. Naturally the significance of the whole 
event went much deeper for me. 
C. Contradictions of Joblessness 
We had come up with an ingenious response to the cruel behavior of the commuters 
but the idea encouraged me also to think much more critically about my own work and 
how it could help. I realized that even if, hypothetically, the Occupiers took the logical 
next step of, for example, pressuring the city council to create some decent jobs, the 
tensions between employed and unemployed would resurface, and to a much more 
                                                
 
3 The community conversation occurred on December 5, 2011 at Harris Hall; Ronnie 
Jeffrey, the occupier that came up with the idea, formed a committee, “Get a Job, Share 
Skills,” and started to make signs a few days later. The quote is taken from a finance 
committee financial request report email from Jeffrey dated December 7. The University 
of Oregon Library’s Special Collections department began archiving materials like these 
within weeks of the start of the occupation. 
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intense degree. For Occupiers even to begin such a campaign it would be necessary to 
develop a deep and penetrating critique of the existing system of employment, as well as 
the origins and dynamics of unemployment. Next, it would be essential to forge virtually 
unbreakable links between the jobless and employed—rooted not only within unions, but 
across professional organizations, occupational and industrial groups, neighborhoods and 
cities, and even within and across nations. These potentially insurmountable difficulties 
would inevitably arise because the whole system of employment hinged upon 
competition between workers; and the requirements of growth further necessitated the 
existence, at all times, of an enormous layer of underemployed and unemployed 
humans—what Marx had called “a reserve army of labor.” I was organizing with the 
reserve army of labor. 
In terms of strategy, I could hardly think of a more appropriate goal than abolishing 
the reserve army. In fact, whenever I was asked to speak I subtly pushed the idea by 
arguing for a statewide jobs campaign—jobs as a right. The impressive extent to which 
Occupy seemed to provide a foundation for building cross-issue movements certainly 
heightened my expectations and excitement about a jobs campaign. After thinking 
through possible courses of action more critically in response to our comrade’s clever act 
of defiance, however, I was no longer confused about why the jobs campaign failed to 
garner any serious interest. To articulate a strategic focus with regard to a problem as 
fundamental as unemployment, it would be necessary to address coherently a set of 
contradictions broadly extending from the dynamics of the macroeconomy to the 
evolution of the labor process, and even to the history of the wage labor relationship 
itself. Part of the problem was that my analysis of unemployment was still largely 
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underdeveloped theoretically. In addition, the economic system itself was in a deep stage 
of crisis that was causing an acceleration of key processes governing employment and 
unemployment. This meant that existing contradictions, such as the internationalization 
of production, were further intensifying. Yet the system was also rapidly generating new 
contradictions, like financialization, with far reaching effects on employment relations. 
Consequently, I concluded that it was impossible for me to develop a clear strategy 
around joblessness within Occupy at the time. Of course, as mentioned above, there were 
many other limitations inherent to the movement itself, but I became convinced that an 
analysis of joblessness sophisticated enough to grapple with new and existing issues 
would be essential to make the stated goals of Occupy a reality. In order to advance 
strategic organizing around these issues people needed vocabulary and concepts that were 
simply unavailable to them—neither the media nor their education would be any help.  
Unsurprisingly, these realizations inspired me to return to my dissertation research 
with renewed vigor. It was exciting to identify several new and important issues, but I 
had still not even fully addressed several existing barriers. The most significant of the 
latter was undoubtedly that “a sociology of unemployment” was simply non-existent. In 
other words, there was literally no basis upon which to build a comprehensive 
sociological theory of unemployment. I was even more surprised to find that even the 
more critical traditions existing on the margins of sociology and economics lacked a 
comprehensive analysis of unemployment, especially in its macroeconomic dimensions. 
This helped to explain my realization that our whole understanding of the problem of 
unemployment was woefully inadequate; it also meant I had no place to start, which was 
a serious problem. There was obviously no justification for restricting attention to the 
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newest or most popular phenomena linked to unemployment—such as financialization. It 
was also pointless to launch a critique within economics proper since the Great Financial 
Crisis of 2007-08 completely undermined the validity of the dominant economic theories 
of unemployment—economists themselves conducted the autopsy. Moreover, it seemed 
totally inappropriate to ignore the more fundamental contradictions that had surfaced. 
How could it be that social scientists as a whole had largely failed to provide a coherent 
analysis of unemployment, let alone give the problem adequate attention (outside of 
mainstream economics)? 
D. Systematizing the Analysis 
The contradictions expressed above obviously placed a number of conditions on the 
present study. In response to the challenges, I have tried to systematize the analysis, 
focusing attention on problems that assert logical priority while anticipating the need for 
additional study in several key areas. The central goal is to begin building an analysis of 
unemployment upon entirely new foundations, anchored within classical sociological 
theory. An important advantage of this method is that it allows me to address the 
deafening silence on unemployment within sociology positively, by focusing on the 
power and relevance of a sociology theory located squarely within the classical canon yet 
entirely independent of mainstream economics: Marx’s general law of accumulation. 
Marx’s general law proves to be an extraordinarily powerful lens through which to 
analyze unemployment, and offers numerous opportunities to assess and integrate the 
work of a broad range of dissident sociologists, economists and political scientists. 
In building upon Marx’s general law I am adopting a paradigm that is completely 
incompatible with the existing, dominant paradigm of neoclassical economics. In this 
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situation it was natural to highlight aspects of unemployment that manifest as scientific 
anomalies within the neoclassical paradigm. I identified persistent unemployment, 
“jobless recoveries,” and worker precariousness as the most salient anomalies. The 
narrative is guided by an investigation into these anomalies, revealing that they are not 
anomalous at all when viewed through a different paradigmatic lens. 
Several important and relevant problems are necessarily left out or only discussed in 
passing and two of these deserve explicit mention due to their importance to the overall 
analysis: the origins of wage labor and the general theory of wages. The problem of the 
origins of wage labor is especially relevant to my discussion of the latent surplus 
population (Chapter VII.C.2), which implicitly assumes an historical process of primitive 
accumulation—or “Original Expropriation” in Marx’s more apt phrasing (1976, 13, book 
2)—working in the background. However, the necessary, self-imposed limitations of the 
present study kept me from a full exposition of Marx’s analysis in this respect. There is 
no attempt here to account for the historical origins of wage labor. Needless to say, 
“employment” under conditions of monopoly capital hardly represents an unproblematic 
solution to “unemployment” (on this point, see Illich 1978). The root problem lies in the 
separation of workers from the means of production. 
Likewise, in the discussion of the general law itself (Chapter VII.A) there are 
numerous references to wage levels and wage rates. However, neither here, nor later in 
the analysis when I introduce the problems of monopoly (Chapter VIII.B), do I provide a 
theory of the determination of wages. As is well known, Marx himself never lived to 
write his projected volume on Wage Labour and to the extent that such a classical theory 
of wages could be said to exist it has to be altered significantly to account for the rise of 
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monopoly (see Chapter VIII.B.2). Recent work on this problem is quite promising—see, 
for example, Foster (2012) and Baran and Sweezy (2012). 
Lastly, what contemporary social movements have taught us is that a truly 
comprehensive theory would have to address the real working class, consisting today 
preponderantly of women and people of color (“minorities” in advanced capitalism). As 
the example of “Rosie the Riveter” in the 1940s (discussed briefly in this thesis) and the 
phenomenon of the “new Jim Crow” today suggest (Alexander 2011), a complete 
analysis of the reserve army has to embrace issues of gender and race—more fully than I 
was able to do here. 
This thesis is then just a beginning. It is an attempt to demonstrate the shallowness 
and futility of the dominant neoclassical economic conception of unemployment (also 
prevailing in economic sociology) and the superiority of a wider, more radical perception 
of unemployment, building on Marx’s industrial reserve army of labor conception. The 
approach here is classical, in the sense of relying on Marx, but it is no less radical and 
forward-looking, since it is grounded as well in insights derived from the Occupy 
movement and the recognition that the unemployed, the “precariat,” the impoverished, 
and the homeless, represent a large and growing part of the 99 percent: “Those in 
darkness, out of sight.” (Bertolt Brecht, The Threepenny Opera, as translated in 
Braverman 1998, 1) 
12 
CHAPTER II 
UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE GREAT FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2007-08 
The severity of the Great Financial Crisis of 2007-08, and the ensuing Great 
Recession of 2007-2009 (Foster and McChesney 2012; Harvey 2010a; Krugman 2012a),4 
painfully exposed the problem of mass unemployment. Nearly six years on, the 
unemployment rate has hardly budged in the U.S. while it has skyrocketed around the 
world. Developed countries in particular have focused considerable attention on 
unemployment as a barrage of reporters and analysts, fueled by the persistence and 
severity of the crisis, have routinely questioned the conventional wisdom (Rothstein 
2012; Krugman 2012b; Romero 2012). Indeed, the majority of mainstream economists 
were blindsided by the Great Financial Crisis, and this not only exposed an incapacity to 
explain the severity of the downturn and hence the level of recession-induced 
unemployment (Krugman 2012b), but, more fundamentally, the existence and persistence 
of chronic conditions of unemployment and underemployment. This can be attributed in 
part to the short time horizon of many economic models, which in this case go no further 
than the bursting of the housing bubble (Palley 2012, 26). Analyses typically focus on 
business cycles—assumed to have a logic external to economic theory proper, but that 
can be tamed—to the neglect of long-term and cumulative problems like stagnating 
growth and secular unemployment (F. Magdoff and Magdoff 2004; Cowen 2011, 5-6; Du 
4 The “Great Financial Crisis” instigated the “Great Recession.” 
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Boff 1977a). Yet, despite the fact that the sheer scale of the crisis—and the utter failure 
of key regulatory institutions to prevent widespread illegality—shook the faith of many 
economists deeply (Delong 2011), the contradictions made visible by the crisis continue 
to increase.  
Economies may recover from slumps (Cronin 2011); productivity may increase 
(Fleck, Glaser, and Sprague 2011); multinational corporations may be flush with cash due 
to record profits (Fleischer 2012; Casselman and Lahart 2011; I. McDonald 2006; 
Linebaugh 2013); interest rates may crash through the floor; and real wages may drop or 
even stagnate entirely (Hansen 2005; ILO 2010; Uchitelle 2011): yet still capitalist 
economies appear less and less able to absorb the available workforce for any significant 
period of time. At the time of this writing, the crisis of jobs has developed into a 
persistent global phenomenon racking nations along the entire spectrum of wealth (but 
disproportionately so, as usual). Meanwhile, odd-sounding phenomena like “sticky 
wages,” “stiff labor markets,” etc., seem to indicate little more than an accumulation of 
paradoxes (Adler 2009).5 
A. The Importance of Unemployment 
In this context, the assessment of social scientific explanations of critically important 
social problems like unemployment is not simply convenient, but essential. Yet there is 
                                                
 
5 It is worth noting that economic paradoxes of this sort often form the subtext for 
prejudicial, and often xenophobic, stereotypes. For example, the suggestion that Greek 
workers are lazy, and that this is the root cause of the economic crisis and need for a 
bailout, has no factual basis whatsoever (C. McDonald 2012). The fact that such 
nonsense still litters the communication waves underscores not only the failure to explain 
economic crises adequately, but also how the problematic assumptions of economists 
consistently work their way into mainstream discussions when left unchallenged. 
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hardly any sign of new theoretical innovations on this question. What one observes 
instead is an uptick in bickering across the narrow divide within mainstream economics, 
and the repeated failure of one narrow explanation after another when confronted with 
simple descriptive data. Most disconcerting is the fact that economists have somehow 
managed to maintain their monopoly over the analysis of unemployment in spite of these 
weaknesses. 
1. Paradigmatic Significance 
It should come as no surprise that while the motivation of the present study is, indeed, 
to be found in the crisis of unemployment, theoretical priorities extend beyond provision 
of yet another explanation of the present incarnation of mass unemployment. From our 
standpoint, the increasing extent to which persistent unemployment and 
underemployment contradict the “accepted model or pattern” of mainstream economics 
indicates an inability to account adequately for urgent social scientific anomalies (Kuhn 
1996, 23). As both Kuhn and Lakatos argue, research traditions are always confronted 
with an assortment of unexplained facts, but the coherence of a paradigm cannot be 
maintained by choosing haphazardly among them. A genuine anomaly is distinguished by 
its paradigmatic or theoretical priority. Accordingly, we argue that the persistence, 
growth and diffusion of unemployment represents a genuine social scientific anomaly 
that logically asserts its theoretical priority, and necessarily raises paradigm-challenging 
questions (Kuhn 1996, 62; Lakatos 1989, 49-52). 
The readily observable stagnation of theories of employment is indicative of what 
Lakatos (1989, 31-7) termed a “degenerative shift” in the research program of 
neoclassical economics—a shift we return to below in our discussion of Keynesianism. 
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From our standpoint the question of whether the standard economic approach to 
employment can account for the “ocean of anomalies” (Lakatos 1989, 50) surrounding 
unemployment has largely been settled in the negative. This does not mean that we make 
this judgment on the basis of unemployment alone,6 or that we find it acceptable to ignore 
mainstream economics entirely. However, no more than a cursory assessment of the 
evidence is required to reach the conclusion that classical sociological approaches offer a 
much firmer foundation upon which to build a realistic theory of unemployment—and 
our energies are directed accordingly. 
2. Practical and Theoretical Significance 
Apart from its obvious status as an urgent social issue, the significance of 
unemployment in the present analysis arises from the fact that 1) it represents a classic 
political-economic contradiction of capitalism, thus providing a basis to develop a 
classical sociological interpretation; and 2) it is a contradiction that necessarily penetrates 
the boundary between economics and sociology. The latter intersection is especially 
significant to our analysis. If we are correct in arguing that the classical foundations of 
sociological theory are more than adequate to resolve the anomalies of unemployment 
there is no justification for absolving contemporary sociology of its own paradigmatic 
failure with regard to unemployment. Thus, by extension, we argue that it is precisely the 
interpenetration of neoclassical economics and sociology (in the case of the U.S.) that 
                                                
 
6 A critic within the discipline itself argued long ago that economics “is based on an 
epistemology, or method of establishing the validity of its knowledge claims, that runs 
counter to the norms of science” (Eichner 1985, 427); and a more recent assessment 
concluded that the shift from marginalist to neoclassical theory marked “a complete 
withdrawal from the scientific method” (Varoufakis, Halevi, and Theocaraki 2011, 154). 
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represents a significant hurdle to the development of a truly independent sociological 
theory of unemployment. 
3. The Reserve Army and Political-Economic Sociology 
In response to the inadequacies of existing formulations of the problem of 
unemployment we argue that a return to Marx’s classical theory of the “reserve army of 
labor”7 is indispensible. While a number of important sociological studies have 
contributed to our understanding of unemployment, the approach developed here differs 
fundamentally from existing work by attempting explicitly to reintegrate macroeconomic 
theory into sociological analysis in building on “The General Law of Accumulation” 
(hereafter, “general law”) developed by Marx, which centers on the reserve army of 
labor. There is a long history of sociological engagement with Marx’s reserve army 
approach. Indeed, in many ways it defined a distinct subset of research we identify as 
“political-economic sociology,” which refers to economic sociologists who draw heavily 
on notions of class and power reminiscent of classical political economy and classical 
sociology, forming an important bridge with heterodox economic approaches. The 
political-economic and sociological perspectives on labor markets that emerged in the 
                                                
 
7 Denning has argued that “reserve army” has become a less useful metaphor because it 
constructs the growing mass of “wageless” humans—i.e., “those without wages, those 
indeed without even the hope of wage” (2010, 79)—as one-sided. The concern is that the 
reserve army makes reference to an old form of the accumulation process, while that of 
today has taken a more and more insidious form. We retain the use of the term for at least 
two reasons. First, it makes little sense to restrict the application of the reserve army to a 
specific phase of accumulation; and second, Marx thoroughly deepened the concept of 
the reserve army, and developed a comprehensive sociological categorization that linked 
the fates of employed, unemployed and non-employed. One must not forget that the 
“industrial war of capitalists among themselves…. has the peculiarity that the battles in it 
are won less by recruiting than by discharging the army of workers” (Marx 1976, 45, 
book 1). 
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1970s were inspired directly by classical reserve army theory, and these early theories 
still remain the foundation of much sociological work in this area (see Attewell 1984, Ch. 
2).  
In returning to a classical-Marxian analysis we aim to establish stronger foundations 
for a renewed reserve army approach. The hope is that by firmly grounding the analysis 
in classical sociology and continuing the fruitful engagement with radical political 
economy it will become clear that sociologists are fully capable of providing a wider, 
over-arching theory of unemployment in ways entirely unavailable to economists. This 
would be analogous to the way that thinkers such as Marx, Veblen, Weber, Schumpeter, 
Polanyi, and Mills used sociological concepts to unveil relations of production and 
power. Our main contention is that renewal of a classical interpretation of Marx’s theory 
of the reserve army has enormous potential to improve existing theories within political-
economic sociology. 
4. The Challenge of Unemployment 
However, a problem is presented by the fact that the phenomenon under 
consideration, unemployment, is either completely ignored or of subordinate importance 
in nearly all existing formulations. Indeed, even the existing approaches within political-
economic sociology fall short, we will argue, of a deeper, sociological examination of 
unemployment, encompassing the full dimensions of Marx’s classical approach. This is 
particularly the case with respect to the macroeconomic framework that has been 
implicitly adopted by the majority of political-economic sociologists through adherence 
to the “social structure of accumulation” perspective (see McDonough, Reich, and Kotz 
2010), as discussed in Chapter VI. Such limitations make the construction of an 
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appropriate narrative quite challenging and calls for a special approach. It is not enough 
to provide an explanation for why unemployment is such a persistent issue: we must also 
investigate some of the deeper reasons for the social scientific failure to address the 
problem of unemployment in a comprehensive way. 
In an attempt to address the dual nature of this problem, we frame our analysis around 
the identification, brief empirical assessment and eventual resolution of three key 
anomalies surrounding unemployment: 1) persistent unemployment; 2) so-called “jobless 
recoveries;” and 3) the rise of worker precariousness. These anomalies are widely 
recognized, of course, but their significance for the present analysis arises from the fact 
that they highlight deep contradictions within the paradigm of neoclassical economics—
and by extension all formulations that take the latter as their basis, whether implicitly or 
explicitly. By providing simultaneous resolution of each of the three anomalies of 
unemployment we attempt to demonstrate that unemployment—only made more visible 
by the current crisis—can be explained within a renewed classical sociological paradigm 
that is fully independent of neoclassical economics. 
B. Three Anomalies of Unemployment 
The first anomaly, persistent unemployment, is as old as capitalism itself. Economists 
are generally less concerned with addressing this contradiction than downplaying its 
severity. When this option becomes untenable, economists have attempted to absolve 
economics of any theoretical responsibility whatsoever. While there are at least some 
economists that have attempted to develop an explanation, this has not resulted in a 
coherent approach, let alone even tacit agreement over root causes. The persistence of 
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unemployment is thus linked with a wide and often contradictory set of phenomena8 that 
are often combined arbitrarily, leading to little more than a theoretical muddle.  
The second anomaly, in contrast, stands out as a genuine contradiction to economists 
because it defies assumptions about the mechanistic relation between economic growth 
and unemployment enshrined in “Okun’s Law” (Okun 1970). Instead of there being a 
rough correlation between growth and employment after a recession, “rebounds in 
aggregate output are accompanied by much slower recoveries in aggregate employment” 
(Jaimovich and Siu 2012, 6). Given that jobless recoveries have been occurring with 
increasing frequency over the last two decades (Manyika et al. 2011, 12-13), leading to 
what some economists have termed a “jobless recovery era” (Jaimovich and Siu 2012, 2), 
this anomaly is of particular interest. 
For sociologists the third anomaly, worker precariousness, is indicative of the 
declining position of workers over the long-term and is associated with a lack of “labour-
related security” ranging from sporadic employment and low income to dangerous 
working conditions and a lack of representation (Standing 2011, 7-13). Mainstream 
economics terms virtually the identical phenomenon “flexibility” and views it as an 
economic necessity: fully flexible labor markets conform to the ideal of perfectly 
functioning markets. In this view, which has been wholly adopted and enforced by the 
OECD and IMF, rigid institutional arrangements tend to produce “sclerotic labor 
markets” that lead to high unemployment (Howell 2005, 16-17). Although there has been 
a considerable number of studies of precariousness (see Vosko 2010 for an overview) we 
                                                
 
8 To take a small handful of examples: business cycles, market efficiency (viewed as a 
‘natural’ check on inflation), organized labor (seen as causing “sticky wages”), worker 
deficiency, technological change, etc. 
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argue that the relation between this anomaly and historical development of 
unemployment itself is far from incidental,9 as in most accounts.10 
C. Logical Development 
The analysis begins with a brief discussion of the development of mainstream 
economic perspectives on unemployment, which continue to dominate or frame most 
analyses despite consistently failing to provide coherent explanations. It then moves on to 
an analysis of the relationship between economics, sociology, and political-economic 
sociology. At this point it is possible to provide a critique and tentative resolution of the 
general problem of unemployment at the macroeconomic level (Chapter III.C.2). This is 
an essential precondition to developing an alternative model of unemployment (at lower 
levels of abstraction) so we return to this model at various points in the analysis.  
                                                
 
9 Many European sociologists use the term “precariat” to refer to a new class of 
(younger) workers who experience all of the main dimensions of precariousness 
(Standing 2011, 7). Appay (2010, 34) explains that the term precariat “emanates from a 
contraction of the words ‘precarious’ and ‘proletariat.’ It regroups the unemployed and 
the precarious (manual and intellectual) workers in struggle in all sectors of activity.” 
This is in line with the current approach, with the significant exception that we provide an 
explicit macroeconomic analysis rooted in Marx’s theory of the reserve army of labor. 
10 From the moment French social scientists introduced the term “precariousness,” they 
strongly emphasized its historical dimension, having in mind the reversal of gains made 
by labor at the end of the Great Depression and through the post-World War II economic 
boom. In this view the attempt by capital to create more “flexible” labor arrangements 
was nothing more than a thinly veiled attack on the social rights won by workers. 
However, in the U.S., sociologists typically conceptualize the same phenomenon rather 
ambiguously as a widening gulf between “good jobs” and “bad jobs” (Kalleberg, Reskin, 
and Hudson 2000; Kalleberg 2011). Moreover, there is a tendency (explicitly or 
implicitly) to adopt the model suggested by the Social Structure of Accumulation (SSA) 
approach (discussed below), which boils down to a search for accumulation patterns 
stabilized by a “social contract between organized labor and organized capital” 
(Kalleberg 2012, 440). 
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Attention then turns to an empirical survey of selected dimensions of unemployment, 
with a specific focus on the three anomalies of unemployment (Chapter IV). While there 
is little disagreement about the contemporary existence of the three anomalies (persistent 
unemployment, jobless recoveries or precariousness), the same cannot be said of their 
root causes. Thus, while the analysis in Chapter IV takes official statistics for granted, the 
focus in Chapter V turns to the critical development of the concept of unemployment 
itself, explaining how official statistics not only mask the existence of a significant 
number of ‘potential’ workers, but also greatly confuse efforts that attempt to identify the 
source of unemployment. Here the emphasis is on the insightful contributions of a 
handful of post-World War II social scientists and heterodox economists who participated 
in important debates over the statistical construction of unemployment; and thus took a 
critical stance on official statistics, ultimately preferring categories that closely 
approximated those developed by Marx. The threads of early post-World War II analysis 
are then followed into the 1960s and ‘70s, when political economists, and eventually 
sociologists, began to develop comprehensive theories of labor markets and, to a lesser 
extent, of unemployment (Chapter VI). 
In Chapter VII the insights of earlier sociological theories are assessed critically in 
relation to Marx’s classical formulation of the general law. In order to establish a more 
powerful critique, this includes a reconstruction of the Marx’s general law and the 
concept of the reserve army (Chapter VII.B), highlighting in particular widespread 
neglect of Marx’s sociological categorization of the layers of the reserve army (Chapter 
VII.C). Having established the basis to construct a classical sociological perspective we 
return to the anomalies surrounding unemployment in Chapter VIII. A key part of our 
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resolution of the anomalies of unemployment involves explicit integration of the 
macroeconomic argument (presented earlier, Chapter III.C.2) into the classical reserve 
army framework (see especially Chapter VIII.B). In this way, we attempt to establish the 
foundation for a political-economic sociology of unemployment. Finally, in Chapter IX 
we restate our general argument and discuss some of the implications of the political-
economic sociology approach developed in the previous chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
ECONOMICS, SOCIOLOGY AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
The economic mainstream has long viewed unemployment as a “necessary evil” of 
capitalism (Garraty 1979, 128) but has nonetheless struggled to rationalize its often-
violent and unpredictable swings, as well as its secular growth. The history of economic 
analysis of unemployment is thus peppered with paradoxical terms like “natural 
unemployment,” “rigid labor markets,” “voluntary unemployment,” “discouragement,” 
“sticky wages,” “efficiency wages,” etc., which together form a relatively constant string 
of economic anomalies. For most contemporary economists these anomalies are very 
difficult to confront directly. This is due, in part, to the fact that the original contributions 
of many outstanding exponents of mainstream economics, such as John Maynard Keynes, 
are ignored or marginalized because, invariably, they prove too threatening to the 
neoclassical canon (Dobb 1973, 212). As economic historians Robert Heilbroner and 
William Milberg explain, there are two conflicting narratives of modern 
macroeconomics. In the non-triumphalist view, “macroeconomics since Keynes has been 
a series of misplaced efforts to reestablish neoclassical thought as the dominant approach 
to issues of income determination, unemployment, inflation, and growth” (1995, 19). 
Keynes tried admirably to rationalize economic theory in response to the utter failure 
of neoclassical economics to account for the events of the Great Depression. However, 
his insistence on jettisoning fallacies like Say’s Law of Markets (i.e., the idea that supply 
creates its own demand) amounted to a frontal attack on the whole of laissez-faire 
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ideology—at core, a dismissal of the idea that “self-interest always operates in the public 
interest” (Keynes 2004, 36; Keynes 2009). Once Keynes’ analysis was assimilated into 
neoclassical theory—as the “neo-classical synthesis” or “Bastard Keynesianism” 
(Milward 2000, 150; Turgeon 1996) depending on one’s vantage point—his critical 
insights, and those of his most brilliant followers, such as Joan Robinson (1969), were 
either discarded or drained of critical insight.11 
Despite the large number of theories that have been developed to tackle the problem 
of unemployment, the vast majority in today’s neoliberal age elude Keynes’s analysis 
even though the latter’s primary focus was employment and unemployment (Skidelsky 
2010). Indeed, the polar categorization of all unemployment either as “cyclical” or 
“structural,” vaguely suggestive of a contestation, is largely illusory. Arrayed on one side 
are New Classicals (representing the conservative wing), who routinely find support for 
structural, non-economic factors. The dogma of New Classicals can be found in canonical 
economics textbooks: “A labor market characterized by perfectly flexibly wages cannot 
underproduce employment or have involuntary unemployment” (Samuelson and 
Nordhaus 1989, 289). On the other side are New Keynesians (representing the more 
liberal wing), who differ only to the extent that they attempt to qualify the assumption of 
involuntary unemployment by establishing a basis for a narrow range of “rational” 
market imperfections (Skidelsky and Wigstrom 2010, 30-1; Heilbroner and Milberg 1995 
                                                
 
11 This is not surprising given the parallels between the approach of Keynes and Marx. As 
Robinson pointed out, Keynes “reintroduced the concept of capitalism as a particular 
economic system, evolving through history”—a system with an “essential flaw,” i.e., 
“inherent instability and chronic failure to make use of its potential resources.” By the 
time Keynes finished The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money he “was 
startled by the indictment of the free-enterprise system that it seemed to represent” (1981, 
97-9). 
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80-91). Anchored within the same theoretical paradigm, both wings accept the validity of 
the cyclical/structural distinction and its supply side implications (Heilbroner and 
Milberg 1995, 92). As a result of its superior logical consistency within the neoclassical 
framework, the structural view of New Classicals, which posits unemployment as a 
function of the “degree of mismatch” between the workers and jobs, dominates most 
discussions (Pissarides 2000, 22).12 
In light of the above review, it should not come as much of a surprise that mainstream 
debate tends more and more often to degenerate into narrow and politically predictable 
policy battles in spite of appallingly high unemployment rates (Wolfers 2013). Far from 
producing new theoretical discoveries, such as a creative resolution of micro/macro or 
cyclical/structural dualisms, mainstream economic work on unemployment is marked by 
theoretical stagnation and, even worse, retrenchment. This is precisely why the “mere 
anomaly” of unemployment represents an “acute crisis” (Kuhn 1996 p. xii) for 
mainstream economic theory. 
A. Sociology and Unemployment 
While sociologists have deepened economic analysis in many areas, the challenge of 
explaining the anomalies of unemployment has been left almost entirely to economics. 
                                                
 
12 It should be obvious that “structural unemployment” does not mean for economists 
what it would mean for most sociologists, i.e., questions related to fundamental social 
relations of production or structural inequalities, but instead resolves itself into a 
technical matter (Rothschild 2005, 30), such as the provision of more opportunities for 
worker training (Lafer 2002). To recognize, as most sociologists do, that training or 
educational achievement is linked to features intrinsic to the socioeconomic system 
(thereby structural in a much deeper sense)—such as the reproduction of social inequality 
or the degradation and polarization of skill, which greatly constrain the range of choices 
available for many workers—is simply out of the question (Schutz 2011, 35). 
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The reason, some have argued, is that sociologists largely ceded the critical study of 
economic inequality and related areas such as unemployment to the domain of economics 
(Myles 2003).13 Morris and Western (1999, 650) reach this conclusion in an extensive 
empirical review of the sociological literature dealing with wage and income inequality, 
lamenting the fact that after a quarter century sociologists are “fighting disciplinary 
boundary battles with literature and the humanities, rather than economics.” In what 
seems like an afterthought, Morris and Western (1999, 649) single out economic 
sociology as an exception to the rule, noting its “important critique of neoclassical 
models.” Curiously, the paragraph-long discussion contains only a single reference—and 
this to a volume that was published twenty years earlier (i.e., Berg 1981) when the 
purported revival of economic sociology was but a year in (Smelser and Swedberg 2005a, 
14). At least superficially, economic sociology would indeed appear to be a logical area 
to turn to for guidance on the question of unemployment, so the fact that Morris and 
Western could find nothing newer to cite is vexing.14 
This lacuna in the record of economic sociology presents no contradiction when 
viewed in terms of its performance in tackling the issue of unemployment specifically, as 
                                                
 
13 “The truth,” in Wallerstein’s more skeptical view is that sociology has “no clear 
domain” of its own. “Intellectually, sociology does not exist.” However Wallerstein 
thinks the case is no different in “all the other so-called disciplines that constitute 
collectively the social sciences. Their respective claims to intellectual coherence are not 
one whit more plausible than those of sociology, and intellectually they, too, are black 
holes” (2000, 309). 
14 Another peculiarity of the article is a quote from Marx that leads off the “Discussion” 
section: “Capital is a social relation of production” Nowhere in the subsequent pages do 
the authors refer back to the idea (Morris and Western 1999, 648). 
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research on the latter question is almost nonexistent. In the 1994 edition of The 
Handbook of Economic Sociology no index entry exists for the term “unemployment” 
(Smelser and Swedberg 1994). The term does appear in the index of the 2005 edition 
(Smelser and Swedberg 2005b), but the entries refer only to two consecutive pages—as a 
small slice of a review (originally published in Annual Review of Sociology in 1993) of 
the work and occupations literature (Abbott 2005, 318-9; Abbott 2005). In this brief 
section, only three of the authors cited are from the U.S.—one sociologist and two 
mainstream economists. The five remaining studies cited are geographically focused on 
Europe and were written by European academics. In terms of content, we gain at most 
scattered clues as to the nature of the unemployment riddle. The issue of unemployment 
is ambiguously summed up as “a complex kind of event”—one that is “tied to ‘sectoral’ 
change between wage, domestic, and informal production as much as it is to the 
conjunctures of the wage economy” (Abbott 2005, 319). The issue of whether 
unemployment is not simply conjunctural but a larger structural reality of the economy, 
or whether it is due to sectoral changes in employment, is thus deftly avoided. 
Contrary to the assumptions of Morris and Western, a tendency to consume relatively 
uncritically mainstream or neoclassical assumptions, and then to add layers of 
‘sociological’ variables, characterizes the majority of the work in mainstream economic 
sociology (on unemployment, see, e.g., Moore 1996; Kalleberg 2007). This is ironic 
given the fact that proponents of the “new economic sociology,” which spearheaded the 
revival of economic sociology and still remains its most prominent area, made a point of 
their theoretical opposition to neoclassical economics (Granovetter 2002). Far from 
challenging neoclassical economics, critics have pointed out that researchers in this area 
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actually display an affinity for, rather than an aversion to, neoclassical modeling 
(Krippner and Alvarez 2007; Krippner 2001; Beckert 2009). In a review of the organizing 
concept of “embeddedness,” borrowed from Polanyi (1957; 1992) by Granovetter (1992), 
Krippner and Alvarez (2007, 232) argue that “what is shared with the neoclassical 
perspective” is most noticeable. In the “Granovetterian tradition,” they continue, 
social relations affect the economy from the outside. To be sure, these social 
relations are ubiquitous rather than marginal, and their effects are seen as 
generally positive rather than as generating inefficiencies, but in both cases an 
exterior relationship is posed between the economic and the social. In this sense, 
it is not surprising that theorists writing in the Granovetterian tradition often seek 
to complement or extend neoclassical models rather than overthrow them (2007, 
232-233). 
These critics locate the problem in Granovetter’s reduction of the concept of 
embeddedness to “a configuration of network ties” (Krippner 2001, 777),15 which leads 
to “cumulative interpretative misunderstandings on several levels” (Beckert 2009, 43). In 
elaborating this critique, Krippner (2001) takes the discussion to a much deeper level by 
recognizing that the “theoretical space” within which sociological concepts emerge can 
distort and even invert their original meaning if they are adopted uncritically (Krippner 
2001, 779, passim). That theoretical space, according to Krippner (2001, 798), was 
Parsonian sociology, “which moved like a glacier over sociology’s intellectual terrain” 
                                                
 
15 It is surprising to note that Krippner (2007) fails even to mention Polanyi’s (1957) 
important article, “Aristotle Discovers the Economy”— wherein he lays out the historical 
and theoretical foundation for the concept of embeddedness—in this extensive critique. 
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and continued to assert its influence long after widespread rejection of Parsonian 
functionalism. 
The great virtue of Krippner’s excavation of the concept of “embeddedness” arises 
from its attentiveness to the history of sociological thought, and especially its 
appreciation of the complicated relationship between sociology and economics. While, 
for the purposes of building a sociological perspective of unemployment, the analysis 
does not go far enough it does contain an important clue. As Krippner (2001, 799-800) 
herself points out, in the “Post-Parsonian intellectual landscape” there is still a strong 
tendency to reproduce the separation between “economic” and “social.” Krippner mostly 
passes over this detail, viewing it merely as a caution for future research, but it obviously 
complicates the argument for no real explanation is given for why, even after the 
Parsonian ice sheet had melted, the same rigid dualisms tended to reassert themselves. 
The core question thus remains: Why, indeed, do the ghosts of neoclassicism seem so 
consistently to haunt sociological investigations of the economy? 
B. Sociology and Economics 
The first step in answering this question is to recognize that the “boundary” between 
economics and sociology cannot be maintained on practical or analytical grounds alone. 
It goes without saying that researchers must constrain the universe of inquiry to make 
logical sense. Moreover, if one were inclined to search for an analog for sociology in the 
“physical” sciences it would surely be found in ecology, in light of sociology’s analytical 
potential. Historically the “boundary” between sociology and economics (no less history 
or anthropology) has been porous. This should occasion no surprise given that 
economists and sociologists share a classical theoretical tradition, where figures like 
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Marx, Veblen, and Polanyi explicitly or implicitly transcended the boundaries between 
the two disciplines with fruitful results. 
From this perspective, and in light of the incessant discussion about ‘boundaries’ in 
virtually every area of sociology that shades into economics, questions about the other 
sociological founders necessarily arise; particularly with respect to Max Weber, as the 
outstanding example of a scholar who carried out an extensive project defining the 
parameters and conceptual frameworks appropriate to sociology. Even if one disagrees 
with such a project in principle, it would be a grave mistake to ignore the relevance of 
such efforts. Indeed, in connection with the problem of “theoretical space” in sociology, 
Weber’s work is profoundly important. Thanks to excellent scholarly work on the 
historical relation between economics and sociology, it is possible briefly to examine the 
background of Weber’s boundary project. In so doing, we shall clarify the basis of a 
genuine sociological theory of unemployment capable of resolving the anomalies of 
unemployment and, additionally, provide a provisional explanation for the peculiar 
resilience of neoclassical formulations. 
1. Tangled Histories 
Simon Clarke’s (1991) exhaustive study of the development of modern sociology 
demonstrates convincingly that the replacement of classical political economy by 
marginalist economics marked a crucially important shift in the history of sociological 
thought.16 The transition did not occur in a vacuum but came in response to growing calls 
for revolutionary change and reform from the nascent and rapidly expanding working 
                                                
 
16 This and the next paragraph are summarized largely from Clarke (1991 Chapters 6-9). 
Direct quotations will be cited in the text. 
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classes across Europe. Sociology was born within this cauldron of social upheaval. Many 
of sociology’s founders, like August Comte and Herbert Spencer, as well as a range of 
other liberal-minded reformers, found it in increasingly difficult to square the new 
philosophies they were developing with the theory of distribution elaborated by classical 
political economy. “Nevertheless there was no other rigorous basis than political 
economy on which to defend the truths of liberalism” (Clarke 1991, 171). Under 
mounting pressure from the working classes in particular, attempts to assimilate 
significant modifications of the theoretical core of classical political economy failed, 
resulting in a collapse of faith in the “law of population” and “law of wages”—two 
crucial pillars in the classical political economy narrative (Clarke 1991, 150). The decline 
of classical political economy marked the birth of marginalist economics, which was 
erected upon the same rational choice foundation as neoclassical theory. (Marginalism 
and neoclassicism are in fact one and the same.) At a crucial point Weber was called 
upon to negotiate the boundary that marginalist economics proposed to erect between 
itself and sociology, and he undoubtedly produced the most workable solution that could 
possibly be built on the foundation of liberal social theory (Clarke 1991, 297). 
The relevant aspects of this transformation were as follows. First, the self-proclaimed 
rigorous price theory of marginalist economics established its scientific foundation and 
provided a basis upon which it could evaluate reforms. Second, in assimilating the 
ideological content of classical political economy, marginalist economics continued to 
acknowledge the deficiencies of actually existing capitalism, thus establishing sociology 
as a complementary but subordinate discipline tasked with addressing the “substantive 
irrationality” (1991, 205) of the system through institutional reform. Third, marginalist 
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economics abolished the classical theory of distribution and included only production (in 
very limited sense) and exchange (where classical political economy contained all three) 
within its purview, attempting to “establish the rationality of capitalist society…on the 
basis of capitalism’s allocative efficiency, viewing problems of growth simply as 
problems of allocation of resources over time” (Clarke 1991, 200); subsequently, the 
domain of distribution was shifted to sociology. Fourth, and relatedly, 1) by removing 
distribution from its domain marginalist economics simultaneously eliminated the theory 
of class—as a social relation of production—from its analytical concerns; 2) the concept 
of class then resurfaced within sociology (as part of the domain of distribution), where 
class now appeared “at a lower level of abstraction,” 
becoming a purely sociological concept in the sense that it now characterizes 
particular social groups that arise out of the free association of individuals on the 
basis of their perception of a common economic interest. It is now economic 
interest that underlies the formation of classes, not the existence of classes that 
underlies the conflict of interest.… Within the framework of marginalist 
economics classes arise not on the basis of the relations of production, as in 
Marxism, nor on the basis of the relations of distribution, as in classical political 
economy, but on the basis of exchange relations. (1991, 237) 
Fifth, and finally, marginalist economics presented a theory of society that erased the 
historical specificity of the core institutions of capitalist society—“property, exchange, 
money, the division of labour and the separation of the labourer from the means of 
production”—by constructing these institutions as the natural result of the interactions of 
rationally acting individuals in the market (1991, 195). 
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2. Breaking from Marginal Sociology 
It may be tempting to assume that sociology’s voyage through the marginalist 
“revolution” lacks contemporary relevance, yet this would be a mistake. The division of 
labor between sociology and economics only fully solidified around the 1940s. 
Moreover, as Clarke points out: 
Despite the fact that modern sociology has developed in opposition to the 
naturalistic rationalism of marginalist economics, it nevertheless rests on the same 
ideological foundations. These ideological foundations are not necessarily 
formulated explicitly, for the intellectual division of labour that separates 
sociology from economics and assigns the task of analysis of the social relations 
of capitalist production to economics, establishes the ideological foundations of 
sociology outside its own domain. 
This, indeed, is why attempts to break away from neoclassicism, with its origins in 
marginalist economics, proves to be so difficult. The problem cannot be resolved entirely 
by attempting to purge imported concepts because “the sociological critique of the 
narrow economic rationalism of marginalist economics cuts the ground from under its 
own feet” (1991, 295-9). As Heilbroner and Milberg observed, 
[T]here is more than one vocabulary and repertoire of economics, so that the 
location and changeful pace of industry, or the spectacle of unemployment will 
look very different through lenses ground with a Marxian prescription and those 
ground to the order of a New Classical economist. But without some form of 
“economics” there would be no comprehension whatsoever of what we see. 
Psychology, sociology, and politics do not include unemployment or uneven 
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growth in their conceptual or analytical concerns. That is to say that there exist 
aspects of a capitalist order that cannot be grasped without economics; or to turn 
the matter around, it is to say that economics cannot be learned or used without 
speaking of capitalism (1995, 112, emphasis added). 
If modern sociology has been constructed upon the dualism between “economy” and 
“society” introduced by marginalist economics, it cannot transcend this basis without 
developing its own economics. The creation of a strict methodological domain of inquiry 
followed out of necessity in order to buttress the limited outlook of neoclassical theory,17 
given its fundamental irrealism18—yet it this was not a requirement of economic analysis. 
To treat economic subject matter, observed G. L. S. Shackle (1972, 260), “as conforming 
to ideal mathematical conceptions,” and “to attach economic meaning to limiting 
processes and other such abstractions, in a literal rather than a suggestive sense, is to 
invite misconception and fallacy” (also see Kaldor 1985, 58-9). Indeed, orthodox 
                                                
 
17 By explicitly linking econometrics with hard science, economist appear to gain more 
prestige than sociologists (Skidelsky 2010, 33) but this higher status is maintained as well 
through dutiful connections to business and the liberal state. As John Kenneth Galbraith 
pointed out in his 1972 presidential address to the American Economic Association, “If 
the state is the executive committee of the great corporation and the planning system, it is 
partly because neoclassical economics is its instrument for neutralizing suspicion that this 
is so” (quoted in Schutz 2011, 15). 
18 See Bhaskar (2008, chapter 4) on “irrealism.” As Bhaskar points out elsewhere, in 
neoclassical economics social behavior is reduced to “a simple maximization problem” 
driven by “rationality.” “To explain a human action by reference to its rationality is like 
explaining some natural event by reference to its being caused. Rationality then appears 
as an a priori presupposition of investigation, devoid of explanatory content and almost 
certainly false.” “Neo-classical economic theory,” Bhaskar concludes, “may be best 
regarded as a normative theory of efficient action, generating a set of techniques for 
achieving given ends, rather than as an explanatory theory capable of casting light on 
actual empirical episodes: that is, as a praxeology, not a sociology” (2005, 31-2). 
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economics is in fact a clear case of what Whitehead (1948, 52) called “the fallacy of 
misplaced concreteness.” 
This orientation clearly takes away from the critical and explanatory potential of 
genuinely sociological approaches by diluting the relevance of broader theoretical 
frameworks that form the basis of the discipline. Unless a radically different orientation is 
pursed, the foregoing analysis suggests, sociology will be unable to accomplish anything 
beyond adding a thin (and misleading) veneer of descriptive realism to the dominant 
economic perspective on unemployment. Indeed, we argue that this is precisely why, in 
scope and breadth, no comprehensive sociological alternative to neoclassical modeling of 
labor markets (hence unemployment) has emerged. Faced with this significant theoretical 
gap we are left with an important problem: where does one begin the important task of 
reconstituting a genuinely sociological perspective on unemployment, assuming that 
economics itself is hardly up to the task? 
C. Political-Economic Sociology 
We believe that political-economic sociologists—a term introduced here to refer to 
the subset of economic sociologists who draw heavily on notions of class and power 
reminiscent of classical political economy and classical sociology, overlapping with 
today’s heterodox economics—have made considerable progress in accomplishing this 
goal. A political-economic sociology is capable of overcoming disciplinary hurdles 
because of the greater realism and comprehensiveness of its holistic approach, allowing it 
to zero in on the gross inadequacies of existing economistic explanations of major social 
issues like unemployment. From the standpoint of political-economic sociology, 
unemployment is not reducible to a constrained range of phenomena, e.g., a modeled set 
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of demographic characters or a series of correlations in a business cycle. In capitalist 
economic systems unemployment is both persistent and inevitable—a core social relation 
deeply embedded within the reproductive logic of the system (Lipietz 2001). The 
conditions of unemployment overlap with and intensify existing inequalities, and 
ultimately shape the life course of millions of workers every year in significant, and often 
destructive, ways (Isaksson et al. 2000; Borie-Holtz, Van Horn, and Zukin 2010; CBO 
2012). 
Indeed, from the standpoint of political-economy sociology the extraordinarily 
limited way that orthodox economics approaches the issue of unemployment is nothing 
less than astonishing. The superficiality of most conceptions of unemployment is 
especially revealing of the deficiencies of orthodox models (Cherry 1987). The existence 
of such enormous gaps in the analysis of economic phenomena like unemployment is 
what makes political-economy sociology indispensable. The attempt to explain what 
mainstream economics leaves out also necessarily raised questions for sociologists about 
the value and integrity of the orthodox economic models themselves. Political-economic 
sociologists found it essential to develop their own, independent theory of the economy 
and this is precisely why it makes the most fruitful starting point. To illustrate, the 
following section describes how political-economic sociologists and heterodox 
economists have come to view the general problem of unemployment. This discussion 
begins to lay the groundwork for investigating the specific anomalies of unemployment, 
which we return to a later stage of the argument (Chapter VIII). 
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1. A New Paradigm of Unemployment 
Historically, investigators within the political-economic sociology tradition have 
taken Keynes’ work much more seriously than mainstream economists, including New 
Keynesians. In fact, economic historians view Keynes’ analysis as part of a broader 
theoretical spectrum (including as well post-Keynesian, institutionalist and neo-Marxist 
approaches) simultaneously initiated by radical economists (particularly Kalecki 1939) 
that shifted focus away from the issue of static equilibrium and toward the problem of 
economic growth (Dobb 1973, 211). Unconstrained by the unrealistic assumptions of 
neoclassical models, these analysts arrive at a series of conclusions that sharply diverge 
from those of mainstream economists. Indeed, as the criticisms mounted political-
economic sociologists ultimately developed an “alternative conception of the economic 
system as a whole,” representing nothing less than “the emergence of a new paradigm” 
(Nell 1972, 20). 
These more critical investigations begin by recognizing that the vicissitudes of 
unemployment are clearly linked with movements in economic growth. This proposition 
should not be confused with “Okun’s Law” of neoclassical theory, which 
(characteristically) posits a deterministic relation between unemployment and changes in 
output or GDP growth (Ball, Leigh, and Loungani 2013; Bernanke 2012). It is not that 
growth smoothly predicts unemployment but that monopoly capitalist economies in 
particular must grow significantly quickly to reduce unemployment.19 This can be seen 
                                                
 
19 “If capital grows rapidly, competition among the workers grows with even greater 
rapidity, i.e., the means of employment and subsistence for the working class decrease in 
proportion even more rapidly; but, this notwithstanding, the rapid growth of capital is the 
most favourable condition for wage-labour” (Marx 1976, 48, book 1). 
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clearly in Table III-1, which correlates changes in the growth rates of real GDP and 
unemployment from 1949 to 2012. 
Table III-1. Change in Unemployment at Different Growth Rates of the U.S. 
Economy, 1949-2012 
 Range of percent change in real 
GDP 
 < 1 1 to < 3 3 to ≤ 5 > 5.0 
Total number of years 11 17 23 13 
Number of years with growth in 
unemployment 11 11 4 0 
Percent of years with unemployment growth 100% 65% 17% 0% 
Average percent change in unemployment 
rate from the previous year* 2.0 0.1 -0.2 -1.0 
*A negative number indicates a growth in employment. 
Sources: “Table 1.1.1 Percent Change from the Preceding Period in Real Gross Domestic 
Product,” Bureau of Economic Analysis, http://bea.gov; “(Unadj.) Unemployment Rate.” Series 
LNU04000000, Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://data.bls.gov. See Magdoff and Foster (2010, 
57), who are credited with the original development of this table. 
The first column shows that when the growth rate of real GDP was 1 percent or less 
the unemployment rate increased 100 percent of time, and it increased by an average of 2 
percent annually. Even when the growth rate was between 1 and 3 percent, the rate of 
unemployment grew most years, by an average of .1 percent annually over all years. In 
contrast, the last column reveals that the U.S. economy has historically required a real 
GDP growth rate of 5 percent to reduce the unemployment rate consistently, reducing 
unemployment by on average of 1 percent annually. However, the last time the U.S. 
economy exceeded 5 percent growth in real GDP was in 1984 (7.2 percent); and since 
2000 the economy has only exceeded 3 percent in two out of the last eleven years.20 In 
                                                
 
20 One early observer calculated (with impressive accuracy) that, as a result of the growth 
of oligopoly in the U.S. economy, GDP would need to grow at four percent annually for 
unemployment to remain stable (Sylos-Labini 1969, 205). 
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years when the grow rate of real GDP was within the respectable range of 3 to 5 percent, 
the unemployment rate still inched up in 4 of the 23 years; and it only dropped on 
average .2 percent annually over all years. 
If one accepts this reality, the question naturally turns to a consideration of the 
determinants of economic growth and decline. Here perspectives within political-
economic sociology begin to diverge significantly from each other, and their point of 
divergence can be traced back to different interpretations of Marx’s theory of the 
“General Law of Accumulation” (hereafter, “general law”). For one group, the general 
law, and specifically the dynamics of the reserve army of labor, is viewed somewhat 
mechanically; for the other, the evolutionary tendencies of the general law, i.e., its 
dynamic development, play a much more central role. At this point, in our consideration 
of broad models of the economy, we restrict our discussion to the neo-Marxian theory of 
monopoly capitalism because it has consistently emphasized the dialectical interaction of 
accumulation and the reserve army (Baran and Sweezy 1966; Braverman 1998; O'Connor 
2001, 20).21 We consider the origin and development of alternative viewpoints below, in 
our discussion of sociological applications of the general law itself (Chapter VI.A). 
                                                
 
21 “Neo-Marxian” is used here not to refer to a departure from Marxist analysis, but rather 
to a theoretical tradition within Marxism, inspired by Michał Kalecki in particular, that 
focused on changes in capitalism’s laws of motion brought on by the rise of the giant 
corporation. Both neo-Marxian political economy in the United States (Foster and 
Szlajfer 1984) and the post-Keynesian tradition (see J. E. King 2003) view Kalecki as the 
primary thinker, but with divergent interpretations of his work and its relation to 
Keynesianism.  
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2. Monopoly Capitalism and Stagnation 
According to the theory of monopoly22 capital, the U.S. economy has been caught in 
a deep period of economic stagnation (defined as a slowdown in the trend-rate of growth 
coupled with high unemployment and excess capacity) for close to five decades. In fact, a 
strong argument can be made that the U.S. economy only experienced a brief reprieve 
between the Great Depression and the stagnating economy of today (Foster and 
McChesney 2012); and that this pause—a period of relatively strong growth coincident 
with what C. Wright Mills (2000) sardonically referred to as the “American 
Celebration”—only occurred as a result of a “fortunate” conjunction of historical 
developments. The most important was, of course, World War II, during which the 
institution of a command and control economy produced the only instance of what can 
reasonably be called “full employment” in U.S. history (Du Boff 1977b; Sweezy 1958, 
121-6).23 Subsequently, the economy was buoyed by: consumer liquidity built up during 
the war; a second great wave of automobilization (including the buildup of the petroleum, 
glass, steel, and rubber industries, and the construction of an interstate highway system); 
the rebuilding of the war-devastated economies in Europe and Japan; Cold War military 
                                                
 
22 The term “monopoly” is meant to include the much more common case of “oligopoly,” 
wherein a few firms control the vast majority of output in a given industry (Baran and 
Sweezy 1966, 6, fn3). Monopoly here refers to giant corporations with significant 
“monopoly power.” These firms tend to behave similarly to monopolists. For example, 
price wars, which only lead to mutually assured destruction, are deftly avoided. Indeed, 
price has tended to decline as the “main vehicle of competition” and new, particularly 
wasteful forms of competition—such as marketing, obsolescence, etc., connected 
specifically with the preservation of monopoly power—have arisen (Robinson 1978, 
171). 
23 Paul Krugman rather cynically refers to the World War II as a “massive deficit-
financed public works program” (2009). One can only hope that the U.S. economy will 
not once again require a “public works program” of this sort to avert economic disaster. 
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spending (including two regional wars in Asia); the growth of the sales effort; and the 
global stimulus associated with U.S. hegemony. All of these external stimuli to the 
economy eventually faded (being inherently self-limiting) and slow growth reemerged 
(Reguly 2012; Foster and McChesney 2012; also see R. J. Gordon 2012 for a similar 
mainstream interpretation). In recent decades, the economy has been increasingly 
dependent on financialization—the growth of the financial structure of the economy 
relative to production—manifested in a series of financial bubbles. But as the Great 
Financial Crisis demonstrated, this is a self-limiting basis of economic expansion. 
As we shall see below, a view that focuses on the long-term economic slowdown and 
its effects on unemployment is a far cry from the tendency in neoclassical economic 
analysis to ascribe higher unemployment as characteristics of individuals belonging to 
certain groups. This is often a way of diverting attention from the larger reality of 
unemployment itself and its role in structuring inequality. A host of other sociological 
factors can be (and often are) blamed for unemployment, including wages, worker 
struggle, unionization, government spending—yet all have been shown to be irrelevant to 
the incidence of unemployment, and especially the mass unemployment of today 
(Rothstein 2012; Treas 2010). Most of these can be classified as attempts to put the cart 
before the horse theoretically. Indeed, sociologists have strongly challenged many of the 
most egregious deficiencies of neoclassical theories of inequality and, to some extent, of 
unemployment (Moore 1996; Treas 2010). 
The question remains, however, why sociological investigators (apart from political-
economic sociologists) have not gone further in questioning the foundations of 
neoclassical theory itself. We argue that in the case of unemployment, one reason is that 
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economic conditions of stagnation led inexorably to a statistical construction of the 
problem that tended to downplay its severity, and hence its root causes. Creeping 
stagnation has meant a widening underemployment gap (i.e., a gulf between actual and 
potential employment), which has been, in a sense, normalized. Thus, it is only during 
major crises that the neoclassical emperor’s clothes are completely stripped away—
providing real transparency. At the same time sociologists have increasingly neglected 
macroeconomic questions entirely, which has made it impossible to comprehend the 
reality of stagnation and, as a consequence, the historical dimension of the problem of 
unemployment. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE UNEMPLOYMENT DISASTER 
The unemployment situation we have, the job situation, is really a national crisis. 
—Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke (AP 2011) 
Even using official statistics it is possible to discern the tendency toward economic 
stagnation, as well as the emergence of the three anomalies of unemployment. In this 
section we therefore conduct a brief empirical examination of selected economic trends to 
provide a sense of how each of the three anomalies fits into this overall pattern of 
stagnation. This survey also affords an opportunity to consider mainstream explanations 
for some of the anomalies in more detail. 
A. Long-Term Trends 
As monopoly capital theory suggests, long run movements in the unemployment rate 
reveal worrying trends in U.S. economic performance. Chart IV-1, which plots the 
official monthly unemployment rate (with shaded areas denoting official recession 
periods), shows that unemployment is a persistent and, since 1949, growing problem in 
the U.S. economy. Over the entire period unemployment has averaged 5.8 percent. Since 
1980, it has averaged 6.4 percent. As we discuss below, this has partly to do with the 
appearance of so-called “jobless recoveries” post-1975, evidenced by the higher peaks, 
which exceeded 10 percent in some months at the depth of the 1981 and 2007 recessions. 
While not immediately evident, the peaks themselves are also wider than in previous 
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years. By analyzing post-recession job creation we can get a better picture of how broad 
and deep recent cycles (or recessions) have actually been. 
Chart IV-1. Unemployment Rate by Month with Recession Periods, 1948-2012 
 
Sources: “(Unadj.) Unemployment Rate.” Series LNU04000000, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
http://data.bls.gov; “NBER based Recession Indicators for the United States from the Period 
following the Peak through the Trough (USREC), Monthly.” St. Louis Federal Reserve (FRED) 
database, http://research.stlouisfed.org. Accessed June 9, 2013. 
Chart IV-2 measures the number of months it has taken to reach pre-recession 
employment levels for five recent recessions. With each recession the number of months 
increases, and recently by a significantly longer period of time. The 2001 recession 
resulted in fewer job losses but it took almost twice as long as in earlier recessions for the 
recovery to reach the pre-recession employment level. According to NBER, the 2007 
crisis only spanned from January 2008 to June 2009; but as of April 2013—62 months 
after non-farm employment began to fall—the economy is still close to 2.5 million jobs 
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away from reaching its pre-recession job level. Conservatively estimated, the economy 
must create 5 million additional jobs if we account for the jobs needed to keep up with 
the growth of the labor force: just shy of 10 million in total (Economic Policy Institute 
2012; Bernanke 2012, 3-4).24 At the current pace (165,000 jobs were created from March 
to April 2013) the economy would not reach this target for another year and a half.  
Chart IV-2. Duration of Job Losses in Selected Recessions 
 
Source: Calculated from “All Employees: Total nonfarm (PAYEMS), Thousands of Persons, 
Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted” and “NBER based Recession Indicators for the United States 
from the Period following the Peak through the Trough (USREC), Monthly.” St. Louis Federal 
Reserve (FRED) database. Accessed March 17, 2012. http://research.stlouisfed.org. 
Assuming the economy does actually recover these jobs within this time frame, the 
employment downturn stemming from the 2008 financial crisis would stretch to eight and 
                                                
 
24 The estimates vary widely as a result of changes in the labor force participation rate, 
and the need to make assumptions about the total size of the labor force. 
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a half years—over double the length of the 2001 employment slump (see Chart IV-2 
sources). 
B. Missing Jobs 
Given these trends, it should come as no surprise that the paradox of “jobless 
recoveries” has resurfaced in mainstream discussions over the last two decades. When 
economists speak of “jobless recoveries” they are loosely referring to a situation in which 
GDP, the technical measure of movements in an economic cycle, begins to rebound with 
little or no commensurate decrease in the unemployment rate. The term first appeared in 
the New York Times in the period leading up to the second downturn of the Great 
Depression (Editors 1938)—known as the Recession of 1937—and while “jobless 
recoveries” have seldom been mentioned until relatively recently, the phenomenon is not 
unique to the two periods alone (Judis 1993). 
The significance of this sort of ‘puzzle’ should be apparent to those familiar with 
standard economic theory, or at least the central tenet of general equilibrium. A “jobless 
recovery,” much like the incidence of “stagflation” in the 1970s (Sherman 1976a), is 
significant enough to throw into question core postulates of conventional economic 
theory (especially now that Keynes’ original theory has been sidelined). If widespread 
unemployment and economic growth can coexist, one could not be faulted for asking a 
set of the rather uncomfortable questions: What exactly is in ‘equilibrium’ anyway? If the 
current jobs picture represents a new equilibrium (or a “new normal,” Weidner and 
Williams 2011) then who benefits and who loses in this new situation? A plethora of 
more recent studies have shown that as economic growth rates have generally subsided 
over the decades since the post-World War II boom (R. J. Gordon 2012; Harvey 2010a; 
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Cowen 2011) the “one percent” has benefitted most, with consistently declining real 
wages generating what some have termed, “The Great Inequality” (Yates 2012). It seems 
clear that these tendencies are somehow related; yet this is not the conclusion reached by 
contemporary economic theory. 
New Keynesians tend strongly to downplay the actual existence of jobless recoveries. 
The problem is viewed merely as “an economic hangover” resulting from “a binge of 
overhiring” in prior years (R. J. Gordon 1993, 306). Given the increased frequency and 
duration of “jobless recoveries” this explanation has weakened significantly.25 New 
Classical economists, as market fundamentalists, take the problem much more 
seriously—at a theoretical and practical level—since unemployment and inequality 
stemming from “jobless recoveries” expose major contradictions of the self-regulating 
market, thus confronting them with a deeper anomaly. In place of Keynes (or Marx) these 
economists often reach back to Schumpeter’s theory of creative destruction, though this 
seldom goes beyond asserting the role of technological change. 
The explanation begins with the attempt to find a correlation between waves of 
technological innovation (usually treated as a black box) and the phenomenon of 
unemployment. At these times, proponents argue, newer and more innovative industries 
cannot immediately absorb the extant labor force because the required skill set has 
changed, presumably significantly (Groshen and Potter 2003). Given that this largely a 
cyclical phenomenon it fails miserably to explain prolonged unemployment. Predictably, 
the more recent variation, which developed in response to the Great Recession, raises the 
                                                
 
25 Stiglitz (2012), in particular, has strongly criticized existing economic theory for its 
complete failure to acknowledge the broad impacts—on everything from inequality to 
mainstream economic education—of monopoly. 
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ante by constructing the impact of technology as secular, or essentially permanent. In this 
view, the revolution in computerization and the proliferation of robots has been so 
significant that it has permanently reduced the amount of labor required in production 
(Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2006)—an updated version of the old technological-
unemployment thesis. Journalistic accounts portend certain doom: “Whole employment 
categories, from secretaries to travel agents, are starting to disappear” and will never 
return (Condon and Wiseman 2013; also see Wiseman, Condon, and Fahey 2013). 
Academic economists attempt to avoid the doom and gloom scenario by linking the job-
destroying tendencies to peculiar modern economies with related but largely independent 
“structural” changes in the labor force. 
This narrative, which is deceivingly reminiscent of Braverman’s argument in Labor 
and Monopoly Capital (1998), begins with the demand-side assertion that the peculiarity 
of computer technology leads to a polarization of skill, hence wages. “Routine” tasks are 
constructed as “intermediate” in terms of skill; while “abstract” tasks are “high-skill” and 
“manual” tasks, “low-skill.” The novelty of the argument amounts to nothing more the 
loose assumption that “computerization,” measured as “the falling real price of 
computers,” disproportionately impacts routine work. When intermediate workers are 
laid off they flow from the lower-wage “manual” tasks, and this superabundance of labor 
causes wages to drop even further (Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2006, 192-3). Kristal (2013, 
369), a sociologist, recently dressed this argument up in “stylized Marxian” language, 
advancing a “class-biased technological change” argument that attempts to explain 
labor’s declining share of income (on the latter tendency, see ILO 2013). The 
sociological explanation is just as focused on computerization so it shares many of the 
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weaknesses associated with New Classical explanation—but it is a distinct improvement 
in some regards (see below). 
In any case, economists have also updated their “computerization” argument by 
adding a supply-side factor to their explanation. At present, they argue, 
Two forces are shifting the quality of jobs, reshaping the distribution of earnings 
and job opportunities, and redefining gender roles in OECD economies: 
employment polarization, whereby job opportunities are increasingly concentrated 
in high-skill, high-wage jobs and in low-skill, low-wage jobs; and a reversal of 
the gender gap in higher education, reflecting women’s rising educational 
attainment and men’s stagnating educational attainment. The result is a labor 
market that greatly rewards workers with college and graduate degrees but is 
unfavorable to the less-educated, particularly the less-educated males (Autor 
2010a, 16; also see Autor 2010b).26 
This tendency to lump together haphazardly disparate factors like academic 
attainment and computerization is hardly new. As Robinson (1972) argued in her Richard 
T. Ely Lecture before the American Economic Association, economic theory simply does 
not “account for the content of employment” (p. 6) i.e., “what employment should be for” 
(p. 8). If economists did so, they would have to explain why modern industry has not led 
to a great reduction of working hours (and less toil), given its spectacular productive 
                                                
 
26 Incidentally, the available evidence flatly contradicts the second point. For example, 
the proportion of workers with “less than high school” education in low-wage 
occupations dropped by close to 20 percent from 1979 to 2011 while the proportion with 
“some college” or “college+” nearly doubled. The latter two categories now exceed the 
former by a 2 to 1 ratio (Schmitt and Jones 2012, 3). 
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potential. As Kristal (2013, 369) argues, “computer-based technologies are not class-
neutral but embody essential characteristics that favor capitalists (and high-skilled 
workers), while eroding most rank-and-file workers’ bargaining power.” Indeed, the 
picture is much more complicated if one takes a more realistic view. 
The only salient conclusion one can draw from the two New Classical explanations is 
that they become indistinguishable they are entirely incompatible theoretically yet 
somehow converge upon the same political conclusion. Indeed, the political prescription 
of the New Classical narrative (in either variant) is consistent. Government should be 
wary of interfering in labor markets. From one side, there skepticism of jobs programs (or 
unemployment insurance) since it could inflate wage rates to such an extent that they 
begin to undermine the incentive of business to engage in relatively risky investments in 
new industries and technologies, delaying the start of a particularly weak “structural” 
recovery (Groshen and Potter 2003, 8; Coe and Snower 1997). From the other side, the 
suggestion is that changes in technology and preferences cannot be controlled; they must 
play themselves out. (As can be seen, “structure,” in this view, more resembles a glacier 
than a building.) The lesson is that the cause of the malaise lies outside of the functioning 
of the private enterprise system, so government assistance is misplaced since it only 
tampers unnecessarily—and potentially disastrously—with free markets. 
A short perusal of Chart IV-3 and Table IV-1 indicates that the job mismatch 
explanation of jobless recoveries is not on firm ground. If it is true that certain industries 
or occupations are innovating or changing qualitatively, conventional economic theory 
suggests that pay rates should be increasing (at least moderately) in these areas since they 
purportedly require newer skills, which most of the workforce fails to possess (DeLong 
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2012). Even if computers and automated production methods are becoming the norm it 
seems reasonable to suppose that sectors involved in producing, programming and 
operating the machinery must reap some of the benefits. Yet, Chart IV-3, which reports 
the annual change of real median hourly wages by occupation, indicates no such trend: 
Across all major occupational groupings without distinction, changes in real median 
wages between 2007 and 2008 are consistently higher than all subsequent years. In 
addition, the recent change from 2010 to 2011 is consistently lowest. 
Chart IV-3. Annual Change in Real Mean Hourly Wage for Major Occupational 
Groupings, 2007-2011 
 
Sources: Occupational Employment Statistics. 2007-2011. “National Cross-Industry Estimates,” 
BLS. Accessed September 2012. http://www.bls.gov/oes/oes_dl.htm; Sahr, Robert. 2012. 
“Inflation Conversion Factors.” Oregon State University. Accessed October 2012. 
http://oregonstate.edu/cla/polisci/sahr/sahr. 
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Table IV-1. Job Openings and Unemployment (in thousands) by Industry27 
 2001  2011  
 Openings Unemployed Openings/ Unemployed Openings Unemployed 
Openings/ 
Unemployed 
Mining & Logging 14 23 0.61 28 52 0.54 
Construction 176 609 0.29 82 1,383 0.06 
Manufacturing 312 992 0.31 232 1,373 0.17 
  Durable Goods 201 630 0.32 160 887 0.18 
  Nondurable Goods 111 362 0.31 73 485 0.15 
Wholesale & Retail 
Trade 559 945 0.59 427 1,834 0.23 
Information 146 190 0.77 104 222 0.47 
Professional & Business 
Services 689 768 0.90 624 1,430 0.44 
Education & Health 
Services 760 463 1.64 582 1,217 0.48 
Leisure and Hospitality 570 833 0.68 362 1,527 0.24 
Other Services 223 229 0.97 120 551 0.22 
Government 447 430 1.04 335 1,013 0.33 
Total Nonfarm (all) 4,287 6,801 0.63 3,216 13,747 0.23 
Notes: The level of openings and unemployed are non-seasonally adjusted. Where industry 
(major economic sector) breakdowns in each series did not precisely correspond the sector was 
dropped. The only exception was “Wholesale and retail trade,” in which case the minor sectors 
from the JOLTS series, “Wholesale trade” (JTU42000000JOL) and “Resale trade” 
(JTU44000000JOL), were combined to match the major sector, “Wholesale & retail trade” 
(LNU03032235), from the unemployment by industry series. Durable and Nondurable Goods are 
subsectors of Manufacturing. 
Source: “Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS)” and “Unemployed persons by 
industry and class of worker,” Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
Table IV-1, which compares the ratio of openings to unemployed by economic sector, 
fills in more of the picture, revealing that the number of unemployed vastly outnumber 
                                                
 
27 The calculations in Table IV-1 are conservative for several reasons. First, job openings 
are notoriously difficult to measure given the tendency to double count since listings are 
often cross-posted; and with the rise of online listings, the problem has only deepened. 
Second, in 2011 the economy was not technically in a recession, like it was in 2001. The 
fact that trend is still clear reveals even more profoundly the inanity of the “structural 
mismatch” thesis. 
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job openings in every major sector of the economy. In 2001 labor shortages only 
potentially existed in Education & Health Services, but by 2011 the unemployed 
outnumbered openings by an average of 4 to 1 and no higher than 2 to 1 in the industry 
with the narrowest margin (Mining & Logging). 
C. Experiencing Unemployment 
At the same time that economic performance has been weakening, the character of 
both unemployment and employment has been changing profoundly. Data from the 
annual “Work Experience” survey conducted by the BLS brings some of the changes in 
the structure of unemployment into focus. Unemployment is technically considered 
“long-term” if an individual experiences a jobless spell of 27 weeks or more over the 
reference period (1 year). As a result, most analysts ignore other groups with long 
durations, including those with jobless spells between 15 and 26 weeks—clearly still a 
substantial period of time. Chart IV-4 plots both of these groups as a percent of all 
individuals who experienced greater than one week of unemployment. The recent 
increases have been substantial. In 2006 the rate of long-term unemployment was 18 
percent or over 2.6 million unemployed; by 2008 the number had climbed 6.5 percent to 
6.4 million, declining modestly to 6 million in 2009. Between 1958 and 1985, the portion 
unemployed for 15 weeks or more averaged 31 percent; from 1980 to present that rate 
grew to 39 percent. 
When looked at from the side of employment, we find a similar picture. Longitudinal 
analyses reveal that employment tenure, defined as the period of time a worker is with the 
same employer, has been declining even among older workers. As a recent summary 
explains: “Among jobs started by 40 to 46 year olds 33 percent ended in less than a year, 
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and 69 percent ended in less than 5 years” (BLS 2012, 1). The trend among the younger 
age groups is in the same direction: After no more than two years 84 percent of 18 to 24 
year olds and 73 percent of 15 to 29 year olds changed jobs. 
Chart IV-4. Experience of Unemployment Rate, 15-26 and 27 or more weeks, 1958-
2010,* 5-year Moving Average 
 
* Data points refer to the previous calendar year. 
Source: “Work experience supplements 1988-2011,” Current Population Survey, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, http://bls.gov. This data set is not publicly accessible but is available by request. 
The above trends in unemployment, which rely entirely on official measures, are 
made to seem tolerable by many commentators because they typically construct the 
unemployed as “unemployable,” or make scapegoats out of the state, powerless 
minorities or distant countries (Treas 2010). Such mirages can only be sustained by using 
a highly restrictive definition of unemployment. Otherwise, the fact that unemployment is 
chronic (or a necessary requirement of the system) would be all too obvious. In order 
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fully to comprehend the depth and pervasiveness of unemployment (especially in the 
U.S.) a new conceptual framework is necessary. In the following section on the social 
construction of unemployment we develop such a framework. 
56 
CHAPTER V 
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
Given its profound importance to policymaking, it should occasion no surprise that 
the measurement of unemployment has itself been heavily contested. Unemployment data 
is, and always has been, socially constructed within a specific political-economic order, 
privileging certain groups over others. As the analysis above implies, an elaborate 
“protective belt” (Larvor 1998, 52) of hypotheses has been built (consciously or not) by 
orthodox economists that tends to downplay or naturalize the root causes of 
unemployment because the anomalies it represents cannot be fitted within the existing 
neoclassical paradigm (for attempts to do so, see Pissarides 2000; Turner et al. 2001). 
Ultimately, however, this effort is indistinguishable from the much longer battle of 
defining the meaning of unemployment itself conceptually. As previous investigators 
pointed out in an insightful study of “productivity” metrics, it is crucial to investigate the 
social construction of a “social indicator” if one is to employ it effectively (Block and 
Burns 1986). When social indicators like productivity or unemployment become a central 
part of social and economic policy, historical analysis will inevitably reveal the contested 
nature of their construction. For example, when a large segment of workers coalesced 
around the idea that wages should be pegged to “productivity gains” in manufacturing, 
the esoteric measurement of the latter concept turned out to be a potent political tool 
wielded by capital to crush unions (Block and Burns 1986, 774). That the meaning of 
unemployment is just as, if not more, hotly contested than productivity, cannot be denied. 
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“No statistical magnitude,” one early commentator noted, “is more vigorously challenged 
than is an estimate of unemployment” (Long 1942, 2). This is no less the case today than 
it was in 1942, as a brief review of the statistical construction of the official 
unemployment rate demonstrates. 
A. Official and Alternative Unemployment 
The unemployment rate is gathered from a survey that turns on a respondent’s 
subjectively determined “level of attachment” to the labor force. The denominator of the 
official unemployment rate is the “labor force,” as distinct from the “civilian non-
institutional population (CLF).” The CLF is the total non-institutional population age 16 
to 65 years, and the labor force is the portion of the CLF that is either employed—
whether self-employed, part-time or temporarily—or unemployed. To be classified as 
unemployed, a respondent must be “available for work and actively seeking 
employment.” Specifically, the person must have searched for a job sometime in the 
previous four weeks—otherwise they are not considered part of the labor force. The 
unemployment rate, then, is the number of unemployed divided by the labor force (M. M. 
Ryan 2010, 4). In 1967, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) began to record alternative 
measures of unemployment in response to recommendations by the President’s 
Committee to Appraise Employment and Unemployment Statistics (Shiskin and Stein 
1975, 4). Despite the introduction of these “alternative” measures, the most conservative 
unemployment rate—which divides the jobless actively seeking work within the last 
month by the labor force (termed “U-3”)—has always remained the “official” rate.28 
                                                
 
28 Many reporters and analysts now consider the U-6 rate to be the most exhaustive 
measure of unemployment since people in this group would clearly work more or begin 
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Chart V-1. Alternative Unemployment Rates 
 
Notes: The U-4 rate adds “Discouraged workers,” i.e., those available and who have looked for 
work sometime in the last year but not in the previous month; the U-5 rate adds the “marginally 
attached” to those included in the U-4 by eliminating the yearlong time frame that defines 
“discouragement”; and, for the final U-6 rate, all respondents “working part-time for economic 
reasons” (e.g., because there isn’t more work available) are added to the U-5 total (Bregger and 
Haugen 1995). 
Source: “(Unadj.) Unemployment Rates.” Series’ LNU04000000, LNU03327707, 
LNU03327708, LNU03327709. Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://data.bls.gov. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
looking for work if there was more demand. The average U-6 unemployment rate since 
1994 (10.5 percent) is nearly double that of the official rate (5.9 percent). The staggering 
increase in the incidence of long-term unemployment since the Great Financial Crisis of 
2007-08 obviously lends legitimacy to the view that the U-6 rate measures 
unemployment more accurately (Seib 2010). 
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The alternative unemployment rates, which are reported in Chart V-1, have 
repeatedly undergone major revisions (Haugen 2009).29 The changes do not reflect any 
fundamental reorientation to the problem of unemployment but they do make it 
impossible to construct a consistent long-term series. The data we do have (from 1994 to 
present) reveal that it is not uncommon for the rates to move in opposing directions. For 
example, the U-3 rate may decline at the same time the broadest alternative rate (U-6) 
remains stable or even increases. This happens because the unemployed eventually give 
up looking for work and thus cause a contraction in the size of the labor force. 
Alternatively, the U-3 and U-6 may increase in tandem. At the onset of a downturn mass 
layoffs are typically combined with the imposition of reduced work hours (and income). 
At the same time, Chart IV-1 clearly shows that there has been a secular upward 
movement in the U-3 rate, as evidenced by the continuous upward revisions in the 
“nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment” (NAIRU) since it was first proposed 
(D. M. Gordon 1988; Gross 1980, 144). Indeed, it should come as no surprise that 
acknowledgment of the inadequacy of the official unemployment rate has now become 
widespread (Bernanke 2012; Peach, Bethards, and Song 2011). 
This begs the question of why the most conservative measure of unemployment has 
never changed. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the most critical perspectives on this question 
developed as a result of fruitful exchanges between post-World War II historians, 
political scientists, sociologists and economists who were historically linked by the 
experience of the Great Depression. In addressing this question, scholars in this area 
                                                
 
29 The BLS currently only reports the most recent data (implemented in 1994) in 
electronic form because they are not comparable with past measurements (Bregger and 
Haugen 1995). 
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ultimately converged upon on a perspective that echoed Marx’s reserve army analysis. 
Ironically, some of these analyses even went further in some regards than contemporary 
political-economic sociology analyses that explicitly use a reserve army approach. 
B. Post-World War II Critics of Unemployment 
Bertram Gross, long-time critic of unemployment statistics and author of the 
Roosevelt-Truman full employment bills of 1944 and 1945, stood at the forefront of this 
vocal group of post-war reformers and radicals (see, e.g., Gross and Pfaller 1987). These 
analysts became increasingly critical of unemployment measures when the struggle for a 
full employment bill unmistakably revealed the strong class forces arrayed against any 
such effort. Employers were intent on keeping slack in the labor market to maintain a 
strong bargaining position. The failure to pass substantive measures guaranteeing full 
employment meant that the U.S. state, which began to play an increased role propping up 
the post-World War II economy, would have to develop the means to justify a significant 
amount of unemployment (Eden 1962; Eden 1960). Unsurprisingly, this tendency is 
common in countries with weak labor organization like the U.S. (Howell 2005). As these 
early investigators later realized, however, the official meaning of unemployment had 
already ossified long before the war ended. 
In a comprehensive review of the development of the concept of the “labor force,” 
which has hardly changed to this day, one investigator concluded: 
Concepts and statistical measures regarding employment, unemployment and 
employability are conceptual artifacts…[that] are historically conditioned and 
determined products of a particular economy and society but have no reality in 
and of themselves. The labor force concept emerged as a response to a job 
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scarcity economy at a time when society viewed unemployment as the major 
social problem. The governmental commitment to successfully managed 
economic growth has resulted in the need for a labor supply orientation which 
would understate the dimensions of labor supply and hence the quantity of 
unemployment (Moses 1975, 43-4). 
The same author predicted that “new measures…[of unemployment would] not be 
allowed to intrude on the primacy of the official unemployment rate” without a 
significant challenge to the existing power structure (Moses 1975, 42). 
Extending this analysis, other studies found that the root of the political and 
institutional edifice built up around unemployment was buried deep within the structure 
and functioning of U.S. capitalism. In one account investigators argued that a “job 
rationing ideology”—meaning a “system of shared beliefs about who should have access 
to the job market”—inevitably evolved because “there has always been in this country a 
chronic shortage of jobs, except during wartime” (Furstenberg and Thrall 1975, 46). The 
historical response of the state to the chronic job shortage was to manipulate incessantly a 
range of government institutions—from public schools to welfare programs. Social 
Security, for example, played an important role not simply in encouraging older workers 
to withdraw from the labor force but, by penalizing recipients for earning token amounts 
of income and ignoring investment income, insisting that they withdraw (Furstenberg and 
Thrall 1975, 51-2). Another example was found in the increase of the average length of 
primary education. This policy obviously led to the removal of younger workers from the 
labor force; but it also created a self-fulfilling need for more teachers and raised job 
requirements artificially, thereby inaugurating the growth of an “education industry,” 
  62                      
which helped further to absorb excess labor in the U.S. (Berg 1970, 178; Braverman 
1998). 
An additional and highly significant finding was that the ideology of “rationing” 
percolated into the minds of workers and this had significant implications for the survey 
methodology underlying the measure of unemployment. Interviews of labor force 
dropouts found that “most people believe that some individuals have a much greater right 
to a job than others,” but that these beliefs soften as job market prospects improve 
(Furstenberg and Thrall 1975, 55, 59). This confirmed the findings of aggregate studies 
of labor force participation, which revealed that participation rates tended to increase as 
the unemployment rate decreased (Strand and Dernburg 1964); as well as earlier studies 
based on a “full employment labor force participation rate” (Eden 1960, 55).30  
Contemporary movements in the labor force participation lend support to this 
position. From the late 1990s to present, the labor force participation rate has dropped 
dramatically, from an historic high of just over 68.1 percent in July 1997 to 63.1 in April 
2013 (BLS, series LNU01300000, unadjusted). Economists using the “overall 
unemployment rate…[as] the primary cyclical indicator” estimated that at least 50 
percent of the decline could be attributed to “labor market weakness.” Moreover, if the 
long-term unemployment rate is used as the indicator, the estimate shoots up to 90 
percent (Romero 2012, 13). These more realistic estimates reduce the probability of 
“demographic” or “structural” phenomena—which, in their most recent incarnation, play 
                                                
 
30 The idea was to ascertain “the extent to which…[the] economic system fails to supply 
full employment to those who ordinarily work in periods of full employment” (Eden 
1959, 23). 
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up the role of aging of baby boomers in decreasing labor force participation (Toossi 
2012; Aaronson et al. 2006; Ruffing 2012)—virtually to nil. 
C. Labor Market Distress 
The contradictions and biases exposed by postwar critics raised substantial concerns 
about BLS methodology because it ignored the state of the job market and thus tended to 
understate the number of willing workers, dumping a huge number of people into the 
nebulous category of “not in the labor force.” Investigators like Gross and Moss (1973, 
33) responded by constructing their own estimates of the “unofficial labor supply.” In 
their analysis of 1971 data for the U.S. they concluded that over 20 million persons could 
legitimately be added to the 4.7 million officially unemployed, leading to a “real 
unemployment rate” in excess of 24 percent (1973, 33). It was precisely criticisms such 
as this that not only forced the BLS to develop alternative unemployment rates but also 
strongly influenced early conceptualizations of the latter.31 
We neglected to mention above that the early experiments conducted by the BLS 
actually resulted in much more critical measures of labor underutilization than the 
alternative unemployment rates used today. This is evidenced by the appearance of the 
concept of “subemployment,” which was originally developed by U.S. Labor Secretary 
Stanly Wirtz to assess inner-city labor markets ostensibly in response to Lyndon 
Johnson’s “War on Poverty” (Vietorisz, Mier, and Giblin 1975, 4). Alongside the 
contemporary concepts elaborated above only the last of the original four components of 
                                                
 
31 There were in fact direct references to Michael Piore, Peter Doeringer and David 
Gordon (Vietorisz, Mier, and Giblin 1975, 3)—scholars who, not coincidentally, played a 
central role in the development of the labor market segmentation theories that we review 
below (Chapter VI). 
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subemployment is distinctive conceptually. This component identified the layer of the 
employed population earning poverty-level wages despite holding full-time jobs (Stricker 
2007, 108). Against the backdrop of today’s massive wealth and income polarization and 
the profusion of low wage jobs, the central importance of this category, as well as related 
phenomenon like underemployment, appears self-evident. BLS efforts to develop 
measures along these lines for the labor force as a whole, however, were stillborn. 
Nonetheless, current data sources allow us to make a rough estimation of the level of 
subemployment and, with the addition of a portion of the incarcerated population, get a 
clearer picture of the state of the contemporary U.S. labor market. It is well known that 
the massive growth in the U.S. penal system is strongly inflected by race, ethnicity, 
citizenship and a number of additional political and historical factors. Yet, critical 
investigations have recently concluded that the process cannot be understood apart from 
labor market dynamics (E. Smith and Hattery 2008; Alexander 2011; Gilmore 2007; 
Western and Beckett 1999). The rapid expansion of prisons and jails in the U.S., argue 
Western and Beckett (1999, 1052), amounts to a “coercive reallocation of labor,” 
reducing unemployment in the short term while severely crippling long-term employment 
prospects of ex-convicts—primarily of black males. The increase in the rate of 
incarceration has been so rapid in the U.S. that categorizing prime-aged male prisoners as 
unemployed caused the corresponding unemployment rate to rise by over a third in 1995, 
from 5.6 to 7.5 percent. Even more revealing is that when the same method was applied 
to European countries the impact on the unemployment rate was negligible (Western and 
Beckett 1999, 1041). 
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Table V-1. Labor Market Distress 
 
(values in thousands) 1994 2000 2006 2010 2012 
Official labor force a 105,966 117,561 125,304 126,057 126,899 
Discouraged b 1,497 727 980 1,713 1,976 
Long-term unemployed c 5,446 4,106 4,430 5,072 5,270 
Incarcerated d 1,013 1,338 1,506 1,549 1,542 
Recalculated labor force e 113,922 123,733 132,220 134,391 135,687 
Officially unemployed f 9,055 6,116 7,521 15,764 13,243 
Subemployed g 4,033 4,071 4,142 3,818 4,119 
Underemployed h 4,340 3,673 4,786 8,704 8,328 
Total labor market distress i 25,384 20,032 23,365 36,621 34,479 
Official unemployment rate j 8.5 5.2 6.0 12.5 10.4 
Labor market distress rate k 22.3 16.2 17.7 27.2 25.4 
Notes: Tabulations were designed to eliminate the possibility of double counting. All values 
except for incarceration levels were calculated using Current Population Survey (CPS) microdata 
(see below) from the March sample of the given year. In the descriptions below the name of each 
variable used is capitalized. Because the data were weighted with the WTSUPP variable, the table 
above is not directly comparable to figures published by the BLS. 
a Civilian non-institutional labor force 16 years and older. The age condition is used on all 
subsequent calculations. LABFORCE=2; AGE (> 16). 
b Not in the labor force but has looked for work sometime in the past year. LABFORCE=1; 
NWLOOKWK (1 ≥ 52). 
c Not in the labor force and has not looked for work in the past year but wants a job now. 
LABFORCE=1; WANTJOB (2 ≥ 4). 
d Totals for each year were multiplied by the fraction of the incarcerated population (state and 
federal) between 18 and 59 years of age in 2011, which was 96 percent.  
e Official labor force + (Active duty military + Discouraged + Long-term unemployed + 
Incarcerated). 
f Jobless but has looked for work in the past month. EMPSTAT=21 or 22. 
g Active, full time workers under the poverty line. EMPSTAT=10; UHRSWORK (≥ 35); 
POVERTY=10. 
h Part time due to business conditions, the inability to find other work or the allowable work is 
less than 35 hrs. EMPSTAT=10; UHRSWORK (< 35); WHYPTLWK=10, 60 or 80. 
i Officially unemployed + (Discouraged + Long-term unemployed + Incarcerated) + 
(Subemployed + Underemployed).  
j Official unemployment as a percent of Official labor force.  
k Total in labor market distress as a percent of Recalculated labor force. 
Sources: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 3.0 
(2010); Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Prisoners in 2011,” Tables 1 and 7 (Carson and Sabol 2012) 
and “Prisoners Under State or Federal Jurisdiction” (BJS 2005). 
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Table V-1 combines the results of subemployment and incarceration with the official 
and alternative measures of unemployment for selected years. This represents the shades 
of what the Economic Policy Institute (EPI) has termed “labor market distress” (Mishel 
and Bernstein 1993). Unlike the term unemployment, “labor market distress” calls 
attention to the fact that the conditions of employment have tended to worsen along with 
the rise of unemployment and economic stagnation. It must be emphasized that the 
measure of subemployment used here is extremely restrictive. EPI’s estimate of 
subemployment in 1989—which could not be repeated “in earlier or later years” due to 
“data limitations”—amounted to 21 million individuals, over five times the level reported 
below for 2012 (Mishel and Bernstein 1993, 17-18). Regardless, the “labor market 
distress rate”—those in labor market distress divided by the (recalculated) labor force—
stood at 25.4 percent in 2012, 10.7 percentage points higher than the U-6 rate. 
Adding the incarcerated population to the other two forms of what may be termed the 
“hidden unemployed”—discouraged and long-term unemployed—increases the number 
of this segment by over 22 percent for 2012. Within the labor market itself the 
underemployed and subemployed represent those with “insufficient employment,” and 
this segment increases by 50 percent with the addition of the subemployed. As Chart V-2 
demonstrates, hidden unemployment and insufficient employment represent a substantial 
portion of labor market distress. Between 1994 and 2012, the number with hidden and 
insufficient employment was on average almost twice the size of the officially 
unemployed. 
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Chart V-2. Relative Magnitude of the Forms of Labor Market Distress 
 
Sources and notes: See Table V-1. 
D. Transcending the Limitations of Socially Constructed Indicators 
The categories underlying labor market distress are obviously useful in many ways, 
but at the same time there are important weaknesses. It will be remembered from our 
discussion above (Chapter III.B.1) that when the concept of class was reimported from 
marginalist economics back into sociology it was reduced essentially to a market relation 
between competing social groupings. The statistical categories of labor market distress, 
no less those of the alternative unemployment rate, bear this imprint. Thus, in the 
interpretation of this data there is a tendency to focus on the personality characteristics of 
narrow segments of the population to explain high rates of the different forms of labor 
market distress. This is not to say all measures distinguished by certain social 
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characteristics are not useful for the purpose of identifying patterns of discrimination that 
then lead to disproportionate levels of unemployment. Indeed, it is well known that race, 
sex, age, citizenship and geography all strongly amplify the experience of unemployment 
(Mishel et al. 2012, 339). At the same time, however, such statistics can and often are 
used to define certain segments of the population pathological, and thus take attention 
away from broader contradictions associated with capitalist labor markets (Chris Tilly 
and Tilly 1994 makes an attempt at integration). This suggests that the interpretation of 
official statistics, even when used critically, can lead to significant confusions outside of 
the context of a broader theory of unemployment. 
 Postwar critics were already quite sensitive to this problem and, consequently, 
developed surprisingly robust and prescient critiques—even relative to those of today. 
Guy Standing (1987), coordinator of labor market research with the ILO at the time, went 
furthest by shifting focus entirely away from behaviorally-determined unemployment 
measures32 to an “alternative perspective” of “surplus labor” that drew explicitly on 
Marx’s sociological categorizations of the reserve army of labor. Standing argued that 
large labor reserves existed in all capitalist economies, and that their absolute size and 
extent depended on the “type of productive structure, the prevailing social relations of 
production, the development strategy being pursued, and the state policies accompanying 
it.” An especially worrisome development was the growth of an “international division of 
labor” (aided by technological changes) that increased immediately available, or “active,” 
labor reserves worldwide. In industrialized economies, this contributed to the growth of 
                                                
 
32 “The job-seeking criterion should not be used to identify voluntary unemployment; it is 
unreasonable to expect workers to expend time, energy, morale, and money in searching 
for jobs known to be unavailable” (Standing 1987, 91). 
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“stagnant surplus populations—represented in part by high total unemployment and an 
unprecedented growth of long-term unemployment—along with a shift toward casual 
labor, part-time working, labor subcontracting, and related forms of self-employment.” 
Moreover, all but the “active” layer of the surplus population tended to be excluded from 
official unemployment statistics. The implication is that the “realistic potential—
long-run—labor supply” dwarfs the size of the statistically constructed “labor force” of 
official reports—especially in peripheral (and semi-peripheral) countries (1987, 81-2; 
also see Ahearn 2012). 
Standing’s analysis reveals the importance of using a broader conception of class to 
conceptualize the development of unemployment. This becomes increasingly important 
with the internationalization of production, which has tended to agglomerate disparate 
pools of actual and potential labor and vastly complicates the relation of labor to capital. 
Labor is capable of traversing national boundaries but this seldom happens under 
beneficial conditions. Moreover, capital has always moved much more rapidly and freely. 
Some examples of this asymmetry include: the promotion of transmigration within 
parameters set by highly restrictive work-visas (Guskin and Wilson 2007, 114-15); the 
tapping of “latent” through the destruction of indigenous agricultural industries via 
mechanization (Amin 2003); and, in addition to outsourcing and offshoring, virtual work 
environments which use communications improvements to restructure and tightly 
monitor labor processes in remote locations (Wagstaff 2012; Aneesh 2009). Despite the 
seemingly impenetrable edifice of globalized, ‘flexible’ production that has emerged, it is 
not impossible to comprehend. In pursuing the more comprehensive (and necessary) task 
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of clarifying the logic driving these processes, a thorough understanding of Marx’s theory 
of the reserve army proves essential. 
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CHAPTER VI 
FROM UNEMPLOYMENT TO THE RESERVE ARMY OF LABOR 
The preceding analysis suggests that the reserve army of labor analysis developed by 
Marx, and applied to our time (although incompletely) by political-economic sociologists 
and heterodox (political-economic) thinkers within economics, offers—if expanded upon 
more fully based on Marx’s original foundational views—the key to unlocking the 
various seemingly anomalous features of unemployment. Even though contemporary 
economic sociology appears to accept the disciplinary boundaries established by 
orthodox economics, a critical, political-economic sociology arising out of classical 
sociology, and frequently defying disciplinary boundaries separating sociology from 
economics, continues to have salience in the discipline. This includes not only those 
working in the area of the political economy of the world system, but also those political-
economists who operate within the domain of economic sociology itself, and often cross 
over into economics per se. Many of these thinkers are associated with radical and 
Marxian traditions. Exemplary works in this regard related to the theories of economic 
accumulation and unemployment by sociologists include important contributions by such 
figures as Mills (2000), Braverman (1998), Domhoff (2002), O’Connor (2001), Foster 
(1986), Arrighi (1999), Wallerstein (1974), Chase-Dunn (1975), Wright (1978), Burawoy 
(1982), Attewell (1984), Block (1990), Schor (1991), Piven and Cloward (1993), 
Aronowitz and DiFazio (2010), Polanyi-Levitt (1996), Krippner (2011). 
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 All of these thinkers, representing political-economic sociology, are closely related 
to traditions in radical or heterodox political economy within economics. Such 
sociologically-oriented heterodox economists have long drawn their inspiration from 
Marx, Veblen, and Polanyi in particular. Accordingly, we briefly review the development 
of relevant theories within political-economic sociology from the standpoint of their 
antecedents. 
A. Social Structures of Accumulation 
Dual labor market theory, the precursor of labor market segmentation theory, was 
first developed in the 1950s by critical “institutionalist economists” inspired in part by 
Veblen (Stoneman 1979)—whom Mills (2000 p. vi) referred to as “the best critic of 
America that America has produced.” The institutionalist tradition of economics most 
fully overlaps with sociology so it should come as no surprise that labor market 
segmentation theory, which fuses Marxist and institutionalist perspectives, has formed 
the basis of nearly all sociological analyses of labor markets (Attewell 1984). Initially, 
Dual labor market theory was concerned with explaining the racial bias in labor markets, 
particularly in urban areas (Piore 1970; Piore 1975; Doeringer and Piore 1985). 
Subsequently, a group of left-leaning economists (Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopf 1985; 
D. M. Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982; Edwards, Reich, and Gordon 1975) extended 
dual labor market theory by explicitly relating worker and employer behavior to the 
industrial and occupational structure of capitalism, further refuting “blame the victim” 
arguments that focused on supply-side problems such as worker skills, education, 
“culture,” etc. This was accomplished by placing the early models of dual labor market 
within a neo-Marxian framework, which put the contradictions of class and accumulation 
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at the center of the analysis. Analyses within this tradition often turned neoclassical and 
Keynesian frameworks on their head by explicitly integrating class power through the 
dynamic impact of the reserve army labor (Schor 1987). 
For a time there was sustained engagement with other strands of political-economic 
sociology. For example, the historical evolution of capitalism from its competitive to 
monopolistic stage developed by Baran and Sweezy (1966), O’Connor (2001), 
Braverman (1998) and Marglin (1975; 1974) remained at the center of the analysis of 
several foundational works emerging from out of the labor segmentation tradition. For 
example, Edwards (1979; 1975), detailed how the appearance of the oligopolistic firm 
had profound implications for the organization of the labor process—specifically the 
development of new methods of coercion and control that formed dividing lines within 
labor markets. However, as labor market segmentation theory developed, investigators 
turned increasingly toward institutionalist perspectives and the bond between radical 
political economists and sociologists weakened. Leading proponents argued that “an 
intermediate level of analysis, focusing on the logic of long swings and stages of 
capitalism,” was “necessary for an understanding of capitalist development.” This was 
needed “to complement both the traditional and abstract Marxian approach to capitalist 
development and the more recent concrete analyses of everyday life” because the 
Marxian tradition had failed “to capture the breadth and complexity of the process of 
capital accumulation” (D. M. Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982, 22). 
The orientation toward institutional transformation was enshrined in the concept of 
“social structures of accumulation” (hereafter, SSA). Mirroring the “long swings” of 
capitalist development, the SSA symbolized relatively constant (though inherently 
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unstable) periods “during which the social, economic, and political institutions supportive 
of capitalist accumulation are: (a) explored; (b) established and successfully reproduced; 
and (c) threatened by internal contradictions within the institutional structure, calling 
forth a period of decay and exploration” (Pietrykowski 2003, 484). The SSA outlook 
converged in large part with the “capitalist regulation” approach developed in France 
(Aglietta and Fernbach 2000), linking stages of capitalism with loosely defined periods of 
stasis, or “accords” between capital and labor. The most notable of these “accords” was 
subsumed under the term, “Fordism” (Kotz 1994; McDonough 2010). As one might 
expect, it is through this “Fordist” lens that many contemporary studies attempt to resolve 
the problem of worker precariousness. According to this view, the decline of the 
“traditional job”—understood as a “marriage-like bond between employee and employer” 
(Dooley and Prause 2004, 8)—post-World War II, symbolized the dissolution of the 
Fordist regime and transition to “post-Fordism” (Piore and Sabel 1984). The decline, in 
this conception, was instigated by a profit squeeze crisis during the 1970s, which 
ultimately forced a transition to leaner and more oppressive labor market structures 
(Lipietz 2001; Lipietz 1989; Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopf 1985). 
B. Sociological Contributions To SSA 
Early on, sociologists added additional layers of complexity to labor market 
segmentation theory, in particular by emphasizing the importance of occupational, in 
addition to industrial, segmentation in unequally structuring labor markets. Along the 
lines of early dual labor market theory, sociologists used the labor market segmentation 
framework to explain the class, racial and sexual bias of labor markets—in 
contradistinction to notions of “culture of poverty” and other narratives emphasizing 
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“innateness,” as well as to defend against conservative supply-side theorists intent on 
blaming workers for the return of stagnation in the late 1970s (Bonacich, Alimahomed, 
and Wilson 2008; Bonacich and Appelbaum 2000; Treas 2010; W. Ryan 1976). As 
sociologists advanced and refined labor market segmentation models, however, the 
majority of energy and debate over labor markets came to be expended on 
methodological minutiae, eliding the general validity so obvious to those who paused to 
reflect on the project as a whole. In an important review of sociological contributions to 
labor market segmentation, Attewell (1984, 83) chose “not to dwell” on the more 
methodologically and empirically rigorous extensions developed by sociologists, because 
they “typically corroborate[d] the prior findings on economic segmentation.” This 
marked a divergence between theories of labor markets and unemployment within 
political-economic sociology, as the bond between radical political economists and 
sociologists began to weaken. 
The early work of Schervish (1985; 1983; 1981) stands out as a partial exception to 
this trend, and as an exceedingly rare example of sociological inquiry into the specific 
problem of unemployment. Not coincidentally, Marx’s theory of the reserve army of 
labor formed the backdrop of his entire analysis. Schervish theorized unemployment as a 
power relation wherein workers were more or less vulnerable depending on the 
“resources” and “capacities” embedded within occupations and sectors of the labor 
market (Schervish 1981, 154-7). In highlighting the unequal power relationship that 
conditions capitalist labor markets, Schervish focused attention on the way that structural 
determinants of unemployment augmented (and sometimes overshadowed) “individual” 
determinants. To make an empirical case, Schervish decomposed unemployment into the 
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statistically available types of “job separation” (i.e., temporary layoff, indefinite layoff, 
firing, or quit) and then attempted to predict separation patterns by analyzing the 
“underlying social processes of vulnerability and power derived from class fraction,33 
economic sector [oligopolistic, competitive or state], and period in the business cycle in 
which the separation occurred” (Schervish 1983, 11). Schervish concluded that 
employment segmentation closely mirrored unemployment segmentation.34 
Ultimately, however, the major labor market segmentation theorists, as well as 
Schervish, adopted only limited and one-sided approaches to Marx’s reserve army theory. 
Gordon, Edwards and Reich (1982) thought that the reserve army concept was too 
abstract, providing no clear guide for understanding the complexities of contemporary 
labor market institutions. In later work, Gordon (1996, 88-90) argued “for placing greater 
priority on the problem of wages than on the problem of unemployment in the United 
States,” effectively severing the connection between the two. Similarly, Schervish (1983) 
claimed that Marx had not developed a sociological grounding for the theory of the 
reserve army, and ignored entirely its long term implications. This tendency is 
exemplified by the recent work of Lipietz, who has argued that the rise of essentially 
                                                
 
33 Using occupational census data, Schervish attempted (not unproblematically) to 
categorize workers into social classes based on “technical relations of production of 
work-task criteria” (Schervish 1983)—in other words, by degree of control over the labor 
process. 
34 Sociologists have continued to engage with the SSA tradition, leading the way in 
“detailed application of the SSA framework,” and even developing an original 
perspective, termed “spatialization” (Wallace and Brady 2010), that attempts to identify 
the current, globalized SSA (McDonough 2010, 26-7). Although these investigators 
implicitly accept the basic SSA framework, the foregoing analysis suggests that they 
might benefit from grounding future work in a more robust framework that we develop 
below, rooted in a classical reserve army perspective.  
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“permanent” unemployment is “a novelty in the core capitalist societies.” The 
contemporary masses of unemployed, we are told, “is no longer a ‘reserve army,’ but a 
population that capitalism does not need any more, not even to discipline stable workers 
with the threat of dismissal” (2001, 27). 
These viewpoints highlight an unfortunate tendency to view the reserve army in a 
disembedded and restricted fashion—i.e., exclusively as a mechanism endemic to the 
accumulation process that, for example, causes a profit squeeze at the peak of a business 
cycle (Boddy and Crotty 1975; Basu, Chen, and Oh 2011) and serves only to discipline 
workers at other times. The weakness of labor market segmentation theories of 
unemployment, with their emphasis on the profit squeeze (largely irrelevant today; 
Harvey 2010a, 66; Brenner 2006; Foster 1997, 449),35 is that they neglected crucial 
dimensions of classical contributions (e.g., Marx, Luxemburg and Veblen). As a result, 
investigators ignored the greater part of Marx’s analysis in this area, and especially its 
sociological significance. Marx not only suggested that more or less “permanent” 
unemployment was a possibility, as we shall see below (Chapter VII.C), he predicted that 
it would grow and even identified which parts of the working class were likely to become 
the most precarious through careful analysis of the changing methods of production. 
                                                
 
35 As SSA theorists have acknowledged, researchers have had significant difficulty 
explaining why no new SSA has coalesced since the 1970s—or, conversely, why the 
current crisis has lasted so long. Given the central importance attached to periods of 
stasis, the present extended crisis has obviously presented SSA analysts with a series of 
difficult theoretical conundrums (McDonough 2010). 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF THE RESERVE ARMY OF LABOR 
Despite the importance of SSA theory, the foundation laid by its earliest proponents 
forms a barrier to developing a classical sociological analysis of unemployment. SSA 
theorists recycled an ahistorical and uncritical version of the general law that in some 
cases actually rendered it indistinguishable from neoclassical formulations, such as the 
NAIRU (Sherman 1976b, 56). In their account the general law was reduced to a cyclical 
theory with predictable stages, and the reserve army was treated quite narrowly, as a 
buffering mechanism. The explanation proceeds as follows: 1) the boom phase of the 
cycle increases the demand for labor, exhausting the reserve army and stimulating higher 
wage demands from workers; 2) high wages eventually cut into profits 3) the erosion of 
profits dampens the “capitalists’ animal spirits” causing a reduction in investment 
spending; 4) finally, slack investment signals a downturn, hiring tapers off, ultimately 
leading to “higher unemployment, and a replenishment of the reserve army” (Pollin 1998, 
4; Weisskopf 1978; Boddy and Crotty 1975, 9).36 The most immediate problem for this 
theory is its empirical basis, which is nonexistent (see Carchedi 2011, 138-43). Careful 
analyses of business cycles reveal that changes in income toward the end of an expansion 
are either miniscule or nonexistent for the vast majority of workers. The observation that 
36 See Foster (1997) and Brenner (2006) for a full discussion of the contradictions of the 
version of profit squeeze theory developed by the early proponents of the SSA approach 
(Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopf 1989; D. M. Gordon, Weisskopf, and Bowles 1987). 
  79                      
wages rise as a share of national income is thus straightforwardly explained by the fact 
that profits fall rapidly in this same period, and for reasons entirely independent of wage 
movements(Sherman 2010, 53; Sherman 1984, 104; Sherman 1979, 11)—such as, for 
example, the ripple effect of widespread “uncertainty” within financial markets, as 
exemplified by the implosion of markets for “subprime mortgages” that sparked the Great 
Financial Crisis of 2007-08 (Schumer and Maloney 2007). 
From a theoretical standpoint the SSA interpretation of the general law is even more 
vexing—even if we consider Chapter 25 of Capital in isolation. No more than 10 pages 
in (to a 108-page chapter) Marx dropped the assumption—explicitly introduced simply as 
an artificial point to be subsequently removed in the development of his argument—that 
technology remained constant. Insofar as the more mechanical reserve army theorists 
focused on the first section of Marx’s chapter on the general law, where he assumed no 
technological change and hence a possible squeeze on profits by wages,37 they thereby 
excluded Marx’s discussion of the reserve army itself, the full analysis of which is 
introduced only when he drops this assumption. Even a superficial reading of Chapter 25 
shows that Marx was not actually concerned with declining profits or business cycles in 
developing the general law, but with uncovering the mechanisms unique to the capitalist 
system that prevented crises (such as a chronic labor shortages) from occurring in the first 
                                                
 
37 We hasten to point out that the notion of a “profit squeeze” is highly questionable even 
if one ignores all but the first section of chapter 25. “The law of capitalist accumulation,” 
Marx explains at the close of this section, “mystified by the economists into a supposed 
law of nature, in fact expresses the situation that the very nature of accumulation 
excludes every diminution in the degree of exploitation of labour, and every rise in the 
price of labour, which could seriously imperil the continual reproduction, on an ever 
larger scale, of the capital relation” (Marx 1977, 1:771-2, emphasis added). 
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place.38 The central mechanism governing this process was, indeed, the reserve army of 
the unemployed. 
A. Outlines of The General Law of Accumulation 
One of the great fallacies of modern economic discourse is the claim that the never-
ending drive to accumulate ever more capital—the motive force of the system of 
commodity production (Hunt and Lautzenheiser 2011, 235)—also (and incidentally) 
gives rise to harmonious social relations.39 To support this assertion, mainstream 
economic theory, working at a perilously distant level of abstraction, conceptualizes 
capital, land and labor as interchangeable factors of production with equivalent quantities 
of social power.40 The bold, perpetually innovating entrepreneur is then introduced into 
the latter scenario, adding an essential dynamism to the process (Schumpeter 1936). By 
repeatedly reinvesting profits into new productive capital the entrepreneur ensures that 
                                                
 
38 As Hunt and Lautzenheiser have pointed out, “Marx’s assertion that the profit rate 
tended to fall…. was merely a theoretical, or taxonomical, device for identifying various 
forces” that could lead to the opposite result (Hunt and Lautzenheiser 2011, 238). 
39 While the population is encouraged to believe that the market economy exists for a 
vague assemblage of reasons—for example, to distribute scarce resources, provide jobs, 
satisfy needs, develop technology, and so on—it is no mystery that it routinely fails to 
deliver. These “higher goals” are little more than window dressing: As any economics 
textbook will attest, the “the interests of capital or of the capitalist class are made into 
those of the economy as a whole” (Linder and Sensat 1977, 1:7). 
40 When confronted with overwhelming evidence of class conflict and disharmony, the 
tendency is for proponents to conflate “capitalism” with “democracy” or “freedom.” 
Capitalism thus takes on the guise of “the market,” and is held up as an irreproachable 
means of preserving liberty and choice (Lindblom 2001 236-250). The effectiveness of 
this approach is especially obvious during periods of economic crisis when the need to 
deflect attention away from the inner-workings of the capitalist economy heightens. This 
cues a shift in focus to the state, a neutral arbiter that (at least in the U.S.) is seen as the 
de facto “manager” of the economy. 
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each new phase is constantly renewed at a higher plane of development. (For many 
proponents of this view, steadily increasing “productivity” is the only conceivable way to 
expand the economic pie and avoid crisis.) Formed on the foundation of methodological 
individualism,41 this perspective naturally leads to inordinate focus on the psychological 
proclivities of the entrepreneur (capitalist), and neglects any consideration of the potential 
contradictions that accumulation presents for the system as a whole. There is little room 
here for the external, coercive laws, emergent feedbacks generated by the cumulative 
actions of capitalists, power struggles between workers and capital (or competition 
between workers themselves, and also nations), etc. (Bagchi 2005, 38-9) and numerous 
other internal, external and/or social factors affecting the level of unemployment and 
business conditions more broadly. Accordingly, the real-world effect of this insatiable 
accumulation drive upon workers, the environment and the stability of the economy as a 
whole disappears into the background.42 
In stark contrast, Marx was the first political economist to subject the growth 
imperative of capital to critical theoretical and empirical examination, and as a result he 
                                                
 
41 Schumpeter (2007), and especially Hayek (1943) and Popper (2002, 125-6), were early 
and vigorous defenders of methodological individualism. The argument is that beginning 
with individuals, and especially “ourselves about whom we know most,” makes it 
possible to construct realistic assumptions about human nature. Then the analyst can 
build up “wholes from…previously analyzed individual parts. In this way we are 
supposed to get scientific knowledge which is valid for all times and places” (Sweezy 
1953, 334).  
42 The majority of classical economists (so identified by Marx) acknowledged and even 
praised the growth imperative of capital because it served their goal of defending the 
nascent capitalist class against the protestations of the feudal aristocracy. While classical 
economists were forced to grapple with many of the contradictions inherent to the 
accumulation process in response to criticisms by sympathizers of the aristocracy (such 
as Malthus), critical investigations ceased abruptly with the eventual triumph of capitalist 
social relations (Marx 1977; also see Marx 1991, 3:351-2). 
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systematically addressed the broader issues raised above.43 By Chapter 25 of Capital, vol. 
1, Marx, turned his attention to the impact of the accumulation drive on the “fate of the 
working class” (1977, 1:762). The “general law of capitalist accumulation,” in which the 
reserve army figures prominently, represents a distillation of Marx’s entire effort in the 
preceding chapters. Considering this backdrop, it should come as no surprise that the 
development of the reserve army concept was very significant. It not only represented an 
important innovation, it epitomized a radically different approach to economic growth 
and crisis. First, the reserve army resolved a major anomaly within political economy at 
the time: why profit rates did not decline “inevitably” as accumulation proceeded (Hunt 
and Lautzenheiser 2011, 238-9; Dobb 1973, 153-4). Second, by developing a detailed 
sociological categorization of the reserve army, Marx strongly anchored his own 
empirical insights and laid a firm basis for subsequent investigations into employment 
and unemployment. In this regard it is especially important to recognize that the 
empirical case Marx developed convincingly demonstrated that the reserve army formed 
a permanent component of the accumulation process. The transitory (cyclical) character 
of the reserve army was in evidence only under exceptional conditions. Third, and finally, 
the continued growth and persistence of the reserve army lent strong support to a theory 
of crisis Marx had developed to an impressive degree. This referred to the possibility of 
generalized over-production of means of production—i.e., of machines, workers, 
commodities, etc., “in so far as these function as capital” (Marx 1991, 3:364)—or 
                                                
 
43 A key innovation here is the theoretical distinction between use-value and exchange-
value. By making this distinction Marx was able to demonstrate that production under 
capitalist social relations, which focused on exchange, diverged fundamentally from the 
social needs of society, defined by use. 
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“overaccumulation” (Clarke 1994, 235-40). When means of production fail to create 
additional value (i.e., are not realized in sale or use) the capital invested is lost. A chronic 
state of overaccumulation44 is synonymous with a pool of redundant workers “who are 
not employed by this excess capital on account of the low level of exploitation of labour 
at which they would have to be employed, or at least on account of the low rate of profit 
they would yield at the given rate of exploitation” (Marx 1991, 3:364). Incidentally, this 
strand of Marx’s thinking, which has largely been neglected by political-economic 
sociologists, represents a crucial link to the theory of monopoly capital, as we discuss 
below.45 
B. The Reserve Army of Labor 
The stereotypical account of the general law mistakenly assumes no technological 
change. In reality, competition obliges capitalists constantly to revolutionize the means of 
production, in large part because the only way to stay competitive is to accumulate 
endlessly (Marx 1977, 1:739). Since introducing labor-saving processes and machinery is 
the primary means to this end there is a strong tendency to reduce labor costs, so as to 
                                                
 
44 The complexity of overaccumulation theory arises from the need to distinguish (and/or 
integrate) periodic from chronic overaccumulation; and, further, to determine the precise 
origin of the latter form (Sweezy 1981, 33-4). 
45 There are numerous places where Marx states that the antagonistic character of 
production is a feature endemic to capitalism. In volume 2 of Capital, Marx draws out 
many of the implications of this contradiction as part of the elaboration of his 
reproduction schemes (see, for example, 1981, 2:391-3). We provide more details below 
but this brief excerpt by Sweezy (1984, 53) provides some context: “This contradiction 
between the power of production and the power of consumption, between self-expanding 
value and contracting use value, vents itself in crises and stagnation which capitalism 
seeks to overcome not through producing what the workers need to live decent lives (that 
would be to negate its own nature), but by creating irrational and inhuman modes of 
consumption more in keeping with the spirit of capital.” 
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keep wages in check; and this is typically achieved by reducing the amount of labor46 
necessary to produce a given output. Capitalists may resort to a variety of methods of 
transforming the production process provided, ceterus paribus, that they reduce the 
amount of necessary labor time per unit of output—or, what amounts to the same thing, 
increase labor productivity (Marx 1977, 1:789).47 In addition to investing in labor-saving 
machinery, which is often (and incorrectly) assumed to be the only possible option,48 
other tactics include: increasing the pace of work; increasing the length of the work day; 
favoring more precarious layers of the workforce (especially women, migrants, 
                                                
 
46 The term “amount of labor” is not synonymous with “number of laborers.” This nuance 
arises from Marx’s conceptual elaboration of three concepts—productivity, duration, and 
intensity—which cover the methods available to decrease the ratio of labor time to 
output. Technically, only “productivity” improvements hinge on changes in the 
conditions of production (for example, new methods, machines, etc.). The difference 
between productivity and, for example, lengthening the working day (duration) or 
increasing the pace of work (intensity), is considerable when it is recognized that in the 
latter case no additional capital is required to achieve the same result: greater output 
(Marx 1977, 1:655-66; also see Kay 1979, Chapter 6). 
47 The BLS consistently measures the ratio of wages to output, which it terms “unit labor 
cost” (M. M. Ryan 2010, 243), for the leading capitalist countries. Incidentally, the 
countries with lowest unit labor costs tend to be dominant economically (International 
Labor Comparisons 2012). 
48 The belief that capitalists tend inevitably to integrate ever more advanced machinery 
(enshrined in the idea of the fully automated factory or, more common today, robotics) is, 
in the dominant view, axiomatic. This brings to mind the brilliant passage from The 
Communist Manifesto extolling the technical prowess of the bourgeoisie (Marx and 
Engels 2005, 44), which is frequently cited as proof of the latter tendency—and, at the 
same time, of Marx’s “technological determinism.” Anyone who cares to read Capital, 
however, will immediately identify such assertions as willful ignorance at best and, at 
worst, blatant opportunism. After a similar refrain that includes the aforementioned 
passage in a long footnote, Marx points out that in its capitalist form modern industry 
also “reproduces the old division of labour with its ossified peculiarities.” The form of 
technical development is suited to capital, not the worker. This “absolute contradiction,” 
so far as the majority of workers are concerned, only portends greater intensification and 
hastened entry into the reserve army—and to an increasing extent as the contradictions of 
accumulation mount (Marx 1977, 1:617-18, 568-9). 
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undocumented workers, and other minorities); relocating production to different regions 
or countries (with lower relative wages); etc. (see Marx 1991, Ch. 14; Harvey 2010b, 
325; Sweezy 1942, 97-100). The net effect of the various actions of individual firms is 
constant reproduction of the reserve army, which moves independently of the absolute 
population level.49 
The extraordinary transformation of the U.S. economy over the World War II period 
provides a rare opportunity to assess the enormous flexibility afforded by the reserve 
army; and, ironically, the same example reveals why the reserve army must exist 
continuously, in spite of the fact that the mass of profits is significantly greater near full 
employment. Upon entry into the war the U.S. economy increased output at an 
unprecedented pace despite the loss of millions of male workers to the war effort. 
Integration of the massive number of unemployed sustained the expansion initially, but 
the breakneck pace of production would have been impossible to sustain without the 
massive increase in female workers. The latter comprised 60 percent of the 10 million 
new labor force entrants from 1940 to 1945, and took up critical positions in 
                                                
 
49 This explanation stood in sharp contrast to theories that linked wages with the absolute 
size of the working population (or any of its supposedly peculiar characteristics). “Every 
particular historical mode of production,” Marx (1977, 1:784) argued, “has its own 
special laws of population, which are historically valid only within that particular 
sphere.” This was a direct response to Malthus, whose “‘law of population’” 
hypothesized that “an increase in real wages above subsistence level…would lead to an 
increase in population which, owing to the decreasing returns to the land, would lower 
the real wage again until it reached an ‘equilibrium’—the subsistence level.” In Malthus’ 
theory, Marx “perceived…the hidden intention of offering a general apology for all the 
ills of capitalism, by making out that poverty was a law of nature” (Steindl 1976, 247; 
Marx 1977, 1:289). While few would defend the “law of population” in its “iron law of 
wages” form today, mainstream economics still clings to a naturalized view of 
unemployment, i.e. as “market failure”—the system not working like it should under 
“optimal” conditions. For Marx, this “failure” resulted in the reproduction of the reserve 
army, and thus made the whole system of surplus production possible. 
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manufacturing. This extremely rapid increase of the labor force illustrates the great 
depths of the reserve army and of course puts the lie to supply side claims of a worker 
skills gap. However, female workers were massively demobilized from all “traditionally 
male” occupations following the end of hostilities, and mass layoffs were particularly 
abrupt in the most technical (higher-wage) occupations (Medvin 1950, 196-7; Enloe 
1980, 44; Schweitzer 2010, 90-1). 
To grasp the importance of this moment, one must appreciate the fact that strikes 
continued to increase in both frequency and intensity from 1935 right through 1949, 
peaking in 1946 (Medvin 1950). This trend did not go unnoticed by the largest 
employers. Although the assault on organized labor was interrupted by the war (having 
already begun in 1938), the militarized economy allowed corporations to concentrate 
their power significantly (Koistinen 1973, 478; Piven and Cloward 1979, 164). As a 
result, they took decisive action to counter organized labor soon after the war ended. On 
the political front corporate efforts culminated in the brazenly reactionary Taft-Hartley 
Act (passed in 1947), which summarily reversed the growth in union membership (Piven 
and Cloward 1979, 168-70). On the economic front, employers—who viewed the return 
of millions of male workers and an evaporation of wartime demand as a potentially 
disastrous combination—were only too willing to eliminate women from core industries 
by exploiting the resumption of sexist stereotypes. In total, some 2.5 million women left 
the labor force in the first year of peace, significantly restocking the reserve army of 
labor. Despite this initial demobilization, rapid postwar growth ensured that labor 
demand was vigorous for much of the decade (MLR 1946, 669-70). Women, however, 
were completely closed off from the high-wage positions they had held during the war, 
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and instead forced back into the growing labor reserves of industries and occupations 
“that had always employed women” (Schweitzer 2010, 90).50 Once the men returned, 
remarked Lola Weixel in the classic film “The Life and Times of Rosie the Riveter,” “We 
were no longer comrades in arms, we were competitors for what little there was. It was a 
very sharp contrast indeed because there was a lot of money going around but it wasn’t in 
our pockets.… It was over for us.” This meant restoration of the patently discriminatory 
wage norms necessary to satisfy the rate of exploitation demanded in such industries.51 “I 
could always get these jobs even though I didn’t want them,” said Wanita Allen. “Any 
time it was a restaurant job, or a dishwashing job, or a kitchen job… I always felt like 
blacks could get those because they save those jobs for us” (Field 1980). 
The actions taken by capital in this period indicate that the significance of the reserve 
army is deeper than is typically asserted—e.g., as a buffer to protect profits from wage 
demands. Profits, while obviously of central importance, are invariably conditioned by 
factors independent of the wage rate (as exemplified by the tendency of 
overaccumulation described above). “The rise and fall of wages is only a mechanism 
through which capitalists are compelled to develop the forces of production,” and does 
                                                
 
50 The tendency to attract and repel groups of vulnerable laborers is an enduring 
characteristic of the accumulation process, as our resolution of the third anomaly below 
demonstrates. 
51 In this connection, it is important to note that “female” industries and occupations 
continued to grow at the same time as “traditionally male” sectors (for example, 
manufacturing) steadily contracted. This process is sometimes referred to as the 
“feminization” of labor, but the term is misleading. The incomes of both men and women 
alike have actually polarized to a significant degree (Morris and Western 1999, 628). 
This suggests there are deeper forces involved in the changing nature of occupations, 
which are superficially (though not insignificantly) affected by the persistence of 
patriarchal relations. 
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not determine the pattern of accumulation (Clarke 1994, 254). The crucial importance of 
the reserve army, according to Marx, is that it sets the background conditions “against 
which the law of the demand and supply of labour does its work. It confines the field of 
action of this law to the limits absolutely convenient to capital’s drive to exploit and 
dominate the workers” (1977, 1:792). For owners and managers, the absolute necessity of 
the reserve army is viscerally felt when strong labor demand tips the scale of power 
toward workers, who immediately begin to challenge all facets of the labor process, not 
simply wages.52 It is the broad impact of the reserve army of labor that gives capital the 
power to maintain acceptable conditions for capital accumulation—and it is not hard to 
see why. The reserve army looms as a constant threat to the employed, putting a “curb on 
their pretensions” under relatively stable conditions. “The pressure of the unemployed 
compels those who are employed to furnish more labour, and therefore makes the supply 
of labour to a certain extent independent of the supply of workers.” Even in periods of 
rapid expansion, workers are drawn from the reserve army, so “the general demand for 
labour increases only to the extent of the excess of the employed over those ‘set free’,” 
thereby ensuring that wage movements are kept within an acceptable range that 
corresponds with, but never exceeds, the “energy and extent” of accumulation (Marx 
1977, 1:782-3). 
                                                
 
52 Whether labor markets are tight or controlled by strong labor unions, however, workers 
“cannot, in the long run, change the distribution of income to the detriment of profits. The 
system…has an internal servomechanism to defend the profit rate against labour 
encroachment” (Flakierski 2004, 91). Since workers depend for their livelihood on 
capital’s ability to achieve sustain accumulation they must ultimately acquiesce to 
employer demands. The only other option is to reject the existing set of production 
relations. 
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From this vantage point, it makes little sense to characterize the relation between 
wage laborers and capital as a “free market” since capital is able to act decisively on both 
the demand- and the supply-side of the equation (Marx 1977, 1:793).53 This “totally 
contradicts the way in which markets are supposed to work,” and implies that labor 
markets hardly represent an exchange between equals, even if exchange of equivalent 
values prevails (Harvey 2010b, 277). Indeed, to the extent that “equilibrium” exists in a 
given labor market, the corresponding wage level merely represents an upper limit 
conditioned by the requirements of accumulation. “The great beauty of capitalist 
production,” says Marx with characteristic irony, 
consists in this, that it not only constantly reproduces the wage-labourer as a 
wage-labourer, but also always produces a relative surplus population of wage-
labourers in proportion to the accumulation of capital. Thus the law of supply and 
demand as applied to labour is kept on right lines, the oscillation of wages is 
confined within limits satisfactory to capitalist exploitation, and lastly, the social 
dependence of the worker on the capitalist, which is indispensable, is secured 
(Marx 1977, 1:935). 
Marx’s prescient observation that the accumulation process tended (over the long-
term) to result in the concentration and centralization of capital made up the final element 
of the general law. By “concentration” Marx meant an absolute increase of capital by 
individual capitalists (accumulation proper). This occurs as non-capitalist forms of 
                                                
 
53 While we abstract from the impact of trade unions and social welfare policies at this 
point, it should be obvious that any such efforts will be strongly impacted by the 
existence of the reserve army. 
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production (e.g., craft work, traditional farming, etc.) are transformed along capitalist 
lines, thus ensuring the “social dependence of the worker on the capitalist.” Even more 
important today, however, and much more rapid, is centralization, which refers to the 
consolidation of existing capitals (e.g., via mergers and takeovers) “in a single hand in 
one place, because it has been lost by many in another place” (Marx 1977, 1:776-7). By 
bringing a larger mass of labor and capital together, the scale of production increases, 
leading to higher labor productivity, which gives a distinct advantage to larger capitals 
over the smaller.54 Yet this progressive concentration and centralization also creates the 
conditions for increasingly more rapid movements in accumulation as the reserve army 
grows proportionally, thereby providing the basis for accelerated revolutions in the 
process of production. “It is not, therefore, the technology itself that is the main lever of 
accumulation, but the pool of surplus laborers to which it gives rise” (Harvey 2010b, 274; 
Marx 1977, 1:568-9). The suggestion here is that qualitative changes in the accumulation 
process brought about by centralization will result in equally impactful changes in the 
form of the reserve army itself.55 This evolutionary aspect of the theory of the general law 
clearly has significant implications for the reserve army, which is likely why Marx 
devoted so much attention to the social form of the latter. 
                                                
 
54 In the words of Veblen (Veblen 2011, 383-4): “The farther and faster capital 
accumulates, the larger will be the reserve of unemployed, both absolutely and relatively 
to the work to be done, and the more severe will be the pressure acting to reduce wages 
and lower the standard of living.” 
55 Some theorists have, accordingly, responded to uncritical approaches by emphasizing 
that Marx treated the reserve army as an “actual historical development” that could not 
“be understood apart from the process of capital accumulation” (Yanz and Smith 1983, 
94). 
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C. The Sociology of the Reserve Army 
The necessary existence of an industrial reserve army of labor was actually first 
theorized by Engels in The Condition of the Working Class in England (1984). Marx’s 
subsequent historical analysis mirrored and extended that of Engels. An intriguing result 
of this follow-up analysis was that Marx became progressively more skeptical of the 
official statistics available to construct the categories of the reserve army. These 
measures tended to become “more and more misleading” as the reserve army grew in 
size, since its growth revealed the failures of the system to workers with ever more 
damning clarity (Marx 1977, 1:808). Marx’s careful and critical investigation into the 
conditions of labor in a variety of countries ultimately resulted in a method of 
categorization of the reserve army that has proven to be surprisingly robust. This led to 
the identification of four basic layers of the “relative surplus population” or “reserve 
army of labor”: the “floating,” “latent,” “stagnant,” and, its “lowest sediment,” the 
pauperized (1977, 1:794).56 Although the reserve army concepts were derived from 
existing historical conditions, Marx emphasizes their dynamic nature by linking them to 
the level of development of the productive forces of society. Moreover, as we briefly 
sketch the development and relations of these layers, it is important to bear in mind that 
the sociological categorization of the reserve army came before Marx’s elaboration of the 
general law in the narrative—once again highlighting the central importance of the 
reserve army itself. 
                                                
 
56 International Labor Organization (ILO) reports on “Global Employment Trends” use 
virtually identical categories (ILO 2011; Foster and McChesney 2012, 145), showing that 
Marx’s conceptualization of the reserve army still provides a firm basis upon which to 
build a comprehensive picture of the labor force. 
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1. Floating Surplus Population 
The most tumultuous layer of the reserve army is the floating population, which 
comes into existence as a counterpart to the extensive application of machinery and the 
intensive refinement of the labor process. Here, at the center of modern industry,57 the 
working population is in constant flux—not only because of an unceasing compulsion to 
reduce labor requirements, but also because the “consumption of labour-power is so 
rapid” that the human body can only withstand the physical torture of work for a short 
time before it is no longer suitable to capital. The factories, workshops, mines, etc., thus 
tend to seek out the freshest, most easily exploitable layers of the reserve army—
particularly children, young women and “nomadic” (migrant) laborers (Marx 1977, 
1:818).58 Because of the chaotic and intense nature of production in modern industry, 
flows in and out of the floating population tend be extremely high. As noted above, this 
manic relation to labor is a distinguishing feature of modern industry: its apparently 
insatiable appetite at one moment is matched by an equally strong repulsion the very next 
moment (Marx 1977, 1:575-88). Given its consistent and rapid replenishment, the 
floating population is closely related to the “officially unemployed” of contemporary 
                                                
 
57 For clarification, note that Marx also uses the term “manufacture” to describe the 
revolutions in production associated with changes in the “organization of labor”; in 
contrast, the stage described above, which some have termed “machinofacture” is 
characterized by revolutions in the “instruments of labor.” The latter stage is marked by 
the complete removal of the tool “from the worker’s hand,” which is now “placed in the 
grip of a mechanism,” (Braverman 1998, 117; Sweezy 1981, 37) and ultimately the 
production of machines by machines. 
58 That sweatshops almost as horrific as those described by Marx still exist today (even in 
the U.S., see GAO 1994)—as evidenced by a recent rash of textile fires (Shah 2012; 
Alam 2012) and a catastrophic building collapse (AP 2013)—is unfortunate proof of the 
existence of a modern floating population (Esbenshade 2004; Ross 2004; Angela and 
Wills 2005). 
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statistics. Of course, this is primarily because it contains the most visible or “active” part 
of the reserve army—i.e., those immediately available and particularly suitable to the 
needs of industry. 
2. Latent Surplus Population 
The next layer of the reserve army is the latent surplus population. For the most part 
this refers to the (self-sustaining) segments of the agricultural (or rural) population. In 
many countries the agricultural population59 is still quite large today, and thus serves as a 
vast sink of potential labor (hence, “latent”). The latent population is an important source 
of fresh labor power for modern industry and has historically been “released” by forceful 
means. (Marx 1977, 1:848). As Marx pointed out, in England and Ireland a devastating 
sequence of events—regressive legislation, concentration of farms, land conversion, labor 
rationalization, and mechanization—eventually reduced the agricultural population to a 
mass of paupers. This massive dispossessed population had little choice but to cram into 
rural towns or cities, which increased the supply of labor available to manufacturers. 
However, even as the new agricultural and manufacturing industries began to absorb a 
portion of the dispossessed agricultural laborers, causing local shortages, the periodic 
introduction of new layers of the latent surplus population—in particular women and 
children (via the “gang-system”)—consistently replenished labor reserves, ensuring 
                                                
 
59 While “subsistence population” may seem like an appropriate substitute for 
“agricultural population,” the former term usually connotes conditions of poverty. The 
irony, of course, is that it is precisely the progress of accumulation, which mercilessly 
devalues agricultural labor, that has contributed to this linguistic devaluation (Braverman 
1998, 300-1). 
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stabilized wages rates (Marx 1977, 1:850).60 In spite of absolute declines in population in 
Ireland, for example, there always remained a significantly large surplus population in 
rural areas. 
3. Stagnant Surplus Population 
The stagnant population forms a “refuge” from the branches of industry associated 
with the floating and latent populations. This layer continuously absorbs the stream of 
workers expelled from modern industry and agriculture, representing an “inexhaustible 
reservoir of disposable labour power” (Marx 1977, 1:796). In the stagnant layer 
employment is “extremely irregular”; and to the extent its members attain employment at 
all, their degree of exploitation tends to be extremely high (Marx 1977, 1:798). Central to 
this category for Marx was the development of “modern ‘domestic industry’,” an adjunct 
of modern manufacturing. In this industry, according to Marx (1977, 1:591), exploitation 
is “still more shameless than in modern manufacture,” 
because the workers’ power of resistance declines with their dispersal; because a 
whole series of plundering parasites insinuate themselves between the actual 
employer and the worker he employs; because a domestic industry has always to 
compete either with the factory system, or with manufacturing in the same branch 
of production; because poverty robs the worker of the conditions most essential to 
                                                
 
60 On this point it is tempting to assume, along with W. Arthur Lewis, the great 
economist and founder of development economics (who borrowed heavily from Marx’s 
reserve army analysis), that increased accumulation will eventually benefit the broader 
population since the “surplus, after all, is only partly consumed; the other part is used for 
capital formation,” i.e., reinvested in the economy (1954, 154). Like so many other 
economists, however, Lewis ignores the inexorable tendency toward polarization inherent 
to accumulation (Harvey 2010b, 286)—a tendency that is especially pronounced in 
“labour reserve economies” (Patnaik 2010, 45). 
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his labour, of space, light and ventilation; because employment becomes more 
and more irregular; and, finally, because in these last places of refuge for the 
masses made ‘redundant’ by large-scale industry and agriculture, competition for 
work necessarily attains its maximum.61 
Labor conditions were particularly horrid in modern domestic industry because it 
took the stagnant surplus population as its basis—i.e., the conditions of the former were 
reflective of the conditions of the latter. In the case analyzed by Marx, a super-abundance 
of cheap, freshly exploitable labor—the majority of whom were women and children—
actually forestalled mechanization initially, leading to the persistence of needlessly 
dangerous and oppressive production processes. Mechanization only commenced when 
efforts to cheapen the value of labor power came up against obstacles (see Chapter 
VIII.B.1 for further discussion). This took the form of rapid development of ever-more 
productive textile machines, which rendered the existing tools of workers obsolete and 
signaled the integration of outwork into the factory proper (Marx 1977, 1:602-4). 
This description of the character of production in modern domestic industry clearly 
foreshadows accounts of the growth of informal or “precarious” forms of work—
“‘flexible,’ part-time, fixed term, temporary or agency jobs” (Thornley, Jefferys, and 
Appay 2010, 2). However, Marx actually goes much further, arguing that the “conditions 
                                                
 
61 Some of the cruelest forms of exploitation in the stagnant population were inflicted 
upon children in their own homes and by their own parents, who conducted outwork for 
large-scale textile operations (i.e., in “modern domestic industry”). The parents, so 
demented by the their condition of existence, came to “think of nothing but getting as 
much as possible out of their children” (Marx 1977, 1:599, 798). In response to the notion 
that the parents were to blame Marx trenchantly replied that “the capitalist mode of 
exploitation, by sweeping away the economic foundation which corresponded to parental 
power, made the use of parental power into its misuse” (Marx 1977, 1:620). 
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of existence” of all workers become increasingly more “precarious” (1977, 1:798) 
because the contradictions of the reserve army are intensified by the concentration and 
centralization of capital. Indeed, the final category of the reserve army that Marx 
identified is suggestive of the general direction of the accumulation process—absent a 
radical alteration of its form. 
4. Pauperized Surplus Population 
Marx identified the “lowest sediment” of the relative surplus population with 
pauperized workers. This was because the largest portion of this layer dwelt “in the 
sphere of official pauperism”—the remainder being made up by “vagabonds, criminals, 
prostitutes, in short the actual lumpenproletariat.” The degrees of pauperism Marx 
identified among English workers sound disturbingly familiar today: the long-term 
unemployed of the most immediate crisis; poor and/or disaffected youth; and those so 
victimized by work experience—as a result of age, physical injury, or an incapacity to 
adapt—that capital no longer has any use for them (Marx 1977, 1:797-8). Despite their 
“relative impoverishment”63 the majority of those in the pauperized layer of the reserve 
                                                
 
63 The term used here is intended to highlight the bankruptcy of the “immiseration 
thesis,” which portrays Marx’s general law as crude pronouncement of the “absolute” 
impoverishment of the working class (Heinrich 2012, 127; Foster and McChesney 2012, 
125; Fracchia 2008). (Also see Araghi 2003, 62, en3, on national differences.) In this 
connection it is important to note Marx’s qualified use of the term, “pauperism” (i.e., 
“official pauperism”), which is different from contemporary usage, which implies an 
inability to work and complete reliance on charity. In contrast, Marx points to a growing 
mass of impoverished humans: people fully capable of working, and often already 
producing much more than they consume, yet who cannot find enough employment, or 
any at all. “The great and growing evil in the United States,” H. J. Walls (1879, 22), the 
first commissioner of the BLS for the State of Ohio stated in 1879, “is poverty of the 
masses. Poverty is more than an evil, it is a crime, not that the individual poor are 
criminals, far from it, but poverty is the greatest crime of society against the individual, 
and is the progenitor of nine-tenths of the criminals in the country.” 
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army are able and willing to work.64 Indeed, from a reserve army perspective, the actual 
extent of “unemployment” only begins to become apparent after the fact, so to speak, “in 
times of great prosperity,” when the floating population is fully absorbed, and when large 
sections of the stagnant and pauperized populations are “enrolled in the army of active 
workers” (Marx 1977, 1:797; Engels 1984, 117-8). At that point, it was possible to see 
how truly elastic the labor supply was. Still, at this point the full extent of the reserve 
army may still not be apparent if a significant latent surplus population exists—a 
situation that most certainly still obtains in many countries, such as India and China 
(Patnaik 2007; Amin 2003). 
                                                
 
64 This type of explanation is, of course, entirely alien to the modern-day economist, who 
would be quick to label the majority of these layers of the population as “unemployable” 
or “voluntarily unemployed.” Yet Marx is only making explicit a connection that has 
been supported by sociological work on the labor process (Zimbalist 1979; Navarro 
1982), and psychological work on unemployment (Oreopoulos, Page, and Stevens 2008; 
Per-Anders and Gustavsson 2008; Sullivan and Wachter 2009). In short, the degree of 
estrangement of the working population from “gainful” employment is proportional to 
the degree of torment of past work and/or unemployment experience (for an elaboration 
of this point, see Fracchia 2008). 
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE RESERVE ARMY AND THE ANOMALIES OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
Given the persistence of the reserve army, it should be clear that focusing on the 
economic categories of “employment” or “unemployment,” as they are constructed by 
mainstream economics, is entirely unhelpful. As Schervish (1978) recognized, the reserve 
army concept considerably deepens both categories by revealing the dialectical 
connection between the structure of unemployment and the structure of employment. 
Moreover, as part of the general law, the dynamic development of the reserve army (as 
reflected by its changing sociological composition) represents an intractable contradiction 
for the accumulation process. Thus, in Marx’s most concise statement of the general law, 
we find that the sustained production of wealth under capitalist social relations comes at a 
very high price: 
The greater the social wealth, the functioning capital, the extent and energy of its 
growth, and therefore also the greater the absolute mass of the proletariat and the 
productivity of its labour, the greater is the industrial reserve army.… The relative 
mass of the industrial reserve army thus increases with the potential energy of 
wealth. But the greater this reserve army in proportion to the active labour-army, 
the greater is the mass of a consolidated surplus population, whose misery is in 
inverse ratio to the amount of torture it has to undergo in the form of labour. The 
more extensive, finally, the pauperized sections of the working class and the 
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industrial reserve army, the greater is official pauperism. This is the absolute 
general law of capitalist accumulation. (1977, 1:798) 
This dim prognosis of the general law arises in part from the conclusion that the 
historical limitations of the system prevents any thorough, rational response to the reserve 
army (Marx 1991, 3:368); and in the current historical context Marx’s skepticism seems 
hardly to have been misplaced. However, to grasp the subtlety of Marx’s approach one 
must be careful to avoid common misinterpretations (or distortions) of the general law. 
Marx is synthesizing numerous strands of the argument at this point in Capital, and thus 
appropriately concludes the latter paragraph with a familiar caution: “Like all other laws 
it is modified in its working by many circumstances, the analysis of which does not 
concern us here.” Marx does indeed make important qualifications to the general law; and 
it should come as no surprise that qualitative changes in the historical environment turn 
out to be of particular importance, especially with regard to unemployment and the 
reserve army. 
By isolating the core contradictions of capitalist accumulation Marx is not suggesting 
an end to the analysis (or the “automatic” demise of the system): rather, the point is to 
provide a firm basis upon which to assess subsequent developments.65 The very survival 
of the system suggests that “counteracting influences must be at work, checking and 
                                                
 
65 As Sweezy pointed out long ago, Marx 1) uses the term “absolute” in its Hegelian 
sense of “abstract”; and 2) is working at a high level of abstraction in the first volume of 
Capital, so certain conclusions undergo considerable modification at lower levels of 
abstraction “when the analysis is brought to a more concrete level” (1942, 18-19). “All of 
Marx’s statements which appear to be making universal claims,” Fracchia (1991, 165) 
adds, “are actually conscious abstractions. As guides for the historical-materialist 
scientist they are useful abstractions; but, prior to being given content and corrected by 
the results of concrete historical-empirical analysis, they are simply abstractions, and 
certainly not statements of universal truth.” 
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cancelling” predicted tendencies and, in some cases giving rise to new sets of 
contradictions (Marx 1991, 3:339; Mészáros 1995, 560; Becker 1977). These insights 
suggest that the three anomalies of unemployment are closely tied to the unfolding 
contradictions of accumulation typified by the growth and persistence of the reserve 
army. Indeed, where, from the standpoint of mainstream economics, persistent 
unemployment, jobless recoveries, and worker precariousness manifest as stubborn 
anomalies, the very same phenomena appear as straightforward expectations when 
viewed within the classical sociological paradigm. 
A. The Inevitability of Unemployment 
In the classical reserve army perspective the first anomaly, persistent unemployment, 
is understood as a necessary part of capital accumulation; it exists at all times—save 
exceptionally rapid bursts in economic activity.66 In the U.S., this has been evident from 
the moment the BLS began compiling labor statistics to present (Du Boff 1977a). In the 
BLS’s first annual report (for the state of Ohio)—a report, incidentally, that was of 
considerable interest to Marx67—then commissioner H. J. Walls explained that 
                                                
 
66 “If the quantity of unpaid labour supplied by the working class and accumulated by the 
capitalist class increases so rapidly that its transformation into capital requires an 
extraordinary addition of paid labour, then wages rise and, all other circumstances 
remaining equal, the unpaid labour diminishes in proportion” (Marx 1977, 1:771, 
emphasis added). Even exceptionally rapid bursts in activity may not substantially reduce 
unemployment in underdeveloped countries as we explain below. 
67 In reworking the materials for volume 2 and volume 3 of Capital, Marx transcribed 
numerous long sections of this report—and it is no mystery why upon inspection. In his 
testimony Walls reminded legislators that the “Bureau” owed “its existence to…the labor 
reform movement,” explaining why he had no qualms forthrightly advocating on behalf 
of workers. The report contains copious references to critical political economists, an 
exceptionally detailed history of labor (from the dissolution of serfdom through the 
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unemployment was the central cause of the starkly unequal distribution of wealth that had 
accrued over a decade of prosperity (1863–1873). During this period, wealth, measured 
by the change in the total value of personal property, grew by 87 percent. However, “this 
vast increase in wealth and wealth producing power,” 
[even] with the small relative increase in population, did not prevent our 
industries from becoming paralyzed, and workingmen by the hundreds and 
thousands denied the right to earn bread for themselves and families. 
The wealth and wealth-producing power remain intact, the brains and muscle are 
eager for employment, and nothing prevents a new era of prosperity but the 
poverty of the masses. Their wants are unsupplied, and their inability to supply 
them is keeping the work-shops of the State closed, or nearly so. They must have 
work and wages before their wants can be supplied, but they can not, under 
existing conditions, commence production and increase consumption except at the 
will of others, who possess the wealth and machinery for production. 
The system under which labor receives its reward—the wages system—is the 
main cause of labor’s poverty. (Walls 1878, 528) 
In the nascent industrial powerhouse of Ohio, it was clear that the “surplus of 
laborers” belonged primarily to the floating layer of the reserve army, as they had been 
cast out of the “industrial centers of the State.” In the majority of a letter accompanying a 
survey circulated to the agricultural population, commissioner Walls implored these 
                                                                                                                                            
 
consolidation of the wage system), and an impressive historical-comparative argument 
(based on English labor history) for greatly strengthening and expanding unions in the 
U.S. (1878, 526, passim; Marx and Engels 2011, IV:95-122). 
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redundant laborers to stay in Ohio, instead of moving out west “to take up government or 
other unimproved lands” (Walls 1878, 828). The history behind the commissioner’s 
concern is of course that vast “uninhabited” lands became available after the 
extermination of the majority of the indigenous population of America. This abundance 
of cheap land meant that workers could effectively escape the active layer of the reserve 
army by making a living off of agricultural land. The problem, of course, is that this 
could easily cause significant labor shortages at the resumption of accumulation. As 
Marx pointed out, where “the separation of the worker from the conditions of labour and 
from the soil” does not yet exist (or is too limited) “the labour-market is always 
understocked. The law of the supply and demand of labour collapses completely” (1977, 
1:935-6). When, in such a case, “adverse circumstances prevent the creation of an 
industrial reserve army,” capitalists try to “make up for its inadequacies by forcible 
means” (1977, 1:794). Luckily for the U.S., a continuous wave of immigrants ensured the 
existence of a significantly large reserve army. According to Marx this substantial reserve 
army, coupled with profligate land giveaways to business (which raised its price to 
workers and prevented them from leaving the labor market),68 is what allowed the U.S. to 
achieve “a very rapid centralization of capital” (1977, 1:940). 
B. A New Era of Accumulation: Monopoly and the Jobless Recovery 
Given that jobless recoveries are of relatively recent origin, they evidently represent a 
significant challenge to the classical reserve army perspective. After all, who would deny 
that 21st century capitalism bears little direct resemblance to the system confronted by 
                                                
 
68 “An artificial high price upon colonial land” serves to “prevent the too quick 
conversion of the wages labourer into the independent peasant” (Marx 1976, 59, book 2). 
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Marx toward the end of the late 19th century? In Capital Marx based his model of the 
economy on classical (or “price-based”) competition—the omnipresent force that 
subordinates “every individual capitalist to the immanent laws of capitalist production, as 
external and coercive laws” (1977, 1:739). To the extent that concentration and 
centralization limit or distort the dynamics of competition, these laws clearly must 
undergo significant alteration—and this has indeed been the case. Consequently, a fuller 
understanding of the phenomenon of economic “maturity and stagnation” (Steindl 1976) 
is key to unraveling the anomaly of the jobless recovery. 
Even so, Marx still managed to anticipate the broad outlines of the historical 
transformation of the system with impressive clarity.69 This is evidenced by the extent to 
which the theory of economic stagnation is grounded within Marx’s general law and the 
contradictions posed by the reserve army.70 Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to say 
                                                
 
69 Recent scholarship has shown that Marx was fully aware that capitalism was in the 
midst of profound transformation near the time of his death in the late 1800s—the dawn 
of monopoly capitalism—and intended to make significant changes to newer editions of 
the first volume of Capital (Heinrich 2013, 30). Indeed, a close reading of volumes 2 and 
3 of Capital shows that Marx intended to modify the general law of accumulation in 
important ways as he successively integrated new phenomenon, such as interest, credit, 
economic crisis, the state, etc., into the analysis (Heinrich 2012). A continuous struggle to 
identify the system’s “innermost causal determinations” (Mészáros 1995, 108) certainly 
epitomized Marx’s approach, but he “persistently followed his methodological rules 
despite the difficult restrictions…[they] imposed on the scope of his analysis” (Araghi 
2003, 42). Thus, while Marx refrained from making specific historical predictions his 
analysis was influenced at every step by changing historical conditions, and this explains 
why the general law theoretically anticipates important tendencies associated specifically 
with the new constellation of forces consolidated under the regime of monopoly. 
70 Moreover, it is highly likely that Marx would have addressed the problem of stagnation 
specifically, as indicated by the following passage from his unfinished manuscript on 
“Wages”: “If the growth of productive capital progresses only slowly, if it remains 
stationary or even decreases, the number of workers is always too large in proportion to 
the demand for labour” (1975, 6:433). 
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that the general law contains the germ of the theory of stagnation (Steindl 1976, 246). By 
allowing actual historical events to account for the varying strength and direction of the 
tendencies Marx identified, it is possible to make visible the shoots and branches 
connecting the classical and monopoly capital perspectives (sections 1 and 2). In so 
doing, we shall provide a solution to the second anomaly of unemployment (section 3).  
1. Concentration, Centralization and Contradiction 
According to Marx, concentration and centralization of capital was the most 
important long-term tendency of the accumulation process and had serious implications 
for the reserve army. Even the fruits of victories by organized workers (e.g., a reduction 
of the working day) are transformed into spoils because they stimulate “the general 
conversion of numerous isolated small industries into a few combined industries” and 
thereby accelerate “the concentration of capital and the exclusive predominance of the 
factory system.” The precarious sectors that form mere appendages of the factory, such 
as, for example, “modern domestic industry,” are eventually subsumed—destroying also 
the “last resorts of the ‘redundant population,’ thereby removing what was previously a 
safety-valve for the whole social mechanism.”71 Each wave of accumulation, “by 
maturing the material conditions and the social combination of the process of production, 
[also] matures the contradictions and antagonisms of the capitalist form of that process” 
(Marx 1977, 1:635). 
                                                
 
71 This of course does not mean the disappearance of the reserve army; it refers instead to 
an increase in the degree of precariousness within the reserve army, and especially within 
its stagnant layer. 
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As the passage above suggests, Marx understood concentration as a finite period of 
historical development, associated specifically with the subsumption of non-capitalist or 
small-scale industry. Most importantly, this means that under conditions of concentration 
a fundamental requirement of capital, growth, is satisfied to a significant extent, allowing 
accumulation to continue relatively unimpeded—quite apart from its disastrous impact 
on that part of the population continually thrown into the reserve army. An explanation of 
this divergence—which is not simply possible but necessary—helps to explain the 
historic importance of concentration.  
Due to the antagonistic character of the accumulation process—dominated as it is by 
the drive of capital to increase the rate of exploitation—the income of workers, or their 
consuming power, is always held to a minimum; obversely, the surplus appropriated by 
capitalists, or their power to accumulate,72 is maximized. Of course, “the great masses of 
people in practically every field of activity who continue to be ruthlessly ejected from the 
labour process and dismissed as ‘redundant’ by the imperatives of profitable capital-
expansion are very far indeed from being superfluous as consumers required for securing 
the continuity of capital’s self-valorization and enlarged reproduction” (Mészáros 1995, 
233). This highlights the contradiction between production and realization: there is no 
                                                
 
72 Technically, this would also include the personal consumption of capitalists but the 
latter become an increasingly tinier proportion of the entire population at the same time 
that the mass of surplus they appropriate grows significantly. Accordingly we adopt the 
simplifying assumption here that this magnitude is negligible at the level of the economy 
as a whole. 
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guarantee that what is produced will be sold because the sale of commodities is 
ultimately determined by an independent (and often unpredictable) set of factors.73  
Indeed, if the extent to which the surplus could be realized—i.e., converted from its 
form as a commodity into its money form—were determined entirely by the consuming 
power of workers then, ceterus paribus, accumulation would not simply be constrained, it 
would be impossible.74 Capital must grow since growth is the only way it can resolve this 
reproductive contradiction. Concentration resolves (temporarily) the contradictory basis 
upon which the “capitalist form” of production is erected by extending the field of 
operation of capital, which provides an essential impetus for continued accumulation, or 
reinvestment of the surplus (or profits). 
                                                
 
73 In Marx’s words: “The conditions for immediate exploitation and for the realization of 
that exploitation are not identical. Not only are they separate in time and space, they are 
also separate in theory” (1991, 3:352). 
74 For analytical purposes production is divided into two broad sectors or “departments”: 
consumer goods (necessary commodities) and investment goods (capital). In Value, Price 
and Profit, Marx implicitly uses a three-department scheme, with “luxury goods” (non-
necessities) making up a third department (Marx 1981; Marx 1976, 13, book 2). These 
concepts, as well as that of “maturity,” were rooted in the reproduction schemes Marx 
used to investigate the circulation of capital (1981, 2:136). For our purposes, the main 
point is that for capitalism to grow rapidly the investment-goods department must expand 
both absolutely and relatively to the consumer-goods department—and indeed the 
monopoly-capitalist system generates a growing investment-seeking surplus. But actual 
investment is dependent on expected profits on future production. Hence, the social 
disproportionality between the two departments, arising from the tendency for surplus to 
rise (the inverse of which is the tendency of the wages of productive workers to decline), 
is a major contributing factor in the emergence of saturated markets and vanishing 
investment opportunities. Kalecki summed this up in his pithy phrase: “the tragedy of 
investment is that it causes crisis because it is useful” (1939, 149). 
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Marx went on to suggest that the process of concentration could not go on indefinitely 
within a given country because the economic system would eventually “mature”75 as 
modern systems of production predominated and small-scale industry was relegated to 
the margins. It follows that in mature economies capital must find some new basis to 
support continued accumulation. As noted above, Marx argued that centralization would 
tend to rise in prominence at this point, stimulating the development of credit and the 
stock market institutions that would in turn contribute to an exponential increase in the 
forces of centralization.76 In a classically competitive context the primary means of 
competition between large firms is simply greater production, which accelerates the 
accumulation of capital goods and further develops the capacity to build yet newer and 
more sophisticated means of production (Marx 1977, 1:739). In this situation there is an 
increasing likelihood of generalized overproduction or overaccumulation of capital. Far 
from stabilizing the accumulation process, this implies that centralization tendencies will 
tend quickly to spiral out of control as increases in output lead to bitter competition at 
great expense to producers. While Marx did not take the classical reserve army analysis 
too far beyond this moment of contradiction, the inherently chaotic nature of these 
                                                
 
75 Marx used the term “mature” in a somewhat different sense than Steindl (1976, 132), 
and the concept underwent an important modification by the time it was eventually used 
by Baran and Sweezy (see Sweezy 1981, 37-9). Marx was focused on the tendency of 
maturity to deepen the contradictions of capitalist economies, and weaken their 
dynamism. However, as we explain, the key tendency Marx associated with maturity— 
concentration (or monopolization)—itself came to affect the essential dynamics of the 
system. From this standpoint, it is quite appropriate to identify the growth of monopoly as 
a qualitatively new stage of capitalism. 
76 In reality the two processes occur unevenly across economies as a result of the 
dominance of advanced, monopolistic economies of the core capitalist countries (roughly 
the G8) over nearly all other countries. (see Chapter VIII.C.2 for further discussion).  
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processes comes into sharp relief against the backdrop of subsequent historical 
developments. 
2. Rise of the Monopolistic Firm  
Indeed, one could have witnessed such events unfolding in the United States circa 
1890, when gluts led to bitter price wars and deep economic crises. As one prominent 
business historian relays, the new mass production industries “depended on high-volume, 
relatively steady levels of operating to achieve their low cost per unit of output. This 
made them inclined to keep the production lines rolling, which in turn contributed to the 
persistent decline in prices that marked the latter half of the nineteenth century and 
heightened business concerns about what many saw as excessive competition” (Porter 
2006, 13). The trend toward monopolization, moreover, “was accentuated by the crisis of 
over-production which was…the immediate case of the ‘great depression’ [as it was 
called in Europe at the time] between 1873 and 1895” (Barraclough 1964, 44). Mounting 
crisis reached its crescendo in the great merger waves of the late 19th and early 20th 
century (see Du Boff 1989). Early 20th century commentators recognized that capitalism 
had entered an entirely new stage of development (Hobsbawm 1994, 103-4), symbolized 
by the emergence of the modern corporation as the dominant form of business 
organization, but most were blind to the full significance of the transformation.77 
A prescient theorist in this respect was Thorstein Veblen, who was a vociferous critic 
of the economic orthodoxy that grew along with the giant corporation. Veblen (1923, 79) 
                                                
 
77 For theorists who adhered to a classical interpretation of the general law, the pivotal 
importance of this historical moment was obvious, and this is evidenced by the 
emergence and continuous development of MC theory (Lenin 1984; Hilferding 1981; H. 
Magdoff and Sweezy 2009). 
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argued that three main factors contributed to the decline of the “old-fashioned 
competitive system”: a) the existence of “excessively productive” industrial capacity b) 
an end to “territorial expansion” in search of new markets and c) the proliferation of 
credit and security markets. “The result is not that competition ceases or declines” when 
“collusive or corporate combination” becomes the norm, Veblen (1923, 128) further 
explained, “but only that it takes a new turn, commonly with an increased vigor and 
persistence.” The key difference was that “ruinous price competition” was effectively 
banned and replaced by “price maintenance” as the change in the size distribution of 
firms enabled the dominant corporations to enforce beneficial pricing arrangements 
through a process of “learning” or disciplining (Lamoreaux 1988, 134-8; also see Veblen 
1923, 96).78 The giant corporation has unparalleled control over its environment so it 
does not haphazardly overproduce as if it were operating in a blindly competitive way. 
Veblen knew very well what this change in the nature of competition meant for 
workers: “Instead of competing against one another, to their own mutual defeat, the 
absentee owners now turn their undivided competitive efforts against the consumers” 
(1923, 128). “The industrial plant,” Veblen pointed out, 
is increasingly running idle or half idle, running increasingly short of its 
productive capacity.… because it is considered doubtful whether so large a supply 
                                                
 
78 This was just one of many significant changes in the behavior—hence use of the term 
“monopoly capitalism” instead of “competitive capitalism” to delineate a new stage of 
capitalist development. In this connection it is important to note that stability was sought 
in size not simply (or even primarily) for its economic advantages, but: 1) for its political 
advantages vis-à-vis the state; and 2) increased power over the labor process. See, 
respectively, Kolko (1963, 3) on the development of “political capitalism” and 
Braverman (1998) on the connection between the labor process and monopoly. 
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could be sold at prices that would yield a reasonable profit on the investment….; 
that is to say, it is considered doubtful whether an increased production, such as to 
employ more workmen and supply the goods needed by the community, would 
result in an increased net aggregate income for the vested interests which control 
these industries. A reasonable profit always means, in effect, the largest 
obtainable profit. (Veblen 1954, 12-13) 
For Veblen, this “deliberate and habitual” expedient of big business amounted to the 
institutionalization of “persistent unemployment.” (Veblen 1954, 114). Indeed, after the 
postwar boom capacity utilization has on the whole declined, averaging 78.6 percent 
since 1972,79 so, from this standpoint, it should not be surprising that unemployment has 
tended also to rise. 
3. Stagnation and the Normalization of Joblessness 
The fact that a massive increase in productive potential tends to create more 
unemployment instead of increasing leisure and material well-being is a reflection of the 
antagonistic character of capitalist production. The historical pattern outlined above by 
Veblen points to a deepening of this antagonism. Indeed, the appearance of jobless 
recoveries is connected with the growing power of capital at the point of production, and 
this is reflected in the ability of firms to externalize the costs of reduced output—i.e., 
reduced productive capacity—onto workers.80 It was Braverman (1998), of course, who 
                                                
 
79 “Capacity Utilization: Total Industry (TCU),” Federal Reserve Economic Data 
(FRED), Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (retrieved April 9, 2013). 
80 The technical explanation for why a reduction of capacity was most profitable at the 
level of the firm was worked out by Baran and Sweezy (1966, 82-8). Briefly stated, the 
issue revolves around the relationship between profit rates and output (the profitability 
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provided an analysis of the nature of this power by analyzing the transformation of the 
labor process under monopoly capitalism. Braverman was not only concerned with the 
implications of scientific management in workplaces, but for the system of monopoly 
capitalism as a whole. The implications were many, but the main point for our purposes 
is that the polarization of skill (Braverman 1998, 294) manifests in the long term as an 
erosion in the power of workers over their jobs. 
To understand the dynamics associated specifically with recessions and recoveries 
requires that we return to the argument presented above with respect to monopoly and 
stagnation (Chapter III.C.2). There we pointed out that the economy must grow to create 
jobs. Much like the case of reduced production capacity, neither the blame nor the 
penalty for weak growth is borne by capitalists. The state takes the blame and it is always 
the unemployed who suffer the effects. Moreover, firms across the economy capitalize on 
their power during downturns by restructuring their production process and in the context 
of slow growth this leads to a permanent loss of jobs—this includes practices as diverse 
as intensifying the labor process (speed-ups), replacing full time workers with temps, 
introducing machinery, lowering wages, and offshore outsourcing. (We return to some of 
these dynamics below in our resolution of worker precariousness). Thus, as a rule, profit 
margins soar as a recovery commences, and workers are only reemployed en masse when 
capitalists act on expectations of future profits, thereby expanding output. 
Although we have technically resolved the anomaly of the jobless recovery, leaving 
the matter here falls short of addressing the deeper forces involved in reproducing this 
                                                                                                                                            
 
schedule), on the one hand, and the level of investment on the other. It must be stressed 
that the monopolistic conditions of the economy make up the all important context within 
which movements in the profitability schedule take place. 
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very anomaly. Indeed, beneath the surface of the ‘jobless recovery’ is the problem of 
chronic joblessness, meaning in this context the accumulation of unemployed left behind 
after repeated jobless recoveries. Part of this story is told in Chart IV-2 (above), where it 
could be seen that the economy has failed increasingly to produce jobs over the last 
several recessions. Typically these individuals, the long-term unemployed, drop out of 
the labor force and so are not counted. Since 2000 the labor force participation rate has in 
fact continued to decline. To get a sense of the massive number of “missing jobs” in the 
economy, Chart VIII-1 shows how many jobs would have to be created for the economy 
to reach the labor force participation rate of 2000 for each year to present. So far, 2013 is 
the worst of the last 13 years, with close to 22 million “missing jobs.” 
The foregoing discussion leads inevitably to the perverse conclusion that capital in its 
monopoly stage is able to maintain profits and increase its share of income even as the 
utilization of productive resources declines. The level of output (hence growth) must 
increase substantially for the capitalist economy to produce enough jobs actually to 
reduce unemployment; but the conditions needed to realize such growth tend to erode as 
the economy matures. This means that the “investment-seeking surplus” will tend to 
expand at the same time that profitable investment opportunities are on the decline. 
“Since surplus that cannot be absorbed will not be produced, it follows that the normal 
state of the monopoly capitalist economy is stagnation” (Baran and Sweezy 1966, 108). If 
the center of gravity of the economic system is stagnation, meaning that growth is 
chronically slow and recoveries typically weak, this indicates that the recovery reaches its 
peak and begins to decline well before the economy has reabsorbed the jobs lost in the 
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previous slump, leading to enlargement of the reserve army well beyond the size 
associated with the competitive stage. 
Chart VIII-1. Missing Jobs (millions) 
 
Notes: The formula for calculating the number of missing jobs is: CNP * 2000 Peak - 
Employment Level. Where ‘2000 Peak’ is the labor force participation rate for the year 2000 
(67.1 percent). See Magdoff and Magdoff (2004) who are credited with the design of this chart. 
Sources: “(Unadj) Population Level” (LNU00000000), “(Unadj) Employment Level” 
(LNU02000000) and “(Unadj) Labor Force Participation Rate” (LNU01300000). Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, http://data.bls.gov. 
Needless to say, this situation strongly exposes the vacuousness of claims purporting 
to demonstrate that capitalist production naturally produces social harmony and 
“universal beneficence” (Hunt 2002, 396)—even when such claims are constructed upon 
the most gratuitously abstract foundations of marginalist economics (Clarke 1991). The 
behavior of the giant corporation is guided solely by the preservation of its own 
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monopoly interests, and every increase in monopoly power tends to support “a further 
rise in the expenditures in pursuit of monopoly power” (M. J. Gordon 1998, 324).81 This 
evidently has important ramifications for the structure of production itself, not least the 
social and political context within which battles over the labor processes underlying 
production play themselves out. The fact that workers have come to endure what can only 
be described as criminal levels of unemployment with shockingly little resistance 
(relative to the not so distant past) is surely evidence of the increased social power 
afforded by monopoly capital. Indeed, resolution of the final anomaly of unemployment 
demonstrates that the accumulation of economic power is inseparable from concentration 
of social and political power and, by extension, the extent and degree of the process of 
precariousness. 
C. Precariousness and the Disposable Reserve Army of Labor 
As noted above, most commentators link the rise of worker precariousness with the 
erosion of labor’s position (especially the decline of union membership) that coincided 
with the crash of the post-World War II boom (circa 1970). There can be little 
disagreement with this general proposition but the investigators rarely delve any deeper, 
making the crises of the 1970s their starting point, and taking a relatively stable 
employment environment as given. A monopoly capital-reserve army perspective 
presents a very different picture: The 1970s represented “a return to ‘normality’” and the 
preceding period stands out as a significant exception. Indeed the relative decrease in 
                                                
 
81 As Stiglitz (2012, 35) recently pointed out, “some of the most important innovations in 
business in the last three decades have centered not on making the economy more 
efficient but on how better to ensure monopoly power or how better to circumvent 
government regulations intended to align social returns and private rewards.”  
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precariousness in advanced capitalist nations—which, incidentally, was not as substantial 
as is typically presumed (Foster 1988)—is what actually represented an anomaly.82 
In the context of the discussion of stagnation above, our inversion of the narrative 
about precariousness should be clear. Of course, this view of precariousness is implicit in 
Marx’s sociological categorization of the reserve army as well. Marx used the term 
precariousness specifically to describe the position of workers in the stagnant layer of the 
industrial reserve army. Precariousness in this sense points to the link between the layers 
of the reserve army and the character of employment. While it is widely accepted 
nowadays that one need not be unemployed to experience precariousness—given the 
levels of underemployment, subemployment, temporary and contingent employment—
rarely is the connection between precariousness and the reserve army (in all its political-
economic contradictions) made explicit. 
Given the dynamic character of the reserve army, it should come as no surprise that a 
deep historical understanding of the capital accumulation process is necessary to grasp 
Marx’s view of precariousness fully. This makes it possible to account for important new 
phenomenon connected with the rise of worker precariousness—most prominently, the 
                                                
 
82 Labor organizing during the Great Depression resulted in an unparalleled growth of 
unions, and the size of the reserve army decreased substantially as a result of the wartime 
buildup. The relatively long period of growth following World War II was essential since 
it helped to hold down the size of the reserve army, thereby allowing workers to generate 
sustained pressure in opposition to precarious work arrangements. However, the force of 
stagnation had begun to eat away at the façade years before the breakdown in 
accumulation during the 1970s. Moreover, the counterattack by big business interests was 
swift and sustained, beginning as far back as the late 1930s. The first blow against labor 
came when the elimination of the most radical elements of the labor movement was 
accepted as a condition of the passage of unionization legislation (Milton 1982), and 
declined rapidly after productivity gains were decoupled from wage increases (Linder 
1994; Block 1990). 
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emergence of multinational corporations (or ‘multinationals’ for short), global labor 
markets and technical innovations—in a much more rigorous manner. Thus we begin by 
revisiting Marx’s investigation of “modern domestic industry” and the hegemonic 
relationship that developed between Ireland and England in order to lay the groundwork 
for assessing the dynamics and contradictions of high-tech globalized production 
structured by international oligopolies. 
1. Precariousness and the Stagnant Surplus Population 
In the case of nineteenth-century Britain’s modern domestic industry, the most 
vulnerable layers of the reserve army were recruited from the stagnant population. 
Appalling conditions for workers in modern domestic industry proliferated because 
factories structured their “outside departments” in such a way as to take full advantage of 
the stagnant surplus population—those workers defined, in Marx’s terms, by their 
precarious situation in between the (formally) employed and the pauperized population. 
Facilitated in part by low overhead costs, capitalists in modern domestic industry 
routinely closed operations to accommodate the irregular bursts of production dictated by 
the factories. Such brazen action clearly hinged on the power to exploit the 
precariousness of massive labor reserves. Owners maintained such power by fully 
controlling the supply of raw materials required by outworkers, which made the crippling 
effect of repeated expulsions complete and ensured the continued existence of a 
substantial reserve army. “During one part of the year,” Marx reported, the capitalist 
“decimates this force by the most inhuman toil, during the other part he lets it starve for 
lack of work” (1977, 1:608). 
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The tendency toward precariousness was further deepened in Marx’s analysis of the 
subordination of Ireland to England, which, foreshadowing later work on unequal 
development (see Emmanuel 1972; Amin 1976), emphasized country-specific nuances in 
the composition of the latent, stagnant and pauperized surplus populations. “Ireland,” 
Marx explained, “is at present merely an agricultural district of England which happens 
to be separated by a wide stretch of water from the country for which it provides corn, 
wool, cattle and industrial and military recruits” (1977, 1:860). The revolution in 
agricultural methods proceeded with greater intensity in Ireland, not simply to offset 
rapid declines in the agricultural population (due to famines and emigration), but also to 
solidify Ireland’s subordinate position to England as a consistent source of raw material 
and disposable labor power (1977, 1:866-8). Marx clearly drew the conclusion that 
accumulation did not inexorably proceed in a progressive sequence because stronger 
countries had an interest in holding back the industrial development of weaker countries 
(see Stavrianos 1981 for an intricate study of this process). As a result, “a new and 
international division of labour springs up, one suited to the requirements of the main 
industrial countries, and it converts one part of the globe into a chiefly agricultural field 
of production for supplying the other part, which remains a pre-eminently industrial 
field” (1977, 1:579-80). Thus, underdeveloped countries are condemned by large labor 
surpluses that tend to stunt social and economic development by keeping wages 
crushingly low (Lewis 1954; Baran 1957; Patnaik 2007). 
Marx (2008) gained many of the above insights because, as a resident of the British 
Empire, he was a keen observer of the system of colonial relations that developed during 
the era of industrial capitalism (Anderson 2010). Moreover, he integrated much of this 
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analysis into his sociological categorization of the reserve army. This is why the nature 
and development of highly unequal ties between mature and underdeveloped economies 
figure prominently in the classical reserve army perspective. Indeed, it is near impossible 
to imagine an assessment of precariousness that ignores the calcification of colonial 
relations given its devastating long-term effects—in mature and underdeveloped 
countries alike.84 
Of course, as in the case of the jobless recovery, the monopoly stage of capitalism has 
brought with it important new tendencies that require explanation. Consequently, we 
draw on work inspired by the classical reserve army tradition to frame our subsequent 
examination of the appearance of the global reserve army of labor and its relation to 
precariousness. 
2. Internationalization and the Divide and Rule of Labor 
In light of the productive power that accumulated during the war years in the U.S.—
far above what was required to sustain workers on an inherently antagonistic basis—the 
rapid growth and institutionalization of the world market was a logical outcome 
(McIntyre 2011). An insightful early critic of the multinational corporation, Stephen 
Hymer, had discerned “the outlines of a new international system,” as well as “its cracks” 
by 1972. In line with Marx, Hymer understood that “the emergence of a unified world 
commodity market” meant “the emergence of a unified world labor market.” The 
                                                
 
84 “In almost all colonial and semicolonial countries,” Bagchi (2009, 87) reports, “the 
vast share of capital resources was pre-empted by the ruling imperial power through 
various forms of tributary mechanisms and remitted to the metropolitan centre. In the 
colonies themselves, the imperial rulers had privileged access to land and credit, often 
directly subsidized by the state, as well as, in many instances, labour.” 
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tendency toward concentration and centralization of capital effectively moved “from the 
national to the international plane,” forcing national-based firms to respond to 
competitive threats by expanding further, thereby accelerating the transformation into 
multinational corporations and eventually reestablishing oligopolies at the international 
level (Hymer 1979, 263-4 and Chapter 8).  
One of Hymer’s most impressive achievements was critically developing the 
“twofold character” of the hierarchical organization of multinational corporations, which 
resembled a pyramid. “At the bottom of this vertical hierarchy, labor is divided into many 
nationalities. As one proceeds up the pyramid, nationality becomes more homogeneous 
and increasingly north European.” In mainstream economic theory only the technical side 
of the corporate hierarchy is visible—hence the continual fascination with new machines, 
“management revolutions,” and cheaper and ever more abundant, yet largely disposable, 
commodities. The side hidden from view is conditioned by the struggle with labor: here 
the “principle of divide and rule” is operative (Hymer 1979, 86-7). A strategy of divide 
and rule is evident across several dimensions of firm organization. Most important in the 
present discussion is the tendency of multinationals to divide their labor force across 
countries to exploit low wages and increase their bargaining power over organized 
workers. Referred to in the business press as “global labor arbitrage” (Hansen 2005), 
empirical work has shown that divide and rule has actually been in important factor 
stimulating the internationalization of production (Peoples and Sugden 2000; Cowling 
and Sugden 1987, 62-76; Fröbel, Heinrichs, and Kreye 1980). “As capital leaves one 
group of workers for another,” Hymer (1979, 88) explained, “in a process resembling 
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slash and burn agriculture, the advanced group is forced to lie fallow in unemployment 
for use later when their resistance has been weakened.” 
The significance of the divide and rule of labor undermines completely the 
assumption that the core capitalist nations form an analytically distinct domain for 
assessment of precariousness. By restricting attention to the most powerful countries 
investigators are blind to the fact that the entire monopoly capitalist period has been 
marked by an acceleration of the long-term trend toward internationalization of 
hegemonic production relations vis-à-vis underdeveloped or “Third World” nations 
(Stavrianos 1981, 41-3).85 More importantly still, this leads to confusion about its root 
causes, especially among workers. 
3. Contemporary Dynamics of Worker Precariousness 
In light of the preceding analysis, it is not surprising that workers in underdeveloped 
countries are especially vulnerable, and continue to remain so (see Bagchi 2005). The 
relationship between the “metropolitan center” and the underdeveloped periphery has 
hinged decisively on the forcible creation or absorption of labor reserves. Early in 
Europe’s industrial development, for example, its colonial possessions were used as “a 
                                                
 
85 “Third World status,” Stavrianos explains, “involves more than simple poverty…. [Its] 
second distinguishing feature…[is] economic growth without economic development—
growth determined by foreign capital and foreign markets rather than by local needs.” 
This “resulted in monoculture economies…that were inherently incapable of overall 
integrated economic development,” and thus “doomed Third World countries to the 
dependency and appallingly high unemployment that characterizes them to the present 
day” (Stavrianos 1981, 39-40). The term “underdevelopment” thus refers to a conscious 
process carried out by dominant capitalist countries deploying a variety of control 
strategies centered on labor and anchored by oligopolistic dominance in key sectors. 
Hence Bagchi’s description of the process as “export-led exploitation” (Bagchi 1982, 
Chapter 5). 
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dynamic safety valve” to absorb an enormous redundant population thrown off by rapid 
mechanization and the ruin of industries subjected to intense international competition 
(M. Davis 2007, 183). Between 1820 and 1950 over 16 million British citizens 
emigrated, amounting to a 50 percent reduction of the annual population gain every year. 
In total, 50 million Europeans emigrated to the colonies, mostly of the ‘new world,’ over 
this period (Foster and McChesney 2012, 148). 
To accommodate the evolving requirements of new and increasingly insidious 
accumulation patterns, the initial phase of subordinate economies has been followed by 
the gradual implementation of a system of informal control. Only very strong states—
who have enough power to intervene into their own economies or enough wealth to sever 
dependence on international lending institutions (e.g., China)—are able to resist this 
onslaught. For example, agribusiness giants, backed by global trade institutions (e.g., the 
World Bank) and their own national governments, have been able to accelerate the 
movement of humans from the latent to stagnant layer of the reserve army. This routinely 
involves attacks on social welfare systems, elimination of local subsidies, targeted market 
deregulation, dumping of food aid and, in some cases, outright control of the entire food 
system of a nation. As agricultural lands are taken over, large segments of the population 
are forced onto marginal lands or the slums of megacities. Slum dwellers meanwhile 
form a vast stagnant surplus population that competes ruthlessly in an informal sector 
marked by rising labor intensification and declining incomes due to a steady inflow of 
  122                      
dispossessed peasants (M. Davis 2007, 181-2).86 Mocking the crude metaphors of 
neoclassical economics, Araghi replaces the “invisible hand” with a “visible foot” (2009, 
111-12) to expose the political project behind the actions of multinationals, which has 
“led to the creation of a massive reserve army of migratory labour” (2009, 134). The 
payoff is the existence of a surplus population that is essentially inexhaustible, with 
fringe benefits that accrue not only to international capital but also to networks of 
indigenous subcontractors, which, increasingly, form an important buffering layer 
between multinationals and the manufacturing process itself (Appay 1998; 
Bronfenbrenner and Luce 2004; Ross 2004; Lichtenstein 2007).  
At the same time, workers in mature capitalist countries are certainly impacted by the 
internationalization of production but hardly in ways that support jingoistic claims of, for 
example, “stolen jobs.” A poignant example is the contemporary trade relationship 
between Mexico and the U.S. The human tragedy in this network of subordination is 
most clearly exemplified by the large pool of undocumented migrants precariously 
drifting across the country in response to muted labor market signals.87 The very 
existence of this pool of workers presupposes a coordinated set of policies and economic 
relationships favorable to the dominant country. In this case, a combination of strategic 
                                                
 
86 Recent work indicates that slum dwellers average almost 54 percent of the urban 
population of underdeveloped nations and the global slum population is expected to 
double by 2030, reaching 2 billion (K. Ahmad 2009, 26, 200). 
87 The horrific conditions of migrant laborers in certain other countries are simply beyond 
belief. In Qatar, where migrant workers compose 94 percent of the workforce, the 
“practice of passport confiscation, primarily designed to further discourage workers from 
quitting jobs without permission,” is “near universal.” State protection is virtually non-
existent: “Employers hold the power to cancel workers’ visas, register them as 
‘absconders’ subject to detention and deportation, or deny them the exit visas required to 
leave the country” (Human Rights Watch 2012, 4). 
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economic control passively enforced through trade agreements88 and Kafkaesque 
immigration policy ensure the creation and reproduction of a mobile stagnant surplus 
population primed to accept a much higher rate of exploitation than the existing 
population. 
It is no surprise that workers in this layer receive very low relative wages. Much more 
important in this context is the power of producers to impose an extremely intensive labor 
process on workers, which is grimly reinforced by the threat of deportation (Guskin and 
Wilson 2007, 113-14; Harris 2013). Undocumented workers are especially vulnerable 
during economic downturns because of increased state enforcement and, as a favorite 
scapegoat of right-wing pundits, recrimination from the domestic unemployed. Since the 
Great Financial Crisis of 2007–08, “net migration flow from Mexico to the United States 
has stopped and may have reversed” (Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera 2012); and 
between October 2007 and February 2012, nearly two million individuals were deported 
from the United States (ICE 2012; also see Bacon 2008). 
The reality, of course, is that this “reserve army of migratory labour” (Araghi 2009, 
134), no less than internal reserve armies sprinkled unevenly across the U.S. and non-
migratory reserve armies elsewhere, have gradually and imperceptibly restructured 
employment relations at a fundamental level. Cheaper commodities and services have 
actually served to soften reductions in the living standards of U.S. workers as their own 
real wages have been falling for decades. The dictates of monopoly capital, which 
impelled these movements in the first place, also ensure that there can be no 
                                                
 
88 Note that the highly mechanized (and highly subsidized) agricultural base of the U.S. 
can be used as a wedge to free layers of the latent surplus population of neighboring 
countries, by flooding them with cheap agricultural commodities (Blatt 2008, 13). 
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unproblematic return to the times of old. Consider, for example, that a recent bump in 
U.S. manufacturing employment, christened by celebrants as a wave of “reshoring” 
(Leunig 2011), has been hampered by employment shortfalls. This seems odd given that 
the work also demands relatively high skill requirements. Incidentally, the starting hourly 
wages typically hover at a meager ten dollars an hour, meaning that a starting job at 
McDonalds currently pays over fifty percent more per hour than the running of a CNC 
(computer numerical control) machine in a newly reshored factory (Sirkin, Zinser, and 
Hohner 2011; Sirkin, Zinser, and Rose 2012; Davidson 2012).89 
From this standpoint it is utter folly to accept explanations that lay blame at the feet 
of migratory or foreign workers—workers who obviously have absolutely no control 
over the choices of multinational corporations. The purpose of confusing the pattern 
causation is to deflect attention from the actual source of declining wages and worker 
precariousness, for this strikes to the very heart of the contemporary process of 
accumulation, which is typified by the internationalization of production and the 
systematic integration of massive global labor reserves (Ahearn 2012; Gereffi 2005; 
Harrison and McMillan 2011; J. Smith 2010).90  
The result of the growth and development of multinational corporations is that 
workers now necessarily compete not only with machinery and with the domestic 
                                                
 
89 This is yet another piece of evidence indicating that employment shortfalls have 
nothing whatsoever to do with a supposed “skills shortage.”  
90 “The world of work…has lived through a double-edged process: on the one hand…in 
the advanced-capitalist countries…. there has been a reduction in traditional industrial 
labour. On the other, there has been a significant sub-proletarianisation of labour, as a 
result of the numerous forms of part-time, precarious, tertiarised, subcontracted, informal 
labour and so on. Labour has therefore become more heterogeneous, complex and 
fragmented” (Antunes 2012, 202). 
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unemployed: divide and rule tactics mean they also find themselves in competition with 
those amongst their numbers who belong to the most precarious layer of workers, 
wherever they may exist in the world economy. Bourdieu gave voice to the stark reality of 
today’s disposable reserve army with a characteristic mélange of passion and rigor: 
The practical instituting of a Darwinian world in which the springs of 
commitment to the job and the company are found in insecurity, suffering and 
stress would undoubtedly not succeed so completely if it did not benefit from the 
complicity of the destabilized habitus produced by insecurity and the existence—
at all levels of the hierarchy, even the highest, especially among executives—of a 
reserve army of labor made docile by insecure employment and the permanent 
threat of unemployment. The ultimate basis of this economic order placed under 
the banner of individual freedom is indeed the structural violence of 
unemployment, of insecure employment and of the fear provoked by the threat of 
losing employment. The condition of the ‘harmonious’ functioning of the 
individualist micro-economic model and the principle of individual ‘motivation’ 
at work lie, in the final analysis, in a mass phenomenon, the existence of the 
reserve army of the unemployed. (Bourdieu and Nice 1999, 98, emphasis in 
original) 
The extent of political, and often military, power wielded by multinational 
corporations is undoubtedly real. The wake of nightmarish social and ecological 
devastation trailing multinationals from the Niger Delta to Alaska proves this amply 
(Rosenau et al. 2009). However, it would be an error to assume multinationals are 
somehow able to circumvent the contradictions of monopoly capitalism. The 
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development of the global reserve army of labor, which is necessarily accompanied by 
mass unemployment, falling wages, increasing work intensification, and the 
generalization of worker precariousness (Fröbel, Heinrichs, and Kreye 1978, 846-47), 
means that the narrow consumption basis of accumulation only narrows further. Even 
though the consuming power of the working class is never sufficient on its own to sustain 
continued accumulation, the narrow range of political options available under the regime 
of monopoly capital portends deeper economic crises and greater instability (Cowling 
2005; Foster and McChesney 2012). 
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION: 
RENEWING POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 
From the moment we asked why unemployment existed at all contradictions in the 
typical narratives surrounding unemployment became evident and began to multiply. The 
persistent anomalies that have emerged suggest that mainstream economics is mired in a 
degenerative stage of development that threatens to overwhelm the existing neoclassical 
paradigm. The present treatment of unemployment has attempted to develop a positive 
refutation of the limitations of mainstream economic theory, and thus provide a basis for 
economic sociologists to make a complete break from the paradigm of neoclassical 
economics. We argued that such independence was not only possible, but necessary in 
light of the fact that the sociology itself was constructed as a subordinate component of 
marginalist or neoclassical economic thought. Early marginalist thinkers accomplished 
this feat by artificially separating economic and social theory, constructing analysis of the 
economy as the purely objective realm of ‘economics’ proper. Consequently, sociologists 
face serious obstacles in the analysis of unemployment beyond its most superficial 
dimensions. 
In response to these difficulties we drew on the most significant competing paradigm, 
political-economic sociology, which traces its roots to classical sociological theory. 
Indeed, political-economic sociology initially evolved at an impressively rapid pace—an 
indication of its inherently progressive character. However, as its connection to radical 
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political economy weakened—exemplified by the disappearance of the holistic viewpoint 
once associated with social structure of accumulation (SSA) theory—political-economic 
sociology began to lose some of its strength. Although Marx’s theory of the reserve army 
formed the foundation of the SSA model, there were also significant limitations to new 
interpretations constructed by radical political economists. These limitations became 
more evident as the tie between political-economic sociology and radical political 
economy continued to weaken.  
Some of these weaknesses became clearer after reviewing the important work Post-
World War II social scientists, whose substantial criticisms of existing unemployment 
measures had largely been forgotten. Their attempts to resolve the anomalies of 
mainstream economic analyses ultimately produced labor force concepts that were more 
critical than many of those used today. This made the true scale of the potential labor 
force, a part of the reserve army of labor, more apparent; it also exposed how disastrously 
inadequate the postwar economy was at absorbing even the mass of visibly unemployed. 
Some analysts took the next logical step of developing a theoretical framework within 
which to interpret the increasing extent of underemployment, unemployment and poverty. 
This work drew specifically upon the sociological components of Marx’s approach, thus 
highlighting the fact that important dimensions of the concept of the reserve army had 
been neglected. 
In an attempt to strengthen earlier efforts, a core component of the present analysis 
involved careful reconstruction of the classical reserve army approach developed by 
Marx. A particularly important part of this effort was elaboration of Marx’s sociological 
categorization of the layers of the surplus population, which clarified the structural link 
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between the pattern of accumulation and the character of wage work (and non-work). 
This provided a strong theoretical basis for addressing the three anomalies of 
unemployment—persistent unemployment, jobless recoveries and worker precariousness. 
To fully resolve the anomalies, however, it was necessary to expand upon Marx’s 
discussion of concentration and centralization by reviewing important historical 
developments. In the process, numerous links emerged between the classical reserve 
army approach and the theory of monopoly capital—a current within radical political 
economy that is less fashionable in the academy in the United States today than in the 
past (largely because of its role as public sociology), but that has continued to turn out a 
rich body of political-economic analysis with enormous global influence. This led to a 
focus on economic stagnation—a contradiction associated specifically with the new 
phase of accumulation marked by the ascendance of the giant corporation. In this 
situation, the power of capital over labor increases tremendously, yet, at the same time, 
the tendency toward stagnation greatly reduces the capacity of capital to rejuvenate itself 
through crisis via the destruction or devaluation of capital (Clarke 1994, 189). Workers 
bear the brunt of these economic contradictions but their suffering does not ultimately 
resolve the tendency toward stagnation, which is why slow growth and high 
unemployment continue to plague the economies of mature capitalist countries even as 
labor costs plummet (Lange 2013). 
A. Can the Reserve Army of Labor be Abolished? 
Toward the end of his life Harry Braverman (1998, 323) asked a poignant rhetorical 
question: “If the captains of industry win their war, as Marx put it, by discharging armies, 
how do we know that the rapidity of the accumulation of capital will keep up…[and] 
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develop rapidly enough to absorb all of the labor freed by the capitalist drive for higher 
productivity?” Braverman went on to explain that capitalism habitually reproduced an 
industrial reserve army of labor and all indications suggested that it would continue to 
grow at an increasing pace. Today’s enormous disposable reserve army of labor, 
symbolized on the one hand by mass unemployment and on the other by massive 
inequality, is, as Braverman suggested, the bitter fruit of capital’s victories and provides 
ample evidence in support of the continuing relevance of his question quoted above. 
This necessarily raises the issue of the abolition of the reserve army. What would it 
mean for capitalism? Is it even possible? Marx obviously believed that the reserve army 
was indispensible under capitalist social relations. Indeed, he thought the reserve army 
was the secret to defeating capital once and for all because it provided the strongest basis 
for general political action: 
The political significance of the general law does not lie…in any belief on Marx’s 
part that pauperism breeds revolution, for Marx was quite clear that pauperism 
bred degradation and demoralisation. The political significance of the law lies in 
its generality, the fact that every worker is subject to the same law, since every 
worker is, from the point of view of capital, merely a part of the common mass of 
disposable labour power, facing competition from other workers, and the constant 
threat of expulsion into the reserve army. (Clarke 1994, 251) 
The preceding analysis provided extensive support for the view that elimination of the 
reserve army is highly unlikely under capitalist social relations, but makes no attempt to 
account specifically for organized efforts (or lack thereof) to resist or reform the system. 
Clearly, a comprehensive assessment of viable political alternatives to stagnation and 
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mass unemployment is obviously beyond the scope of the present study. However, if 
even a brief consideration of alternatives is possible, by way of conclusion, it will be well 
worth our while considering that the intensity of the contradictions associated with the 
reserve army have increased sharply since the Great Financial Crisis of 2007-08. The 
preferred response to global economic crisis and mass unemployment has become mass 
austerity—an astonishingly cruel and unjust practice that has thoroughly confused many 
liberal observers. Far from softening in the face of bitter mass mobilizations, the drive to 
impose austerity has actually intensified. To provide some context for these 
developments we use the monopoly capital-reserve army framework developed above to 
evaluate critically two dominant narratives surrounding unemployment. The first 
constructs automation as the job killer par excellence, while the second postulates 
Keynesian full employment as a viable alternative to stagnation. The importance of these 
narratives (and others like them) arises from their capacity to paint a seductively 
uncomplicated picture of contemporary unemployment, which means they strongly frame 
the majority of discussions and prevent more thoroughgoing responses. 
1. The ‘Player Piano’ Thesis 
There are numerous variations of the technological unemployment argument. The 
version we are concerned with here can be described as the “player piano” thesis, so 
named after Vonnegut’s (2006) novel of the same title. The argument is straightforward: 
especially with the widespread use of computers, automation eliminates jobs regardless 
of changes in labor force characteristics (emphasized in the New Classical variant 
discussed in 0)—a clear case of technological unemployment. In Vonnegut’s dystopian 
city the production facilities buzz on endlessly without human interference (save two or 
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three overseers); an impenetrable river segments the human population, forced to live on 
handouts, from its means of production; permanently displaced, and in a confused search 
for meaning, the inhabitants yearn for the past—sardonically, they dream of the very time 
when they labored themselves out of useful existence. Rifkin evokes many of the central 
themes of the player piano thesis (2004, 194-5 for example). In The End of Work he 
predicted that “in the United States alone…more than 90 million jobs in a labor force of 
124 million are potentially vulnerable to replacement by machines.” Rifkin reached this 
conclusion by noting that at least three quarters “of the labor force in most industrial 
nations engage in work that is little more than simple repetitive tasks”—tasks that 
“automated machinery, robots, and increasingly sophisticated computers” are highly 
likely to render obsolete in the near future (2004, 5). 
The argument is, of course, not new (Bix 2002) but, despite gratuitous use of 
sensationalism to mass market his ideas (V. Smith 2006) and a relatively superficial 
understanding of international patterns of production (Appay 1998, 164), Rifkin does 
expose important contradictions of capitalist production.91 The viewpoint recently gained 
considerable credibility after the publication by two MIT business professors of Race 
Against the Machine (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2011). Soon after Krugman discovered 
the “capital bias” of technology (2012c) and its “potential” connection with monopoly 
(2012e; 2012d), causing him to raise the specter of the “old-fashioned…Marxist sort of 
discussion” that pits capital against labor (2012f). 
                                                
 
91 However, see Sweezy (1957, 27-36) for a much more sophisticated early analysis of 
the trend toward automation. 
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From a monopoly capital-reserve army perspective there are numerous problems with 
narrowly reducing the problem of unemployment to inexorable technological change. It 
cannot be denied that automation is a continuous process under capitalist social relations 
but this has been true from the start. Consequently, Marx predicted that newer branches 
of production, “particularly in the field of luxury consumption,” would tend to take the 
“relative surplus population as…[their] basis” because of the “cheapness and quantity of 
available or dismissed wage-labourers and of the greater resistance that many branches of 
production, by their nature, oppose to the transformation of manual work into machine 
production” (1991, 3:343-4, emphasis added). In other words, there is always a tendency 
toward reducing labor content, particularly in the manufacturing sector, but this 
stimulates the incorporation of labor into new sectors, which are often more wasteful or 
socially unproductive. As Huberman and Sweezy argued in response to similar claims 
about automation long ago, as this relative surplus population grows, “the frantic search 
for profits drives the great corporations which dominate the American economy to create, 
directly and indirectly, other areas of employment—in salesmanship, entertainment, 
speculation (legal and illegal), personal service, and so on.” While this process is not 
“rapid or vigorous enough to prevent the steady rise of unemployment,” they continued, 
“…it does brake the rise of unemployment” ("Editors' Foreword" in Boggs 1963, 11). 
The connection here to the growth of “service sector” in countries such as the U.S., 
and particularly the inherently precarious nature of this new sector, should be obvious. 
As two astute early observers pointed out: “The growth in large-scale commercial 
services…represents a shift from self-employed small shopkeepers to wage and salary 
employment and therefore to a status which, by and large, is more precarious so far as 
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attachment to a source of income is concerned” (Weintraub and Magdoff 1940, 305). 
This was due in part to the fact that “the employment prospects of well over half of the 
people… [in] the service industries…are directly linked to the economic fortunes of the 
commodity-producing industries” (pp. 311-12). 
Marx also highlighted the contradictory nature of technological advance (see 1977, 
1:515-6) noting, as Martin Nicolaus explained, “that there are counter-tendencies which 
prevent mechanization and automation from advancing beyond a certain limited point, 
under capitalism” ('Foreword' to Marx 1993, 51-2; Harvey 2006). One need only think 
from the perspective of a capitalist, say, in Bangladesh running a clothing factory. In this 
hypothetical factory the wage rate is so low that labor power actually competes with 
machinery. The owner never dreams of purchasing more advanced machinery to displace 
workers (as distinct from simply replacing worn out capital) because it would be more 
expensive than simply hiring additional workers. As Marx (1977, 1:515) aptly 
summarized the point: “less labour must be expended in producing the machinery than is 
displaced by the employment of that machinery.” Moreover, if labor saving machinery 
was purchased, displacing a given amount of workers and reducing the wage bill, the 
owner would be compelled to use that machinery to its fullest extent—for when it is idle, 
money is lost. Unfortunately, clothing production is highly seasonal and while workers 
can be laid off during down times, machinery cannot yet it is still a cost of production. It 
should be obvious that as production systems grow in size and complexity the cost of idle 
capacity grows appreciably (also see Chapter VIII.C.1 above).  Indeed, the illogical and 
insidious nature of technological change under capitalist social relations only heightens 
under conditions of monopoly. Thus, theorists of monopoly and oligopoly over fifty years 
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ago predicted a carefully controlled process of technological innovation—far slower than 
what was possible—and highlighted its often negative effect on accumulation, hence 
growth, in the face of already massive idle capacity (Sylos-Labini 1969, 167; Baran and 
Sweezy 1966, 91-104).92 “It is not productivity that creates the problem,” Sweezy and 
Magdoff explained, “it is the fact that production does not keep pace with and overtake 
the rise in productivity. The failure of the private economy as a job-producer is a 
failure—despite valiant prime-pumping efforts—to invest enough capital and grow 
sufficiently to keep pace with growing productivity and a growing labor force” (Sweezy 
and Magdoff 1972, 20-1). 
While the discussion above only scratches the surface it should be obvious that key 
dimensions of technological unemployment are simply left out or inadequately 
understood. Automation is exceedingly more complex than most investigators assume 
because they ignore the fact that it must conform to the exigencies of capitalist 
production (see Fracchia 2008). Instead, technology is treated as a blind force 
independent of social and political processes. This gives a hopelessly misleading picture 
of the problem of technological unemployment—and no less potential solutions, as we 
shall see in the context of discussions of full employment. 
                                                
 
92 Recent observers who have rediscovered this tendency of monopoly have pointed out 
that it contradicts the player piano thesis. Struggling to explain the behavior, they have 
introduced yet another anomalous term into the lexicon of economics: “technology 
stagnation.” This describes a situation in which “technology begins to threaten return on 
capital, mostly by causing the sort of abundance that depresses prices to the point where 
many goods have no choice but to become free.” As a result, “incumbent interests [i.e., 
monopolists] now have the biggest incentive ever to impose artificial scarcity, which is 
stopping the speed of innovation” (Kaminska 2012). 
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2. The Mirage of ‘Full Employment’ 
While the apologists for capital abandoned any pretention to full employment long 
ago, a number of liberal analysts have attempted to theorize the possibility of full 
employment under existing institutional arrangements—some more critically (Pollin 
2012) than others (Moore 1996; Mishel, Schmitt, and Shierholz 2013; Mishel et al. 
2012). In the context of massive underutilization of labor and declining investment it is 
quite natural to speculate on the possibility of full employment. Yet few analysts 
seriously consider the broad implications of a full employment policy in the context of 
the existing structure of power. As a result, many of the same contradictions that arose in 
the analysis of automation and technological unemployment reappear in this narrative. 
Even though a full employment policy would (theoretically) improve the tendency 
toward stagnation, elimination of the reserve army exposes class contradictions that strike 
the very heart of the system. “The maintenance of full unemployment,” Kalecki famously 
argued, “would give a new impetus to the opposition of business leaders”: 
‘The sack’ would cease to play its role as a disciplinary measure. The social 
position of the boss would be undermined and the self-assurance and class 
consciousness of the working class would grow. Strikes for wage increases and 
improvements in conditions of work would create political tensions.… The rise in 
wage rates resulting from the stronger bargaining power of the workers is less 
likely to reduce profits than to increase prices…. But ‘discipline in the factories’ 
and ‘political stability’ are more appreciated by the business leaders than are 
profits. Their class instinct tells them that lasting full employment is unsound 
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from their point of view and that unemployment is an integral part of the normal 
capitalist system. (1972, 78, emphasis added) 
Noble (2011) provided a convincing demonstration of this principle in a thorough 
study of the conflict between technology and worker autonomy at General Motors (also 
see Zuboff 1988). “It is a common confusion,” Noble explained, “that capitalism is a 
system of profit-motivated, efficient production. This is not true, nor has it ever been.… 
The goal has always been domination (and the power and privileges that go with it) and 
the preservation of domination.… Always, behind all the careful accounting, lies the 
threat of force” (2011, 321). As a result, the production processes favored by 
management invariably tend toward the elimination of, and/or intense supervision over, 
labor. Moreover, it makes no difference when more equitable arrangements—which may 
in some cases include the employment of more workers or a shortening of the workday—
are shown to be more efficient and profitable. “The managerial contradictions inherent in 
the use of capital intensive technology,” Noble explained, “are embedded within the 
larger contradictions of capitalist production.” Capitalists obviously hold on tightly to 
their capacity to maintain control over labor power in production: But why?  
 
The answer is that it is upon this basis that their social and political power rests 
(Harvey 2010a, 58; Mészáros 1995, 733). As Noble discovered, the limits of the pilot 
programs in worker participation at General Motors were ultimately “determined by a 
consideration far more fundamental than that of profitable production, namely, the 
preservation of class power” (2011, 318-23).  This is precisely why full employment 
would be nothing short of a disaster, as it would add crucial force to worker demands. 
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Workers would, in effect, hold the “lever of accumulation” in their own hands. Since 
capitalists, and especially monopoly capitalists, will most assuredly use the full force of 
their own political power to attack reforms considerably more modest than full 
employment, it would take nothing less than outright rejection of the existing power 
structure to achieve. 
“In this situation,” Kalecki (1972, 82-3) concluded rather more realistically, “a 
powerful bloc is likely to be formed between big business and the rentier interests, and 
they would probably find more than one economist to declare that the situation was 
manifestly unsound.” Kalecki would hardly have been surprised to learn that academic 
economists loudly amplified the “voices of the rentier interests” in their calls for austerity 
and paltry financial reform in the wake of the Great Financial Crisis of 2007-08, while 
largely failing to report their private financial affiliations (Carrick-Hagenbarth and 
Epstein 2012, 59). 
B. Ideology and Social Science 
Reflecting on the possible reason why the austerity agenda has maintained its force 
despite “the intellectual collapse of the austerian position,” Krugman recently asked, “To 
the extent that we have policy of the 1 percent, by the 1 percent, for the 1 percent, won’t 
we just see new justifications for the same old policies?” “I hope not,” he answered, “I’d 
like to believe that ideas and evidence matter, at least a bit. Otherwise, what am I doing 
with my life?” (Krugman 2013). Even though sociologists tend to be less sanguine than 
economists about the potential impact of their academic work upon the those in power, 
Krugman’s admission should be striking—if only because it is coming from a highly 
regarded mainstream economist. 
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However, in the context of our previous discussion of the origins of modern 
economics and sociology it should come as less of a surprise. “The deepest problem of 
economics,” Heilbroner (1988, 42) observed, is “its failure to recognize the inescapably 
ideological character of its thought.” This ideology, marginalism, or neoclassicism (as it 
is now called), was forged in struggle and because it faithfully represents the vantage 
point (and interest) of a specific social class it “must necessarily remain in ignorance of 
the objective economic limitations” of the system of production it has posited as natural 
and eternal (Lukács 1971, 64). In other words, the contradictions inherent to neoclassical 
economics are an expression of the antagonistic character of capitalist social relations, 
which it serves to justify. As systemic crisis intensifies, crashing up against the 
boundaries of this limited worldview, we should expect more and more economists to 
look on in bewilderment, as Krugman does. 
The need for critical social science independent of mainstream economics is clearly 
indispensible in such a context. Sociologists, at least, have the option to draw on more 
critical traditions, such as political-economic sociology, and we have attempted to 
provide some support for this effort. For the sake of the hundreds of millions of 
unemployed worldwide, we hope that work in this tradition, and others like it, strengthen 
and find political traction. 
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